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1 INTRODUCTION 
Due to the large number of failed reorganizations worldwide, there has been a 
growing demand to study firms and their reorganization processes. It has been 
claimed that reorganization processes are inefficient because they force viable 
firms into bankruptcy and nonviable firms into reorganization, which causes large 
economic and social losses for stakeholders. In response to inefficient processes, 
changes to reorganization legislation have been made worldwide, but the number 
of failed reorganizations remains high. Prior reorganization research has mainly 
focused on differences between failed and non-failed firms in order to predict 
failure whereas failure prevention is largely neglected. However, several 
bankruptcy studies have focused on failure prevention by concentrating on why 
and how firms fail. Thus, the efficiency of reorganization processes has been at the 
center of the discussion among academics, practitioners, and regulators. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide new evidence on the role of financial 
and nonfinancial information in the context of small firms reorganizing under the 
Finnish Company Reorganization Act (FCRA). The research aims to extend the 
existing literature by addressing how and which kind of financial and non-financial 
information should be included to examine firms in different stages of 
reorganization. This dissertation focuses only on small firms while prior research 
has mainly concentrated on large firms, even though small firms are important 
actors in the world economy (Keasey & Watson 1987, 1991; Lussier 1996; Pompe 
& Bilderbeek 2005). The FCRA is comparable to other reorganization systems 
worldwide (Couwenberg 2001; Philippe et al. 2002; Laakso 2012), and therefore 
the results of this dissertation may also be applied to other countries. 
The results of this dissertation will increase academic understanding of the 
efficiency of reorganization processes in the context of small firms. The process 
starts when a firm files for reorganization and ends when the program is completed 
or the process is interrupted. The four essays of this dissertation contain the whole 
life cycle of reorganization, focusing on firms in different stages of the process. The 
first essay concentrates on firms in the first stage of reorganization, namely 
reorganization proceedings, whereas the second and third essays focus on firms 
implementing their reorganization plans. The fourth essay concentrates on the 
whole life cycle of firms filing for reorganization. The results of essays 1, 3, and 4 
indicate that there is no single way in which a reorganizing firm fails or succeeds, 
but different financial paths can be identified among the firms in different stages 
of reorganization. The second essay focuses on the explanatory power of financial 
and non-financial information to predict failure during a reorganization program. 
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The study shows that the most efficient prediction model incorporates a 
combination of financial and non-financial information. In this combined model, 
operating cash flow is very important. Finally, the findings of the last essay suggest 
that different financial paths can be found within firms filing for reorganization. 
The findings further imply that firms’ financial and non-financial information is 
connected to survival time in reorganization. The assumption is that the longer the 
survival time, the larger the chance of success. As a whole, the results of this 
dissertation provide new evidence on the role of financial and nonfinancial 
information in the context of small firm reorganizations. This information can be 
used, for example, by courts when deciding which firms could successfully 
reorganize or by stakeholders (entrepreneurs, administrators, and consultants) of 
the distressed firm when preparing a reorganization plan. This is the first study 
that examines the financial paths of reorganizing firms and the first to focus on the 
importance of cash flow information among reorganizing firms.  
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. The next 
section describes the legal reorganization procedure in Finland (FCRA). The third 
section summarizes the earlier literature on reorganization failure prediction 
employed in various countries. Finally, the last section summarizes the four essays 
that compose this dissertation. 
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2 THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS IN FINLAND 
In Finland, the reorganization proceedings of a business are stipulated by the 
FCRA (47/1993; amendments up to 247/2007 included) that went into effect on 
February 8, 1993. The purpose of the FCRA is to provide a legal framework for 
firms that are economically viable but currently suffering financial difficulties 
(Philippe et al. 2002; Koskelo 2003). The FCRA renders it possible to rehabilitate 
a distressed debtor’s viable business, ensure its continued viability, and facilitate 
debt arrangements. Another option within the legal context in Finland is the legal 
bankruptcy process (comparable to liquidation via Chapter 7 in the United States). 
There are two types of bankruptcy processes in the United States: liquidation 
(Chapter 7) and reorganization (Chapter 11). By contrast, in Finland, firms apply 
separately for reorganization or bankruptcy. (Laitinen 2013.) 
The life cycle of reorganization can be divided into two larger stages: 
reorganization proceedings and reorganization plan implementation. 
Furthermore, reorganization proceedings can be divided into five stages: 1.) filing 
for reorganization, 2.) court’s decision to open the proceedings, 3.) preparation of 
the reorganization plan, 4.) consideration of the proposed plan, and 5.) 
confirmation of the plan. The purpose of the reorganization proceedings is to 
produce a reorganization plan, including both business and debt restructuring, in 
order to recover the firm. (Laitinen 2013.) 
A petition for reorganization proceedings can be filed by the debtor, a creditor, or 
several creditors (FCRA § 5). Proceedings are opened when no legal obstacles to 
reorganize a firm exist. However, proceedings may not be opened or an 
interruption may be requested for opened proceedings if a debtor is insolvent and 
reorganization cannot provide any long-term remedy to this insolvency. (FCRA § 
6-7.) Within four months after a reorganization application, an administrator
prepares a reorganization plan. A plan should include the firm’s current situation
and reorganization actions to rehabilitate the firm. These actions may include
changes in personnel, organization, capital structure, and operations as well as a
debt adjustment program. (FCRA § 40-44.) If a majority of creditors approves the
plan, the court will confirm it (FCRA § 51-52). Finally, a court may appoint a
supervisor to control plan implementation. For instance, an administrator may act
as a supervisor. (FCRA § 61.) If necessary, a supervisor may propose a
reorganization to lapse (FCRA § 65). The process may be interrupted during the
reorganization plan implementation if the debtor fails to comply with any of the
obligations laid down in the plan (FCRA 7§, 64 §).
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The empirical evidence from prior studies indicates that the reorganization 
procedure in Finland is inefficient. Approximately 60 percent of reorganization 
petitions are approved by the courts, and 75 percent of approvals obtain a 
confirmed reorganization plan. However, 40–50 percent of firms will fail during 
the reorganization program. (Laitinen 2011.) Most firms fail during the first years 
in reorganization. According to Laakso, Laitinen, and Vento (2010), approximately 
40 percent of firms fail during the first 20 months after reorganization plan 
confirmation, and almost all failures occur during the first 40 months after 
confirmation. The Finnish failure rate is comparable to that in the United States 
(Jensen-Conklin, 1992), but in Canada, the number of failed reorganizations is 
lower (Fisher & Martel, 1995). Although a large number of reorganizing firms fail 
during the reorganization program in Finland, the payoff rate to creditors has 
proven to be efficient. Creditors also receive a better payoff in reorganization under 
the FCRA than under bankruptcy proceedings in Finland. (Sundgren 1998; 
Bergström, Eisenberg & Sundgren 2004.) According to Ravid and Sundgren 
(1998), the median payback rate to creditors was 33.5 percent under the FCRA and 
56.4 percent in the United States.  
Comparisons presented by Couwenberg (2001), Philippe et al. (2002), and Laakso 
(2012) indicate that the FCRA is slightly different from other reorganization 
procedures. However, FCRA, like many reorganization systems, is plan-based (see 
Philippe et al., 2002), which allows for straightforward generalization of the 
results. Administrative events of the FCRA are particularly comparable to events 
in Australia for voluntary administration. By contrast, there are several differences 
between the Finnish and United States systems. In the United States, a debtor 
prepares the plan, whereas in Finland, an administrator is appointed to do so. 
(Laitinen 2013.) Moreover, plan consummation does not occur immediately after 
plan confirmation in the United States but changes to the reorganization plan can 
still be made until the effective date. In Finland, the plans are consummated 
immediately after confirmation. The priority of creditors is also different in the 
United States versus Finland, since there are more classes of creditors in the 
United States. (Laakso 2012.) 
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3 EFFICIENCY OF THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS 
The relevant literature related to this dissertation can be classified into failure 
prediction and failure prevention studies. The pioneering work by Beaver (1966) 
has been a model for several failure prediction studies and the literature on this 
area is extensive (see, e.g., literature reviews by Dimitras, Zanakis & Zopoudinis 
1996; Altman & Narayanan 1997; Balcaen & Ooghe 2006; Altman, Iwanicz-
Drozdowska, Laitinen & Suvas 2017). The studies have examined which types of 
firms fail during reorganization (see e.g., Comerford 1976; LoPucki 1983; Jensen-
Conklin 1992; Routledge & Gadenne 2000; Barniv, Agarwal & Leach 2002; 
Laitinen 2008, 2011, 2013), and which types of firms should be selected into 
reorganization (see e.g., White 1981, 1983, 1989; Hong 1983; Casey, McGee & 
Stickney 1986; Fisher & Martel 1995, 2004; Campbell 1996; Sundgren 1998; 
Routledge & Gadenne 2000). Fewer studies have examined firm performance after 
emerging from reorganization (see e.g., Franks & Torous 1989; Hotchkiss 1995). 
Several studies have used only pre-filing financial information and non-financial 
information is largely neglected. However, according to Laakso et al. (2010), 
factors affecting failure in reorganization are pre-filing financial information, non-
financial information, and actions suggested in reorganization plans. Therefore, in 
this dissertation, all these aspects of failure are examined. The variables used are 
classified similarly, and they are presented in more detail in sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
Failure prediction studies have developed different models based on various 
techniques to determine the best method. For instance, univariate models, risk 
index models, MDA models, and conditional probability models, such as logit, 
probit and linear probability models, have been applied (Zavgren 1983; Atiya 
2001). However, a problem with classic statistical failure prediction models is that 
they use only a single observation (usually based on annual accounts) for each firm 
(Johnson 1970; Balcaen & Ooghe 2006). Hence, in these models, annual accounts 
are treated as independent repeated measurements, which do not necessarily 
represent the true conditions of a firm. For instance, a healthy firm suffering from 
temporary difficulties may be classified as failing by the model. (Mensah 1984; 
Shumway 2001; Balcaen & Ooghe 2006.) Moreover, these models are based on 
financial variables demonstrating financial symptoms of failure (see e.g., Ooghe et 
al. 1995; Dimitras et al. 1996; Altman, Sabato & Wilson 2010) and causes of failure 
are disregarded (see e.g., Hambrick & D’Aveni 1992; Everett & Watson 1998; 
Charan & Useem 2002). 
Problems that have arisen within traditional failure prediction studies have 
inspired several studies to focus on failure prevention. However, these studies are 
conducted among bankruptcy studies (see e.g., Argenti 1976; Weitzel & Jonsson 
6     Acta Wasaensia 
1989; D’Aveni 1989; Laitinen 1991, 1993; Ooghe & De Prijcker 2008; Laitinen, 
Lukason & Suvas 2014). This type of studies aims to understand and explain why 
and how firms fail, rather than trying to discriminate between failed and non-failed 
firms (Dimitras et al. 1996). Argenti (1976) conducted one of the first studies 
related to the failure processes of firms. He found three different failure 
trajectories among distressed firms. The first group of firms are newly founded and 
have poor performance from the beginning. The second group contains similarly 
new firms that have excellent figures before the failure. The last group includes 
mature firms whose performance is good or excellent before a sudden partial 
collapse, a more stable phase, and a rapid decline to insolvency. However, in this 
group, at some stage, a major change occurs, and if there is a failure to respond to 
this change, a firm will collapse.  
There are a few published studies on the failure processes of firms after Argenti 
(1976). These studies have found a small number of distinct failure processes, and 
the focus has been on firms’ financial variables (e.g., Laitinen 1991; 1993), the non-
financial variables (Crutzen & Van Caillie 2010), or both the financial and non-
financial variables (e.g., Hambrick & D’Aveni 1988; D’Aveni 1989; Moulton et al. 
1996). However, some of these studies lack large-scale empirical proof (e.g., 
Argenti 1976; Ooghe & de Prijcker 2008). Moreover, the terminology used in these 
studies is mixed; some studies use terms such as “trajectory” (Argenti 1976; du 
Jardin 2010; 2015), “patterns” (D’Aveni 1989; Crutzen 2009), “process” (Laitinen 
1991; Ooghe & De Prijcker 2008), “pathways” (Moulton et al. 1996), and 
“extinction” (Sheppard & Chowdhury 2005), and some of these terms are applied 
differently. The studies examine either the whole life cycle of firms or the final 
stages before the collapse. Nevertheless, the extant literature lacks similar studies 
based on reorganizations. Therefore, in this study, both aspects of failure are 
considered. Essays 1, 3, and 4 take a more preventive perspective on failure. Essay 
1 examines failure processes within firms in reorganization proceedings. Essays 3 
and 4 consider financial paths within both failed and non-failed firms. In essay 3, 
firms with confirmed reorganization plans are examined. Essay 4 investigates 
firms that filed for reorganization. In essay 2, failure is predicted within firms with 
confirmed reorganization plans by using financial and non-financial information.  
However, a large body of failure prediction literature has focused on large firms, 
even though small firms have vast relative impact on the economy (see e.g., Keasey 
& Watson 1987, 1991; Storey & Johnson 1987; Pompe & Bilderbeek 2005). Small 
firms have specific characteristics compared to large firms since for instance, the 
resources available, structure of the firm, and role of the owner/manager are 
different (see e.g., Mintzberg 1979; Keats & Bracker 1988). Similarly, the financial 
information of small firms may be more unstable, unreliable, or manipulated 
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(Balcaen & Ooghe 2006), and internal control systems may be insufficient (Keasey 
& Watson 1987; Charitou & Lambertides 2003). Therefore, results related to large 
firms cannot be directly applied to small firms. In this doctoral dissertation, only 
micro or small firms are examined. The factors to distinguish micro, small, and 
medium-sized firms are presented in the following table. 
Table 1. Definition of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises 
(definitions from EU recommendation 2003/361) 
Company category Staff headcount Turnover or Balance sheet total 
Medium-sized < 250 чΦϱϬŵ чΦϰϯŵ 
Small < 50 чΦϭϬŵ чΦϭϬŵ 
Micro фϭϬ чΦϮŵ чΦϮŵ 
 
3.1 Financial variables in the reorganization literature 
The existing failure prediction literature concentrates on financial variables 
because these are objective measures based on public information (see e.g., Micha 
1984; Laitinen 1992; Dirickx & Van Landeghem 1994). Traditionally, variables 
measuring profitability, liquidity, leverage, cash flow, and efficiency are used in 
failure prediction studies (Dimitras et al. 1996). Financial variables are typically 
selected on empirical grounds because the existing failure prediction literature 
suffers from a generally accepted theory of failure (Scott 1981; Balcaen & Ooghe 
2006). 
However, previous failure prediction studies are unanimous on the role of accrual- 
and cash flow-based information in failure prediction models. Certain studies 
claim that cash-based information does not contain incremental information to 
accrual-based models (see e.g., Casey & Bartczak 1984; Gombola, Haskins, Ketz & 
Williams 1987). Several studies recommend using cash flow-based ratios only 
(Gentry et al. 1985; Gentry et al. 1987; Aziz & Lawson 1989) or including cash-flow-
based ratios along with accrual-based variables (Gombola & Ketz 1983; Sharma & 
Iselin 2003). The studies recommending cash-flow-based variables claim that very 
distressed firms, such as those in the reorganization process, tend to manipulate 
their annual account figures through earnings management to hide their actual 
financial situation (see e.g., Argenti 1976; Charitou & Lambertides 2003). In this 
manipulation, accruals play a central role, and therefore cash flow-based variables 
should be used (Sharma 2001). The role of cash-based information is especially 
important in the context of reorganization of small firms, since the relation 
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between inventories, receivables, payables, and cash is complex and constantly 
changing in small firms (Thompson 1986). 
Several reorganization studies have selected financial variables on the grounds of 
coalition behavior theory, first adopted by Bulow and Shoven (1978) (Laitinen 
2013). Bulow and Shoven (1978) used coalition behavior theory to examine 
whether a firm would liquidate or continue under bankruptcy in the United States. 
White (1980, 1984, 1989) applied coalition behavior theory to reorganizations in 
the United States. White claimed that a coalition consisting of equity holders and 
secured and unsecured creditors affects the liquidation risk of the firm. According 
to the theory, coalitions make their decisions in terms of financial characteristics, 
such as leverage, equity commitments, future profitability, secured debt in the 
capital structure, and payoff rate to creditors in reorganization in comparison to 
liquidation. Even though coalition theory was originally used in the studies 
examining whether a firm would liquidate or continue under the reorganization 
procedure, it is also widely adopted in studies predicting reorganization success or 
failure. (Laitinen 2013.) These studies suggest that size, capital structure, liquidity, 
and profitability are important when examining which firms should be selected 
into reorganization and which firms will reorganize successfully (Fisher & Martel 
1995; Campbell 1996; Frost-Drury, Greinke & Shailer 1998; Routledge & Gadenne 
2000). However, financial restructuring as a reorganization strategy should be 
taken into account when predicting success or failure during a reorganization 
program. For instance, Routledge and Gadenne (2000) found that firms that are 
more profitable, more highly leveraged, and have higher short-term liquidity prior 
to reorganization reorganize more successfully (see also Laitinen 2013). It appears 
that pre-filing leverage positively affects success during a reorganization program. 
These conflicting results may be due to debt restructuring (see Routledge & 
Gadenne 2000; Laitinen 2013). 
Cash-based operating cash flow ratios and accrual-based ratios are examined in 
essays 2–4. The accrual-based variables used in this dissertation represent the 
three financial dimensions of firms (profitability, solvency, and liquidity). 
3.2 Non-financial variables in the reorganization 
literature 
Despite the concern over financial variables, only a few reorganization studies have 
examined non-financial variables related to firms and their reorganization 
processes. However, bankruptcy studies have examined non-financial variables 
more widely. The evidence found in prior studies is mixed related to the 
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characteristics affecting the failure risk (Routledge & Gadenne 2000; Barniv et al. 
2002; LoPucki & Doherty 2002). For instance, prior studies examined background 
information about a firm, its industry, and its reorganization process. The 
following paragraphs discuss the non-financial variables used in this dissertation.  
There is conflicting empirical evidence related to the manager’s gender (Watson 
2003). Certain studies claim that gender may be an effective determinant of firm’s 
success and therefore it may also affect reorganization success. Previous studies 
found evidence that female-owned firms may be less effective than male-owned 
firms in terms of revenue, profit, growth, discontinuance, and failure (Du Rietz & 
Henrekson 2000). This may be a consequence of several differences between 
female- and male-owned firms, such as industry, firm age, family commitments, 
access to capital, and the owner’s personality traits (Watson 2003). 
The industry reflects the environment of a firm’s business and the complexity of 
its business processes. However, evidence found in previous studies is mixed. Part 
of the studies claim that industry has a significant effect on firm failure (LoPucki 
1983; Hotchkiss 1995; Campbell 1996; Routledge & Gadenne 2000; LoPucki & 
Kalin 2001), but LoPucki and Doherty (2002) did not find any industry effect.  
Prior failure prediction studies generally recognize the significance of age (see e.g., 
Argenti 1976; Keasey & Watson 1987; Shumway 2001; Laitinen 2005) while prior 
reorganization studies have largely overlooked the age effect. The pioneering work 
by Argenti (1976) found that failure rates of newly founded firms and old firms 
without adequate ability to renew are high. Similarly, studies by Lussier (1996), 
Laitinen (2005), Brinckmann, Dietmar and Kapsa (2010), and Altman, Sabato, 
and Wilson (2010) found age to be significant. However, Keasey and Watson 
(1987) and Shumway (2001) found no significant age effect. Moreover, the size of 
the firm has been suggested to affect success in reorganization since large firms 
are more likely to reorganize successfully (LoPucki 1983; Eisenberg & Tagashira 
1994; Campbell 1996). 
Several studies have found a significant legal form effect (corporation or non-
corporation) when examining the likelihood of failure. Laitinen (1999) found a 
significant legal form effect on the credit risk of firms. Similarly, Fisher (2007) 
found a significant non-corporation effect in Canadian reorganization data. The 
underlying assumption is that the financial liability of the owner may affect 
motivation and decision making, since in partnerships or proprietorships, the 
liability covers the personal property of the owner, whereas in limited companies, 
the financial liability of the owner is limited to the equity invested. (Laitinen 2013.) 
Thus, in partnerships or proprietorships, the failure of the firm indicates personal 
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bankruptcy of the owner, which substantially affects the owner’s commitment and 
task motivation (Keats & Bracker 1988).  
Researchers such as Sundgren (1998) and LoPucki and Doherty (2002) postulated 
that there are differences in the confirmation rates of reorganization plans between 
courts. Sundgren (1998) examined Finnish firms and claimed that some courts 
may be more restrictive than others, which may affect the likelihood of 
reorganization in that particular court district. Similarly, LoPucki and Doherty 
(2002) examined failure rates in United States bankruptcy courts and found that 
the failure rate in one particular court district was higher, which may be caused by 
the reorganization process itself, not the characteristics of the firms. Moreover, 
reorganization actions have been shown to affect the outcome of reorganization 
(Routledge & Gadenne 2000, 2004; LoPucki & Doherty 2002; Laitinen 2008, 
2009, 2011). These actions are presented in more detail in section 3.2.1. 
In addition to examining the effect of non-financial variables separately, failure 
prediction studies also explored the combination effect of non-financial and 
financial variables. Peel and Peel (1987), Keasey and Watson (1987; 1988), 
Shumway (2001), Back (2005), and Laitinen (2013) found evidence that the best 
failure prediction model may be built upon a combination of financial and non-
financial information. 
3.2.1 Efficiency of reorganization actions 
Since reorganization actions are an essential part of a reorganization plan, their 
efficiency should be precisely examined. However, prior studies have focused 
mainly on different types of actions within voluntary reorganizations (for a review 
see Smith & Graves, 2005), whereas this type of studies are scarce for legal 
reorganizations (Routledge & Gadenne 2000, 2004; LoPucki & Doherty 2002; 
Laitinen 2008, 2009). According to Laitinen (2013), reorganization actions can be 
classified into financial and business restructuring. Financial restructuring include 
actions such as remission of debt, increasing of equity or debt, and realization of 
¿xed assets. Using financial actions permits the firm sufficient financial resources 
to continue business and to start business restructuring actions. Business 
restructuring actions are challenging and more risky, and they include for instance 
marketing, cost cutting, organizational changes, and improvement of planning 
systems. Business restructuring actions in particular are examined in prior studies. 
(Laitinen 2013.) 
One of the first studies to examine business reorganization actions was Schendel, 
Patton and Riggs (1976) addressing voluntary reorganizations. According to the 
study, there are efficiency-oriented and entrepreneurial turnaround actions. 
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Efficiency-oriented actions, such as cost cutting, refer to the internal processes of 
an organization, and are applied to use organizational resources more efficiently 
(Woo & Cooper 1981). Entrepreneurial turnaround actions are more market 
oriented, since they deal with such issues as resource acquisition and revenue 
generation (Cameron, 1983) or changes in market niches (Hambrick & Schecter 
1983). However, despite the differences between efficiency-oriented and 
entrepreneurial actions, Schendel et al. (1976) suggested that a set of actions 
should be used rather than one particular strategy. Several subsequent studies 
support efficiency-oriented reorganization actions (Robbins & Pearce, 1992; 
Chowdhury & Lang 1996; Smith & Graves 2005; Laitinen 2013). Certain studies 
suggest that efficiency-oriented actions should be used regardless of the cause of 
the failure (Robbins & Pearce 1992; Laitinen 2000).  
By contrast, Hoffman (1989) classified reorganization actions into operational and 
strategic and indicated that operational actions should be applied when causes of 
failure are internal, whereas strategic actions should be used for external causes. 
Several researchers, such as Bibeault (1982), Pearce and Robbins (1993), and 
Arogyaswamy, Barker and Yasai-Ardekani (1995), suggested a classification of 
decline-stemming and recovery actions. By using decline-stemming actions, such 
as cost cutting, asset reduction, or both, the financial conditions of a firm could be 
stabilized. Afterwards, recovery actions focusing on efficiency maintenance and 
strategic actions that are more concerned with entrepreneurial reconfigurations 
should be used. (Smith & Graves 2005.) 
In the previous literature, financial restructuring actions are not widely examined 
(Laitinen 2013). Mainly, the effect of the remission rate of unsecured debt is 
addressed, since unsecured creditors receive only a small portion of their claims, 
whereas secured creditors receive a full payment, according to the reorganization 
law (Sundgren 1998). Sundgren (1998) examined the remission rate of unsecured 
debt among Finnish reorganizing firms and found that unsecured creditors 
received only 42,9 percent of their claims. Laitinen (2008, 2011) showed that the 
remission rate of unsecured debt is positively connected to success in 
reorganization. Moreover, Laitinen (2008) found that the risk of failure is lower if 
the plan includes realization of ¿xed assets. However, prior studies claim that 
assets may not be easily converted into cash since they can be essential for a firm 
and its business, especially in the case of a small firm (Slatter, Lovett & Barlow 
2006). For instance, in a micro firm, the assets may be privately used by the owner 
(Laitinen 2011). 
Laitinen (2008, 2011, 2013) examined the effect of reorganization actions in 
Finland. Laitinen (2008) developed a data system based on pre-filing ¿nancial and 
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non¿nancial information, reorganization submission information, and 
reorganization plan information to assess the probability of failure in small and 
medium-sized firms. The results indicated that actions suggested in reorganization 
plans were not connected to reorganization success. Afterwards Laitinen (2011) 
examined the effect of efficiency-oriented and financial actions on the long-term 
performance of Finnish firms that carried out reorganization plans for 
approximately 4–9 years, via a survey sent to such firms. Debt restructuring, 
organizational changes, and alterations in the management control system showed 
positive effects on firm performance. Laitinen (2013) examined the effect of 
reorganization actions on firm failure and survival time within firms with 
confirmed reorganization plans in 2000. Only efficiency-oriented actions were 
connected to firm failure and survival time. The firms using efficiency-oriented 
actions were more successful in reorganizations, and the survival time was longer. 
Essays 1 and 3 examine efficiency of reorganization actions. Essay 1 examines the 
connection between pre-filing financial information and reorganization actions, 
including both actions used before and during the reorganizations and actions 
suggested in reorganization plans. Essay 3 addresses the connection between 
clusters of reorganization actions and financial paths of firms. Only suggested 
reorganization actions were examined in the third essay.  
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4 SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS 
The purpose of the dissertation is to provide new evidence on the role of financial 
and nonfinancial information in the context of small firm reorganizations under 
the FCRA. This dissertation consists of four essays, which are briefly discussed 
below. The four essays concentrate on micro and small firms in different stages of 
the reorganization process, and therefore the whole life cycle of reorganization is 
examined in this dissertation. The first essay concentrates on firms in 
reorganization proceedings, whereas the second and third essays focus on firms 
implementing reorganization plans. The fourth essay encompasses the whole life 
cycle of firms filing for reorganization. The financial data used in the thesis was 
extracted from financial statements before and after the reorganization 
applications. The non-financial data was extracted from the confirmed 
reorganization plans available to courts and creditors. Non-financial information 
refers to background information for the firm, its industry, and its reorganization 
process.  
4.1 Taxonomy of six explanatory reorganization 
interruption patterns: empirical evidence from 
Finnish firms 
The first essay of this dissertation examines whether there are differences between 
the small firms that interrupt their reorganization processes in the first stage of 
reorganization. A traditional reason for interruption is bankruptcy. Prior research 
has provided evidence on differences between failed and non-failed firms, but the 
failure processes of reorganizing firms have not been studied. However, prior 
bankruptcy studies examined the failure processes of firms and identified 
differences (Argenti 1976; Weitzel & Jonsson 1989; D’Aveni 1989; Laitinen 1991, 
1993; Ooghe & De Prijcker 2008; Laitinen & Lukason 2014). Prior reorganization 
research focuses mainly on the financial characteristics of firms, despite 
recognizing the importance of nonfinancial variables (see e.g., Routledge & 
Gadenne 2000; LoPucki & Doherty 2002; Barniv et al. 2002; Laitinen 2008, 2011). 
This essay uses a sample of 60 firms that interrupted their reorganization 
proceedings during June 2008–May 2009 under the FCRA. All firms are small, 
and most (75 percent) are limited companies. The number of employees is 
approximately 17, and the mean revenue is approximately 1,4 millions of Euros. In 
this essay, pre-filing financial and non-financial information is extensively 
examined. In addition to the traditional nonfinancial background information for 
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the firms, causes of insolvency, reorganization actions, and causes of interruption 
are examined. The main analyses are conducted using cluster analysis.  
The empirical findings of the essay highlight different failure processes in the 
reorganizing firms. Six different failure processes are found in terms of pre-filing 
profitability, solvency, liquidity, size, and growth, which implies that the failed 
firms are significantly different in several financial dimensions. There are also 
significant differences in non-financial variables for the six groups. These results 
are consistent with prior bankruptcy studies emphasizing the importance of failure 
processes and nonfinancial information (see e.g., Peel & Peel 1987; Keasey & 
Watson 1987, 1988; Poston, Harmon & Gramlich 1994; Shumway 2001; Barniv et 
al. 2002; Fisher & Martel 2004; Back 2005).  
Furthermore, the results indicate that in several cases, the causes of insolvency 
equal the causes of interruption, which can be a consequence of using the incorrect 
reorganization actions. Thus, identifying the causes of insolvency and applying 
corrective actions is essential in reorganizations. Overall, the findings indicate that 
the failure processes of reorganizing firms are different and that these processes 
and non-financial characteristics should be taken into account by the courts when 
examining whether a firm will successfully reorganize or liquidate and by the 
stakeholders (entrepreneurs, administrators, and consultants) when preparing a 
reorganization plan. Hence, the findings of this essay provide important 
information for the legislators and key actors of reorganization, such as 
administrators and courts, and clarify the Finnish reorganization proceedings and 
their quality. 
4.2 Financial and nonfinancial information in 
reorganization failure prediction 
The second essay in this dissertation examines small firms (n=68) with 
reorganization plans confirmed in 2000 under the FCRA. Approximately half the 
firms failed during the program. More precisely, this study examines whether the 
pre-filing non-financial variables, either alone or in conjunction with pre-filing 
financial ratios, are able to predict firm failure more accurately than models based 
solely on financial information. Approximately half the sample firms are limited 
companies. These are very small (micro) firms since the median number of 
employees is 3.0, and the average pre-filing net (annual) sales is 550 thousands of 
Euros (TEUR). Financial and non-financial information is extracted from the pre-
filing documents available to the court and creditors before the reorganization 
decision. 
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The earlier literature is unanimous on the importance of accrual- and cash flow-
based financial variables to predict firm failure. This essay approaches this issue 
by examining whether the expected weak predictive ability of accrual-based 
financial ratios can be improved by using the cash flow-based (manipulation-free) 
operating cash flow ratio of reorganizing firms. Furthermore, prior reorganization 
studies have emphasized the role of nonfinancial information, although 
nonfinancial variables are not commonly used in the models (see e.g., Routledge 
& Gadenne 2000; LoPucki & Doherty 2002; Barniv et al. 2002; Laitinen 2008, 
2011). Therefore, the contribution of non-financial information is also examined 
in this essay. The main analyses are conducted with logistic regression analysis.  
The findings reported in this essay demonstrate that the best failure prediction 
model may rely on a combination of financial and nonfinancial information. More 
precisely, in this combined model, operating cash flow is one of the best 
nonfinancial variables. The results are consistent with prior failure prediction 
studies emphasizing the importance of cash flow-based financial ratios (see e.g., 
Gentry et al. 1985, 1987; Aziz & Lawson 1989) and non-financial information (see 
e.g., Peel & Peel 1987; Keasey & Watson 1987, 1988; Poston et al. 1994; Shumway 
2001; Barniv et al. 2002; Fisher & Martel 2004; Back 2005). Moreover, the results 
related to combination effect of financial and nonfinancial variables are as well 
consistent with prior studies (Peel & Peel 1987; Keasey & Watson 1987, 1988; 
Shumway 2001; Back 2005; Laitinen 2013). However, the studies including both 
financial and nonfinancial information are scarce. Moreover, operating cash flow 
ratios have not been addressed in reorganization studies. This essay contributes to 
the existing literature by examining the impact of cash flow and non-financial 
information on micro firms. 
4.3 Financial paths of reorganizing firms after 
reorganization plan confirmation 
The third essay also investigates micro firms implementing their reorganization 
plans, but the focus of this essay is on post-filing financial information. Using a 
sample of 59 micro firms with confirmed reorganization plans, both financial and 
non-financial characteristics (mainly referring to the reorganization strategy) of 
firms are examined. The mean number of employees is 3.0, and the mean revenues 
are 264,400 TEUR. Approximately 55 percent of sample firms are limited 
companies. More precisely, this essay examines financial paths within failed and 
within non-failed firms and whether there is a connection between financial paths 
and reorganization actions. Financial information is extracted from the financial 
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statements for the year of reorganization plan confirmation and the subsequent 
three years. Factor and cluster analyses were used to examine the financial paths. 
Prior literature has mainly investigated the differences between failed and non-
failed firms by using a single annual account. Failure processes of firms were 
shown to be different among bankruptcy firms (Argenti 1976; Weitzel & Jonsson 
1989; D’Aveni 1989; Laitinen 1991, 1993; Ooghe & De Prijcker 2008; Laitinen & 
Lukason 2014), but the subject is largely neglected for reorganizing firms. This 
essay fills the gap in the previous reorganization literature and examines the 
financial paths within failed and non-failed firms implementing reorganization 
plans. Traditionally, pre-filing financial information is used, whereas this study 
uses post-filing information. Moreover, the reorganization actions used should be 
efficient enough to turn around a firm. The efficiency of strategies was examined 
in prior studies related to voluntary reorganizations (see Smith & Graves 2005) 
but rarely for legal reorganizations (see Routledge & Gadenne 2000, 2004; 
LoPucki & Doherty 2002; Laitinen 2008, 2011). There are no prior studies 
examining the connection between reorganization actions and firms’ post-filing 
financial paths. Therefore, in this study, the connection between reorganization 
strategies and firms’ financial paths is examined. This study contributes to the 
existing literature by focusing on the post-filing financial paths of reorganizing 
firms and the connection between reorganization actions and financial paths.  
The empirical findings of the study indicate that different financial paths exist 
within the group of failed firms and within the group of non-failed firms. This 
result supports the previous bankruptcy studies indicating that different failure 
processes exist among firms (Argenti 1976; Weitzel & Jonsson 1989; D’Aveni 1989; 
Laitinen 1991, 1993; Ooghe & De Prijcker 2008; Laitinen & Lukason 2014). 
Specifically, financial paths differ within the failed firms since three different 
failure processes appear in these firms whereas only two processes were found 
within the non-failed firms. Furthermore, most non-failed firms belong to one 
cluster, which may indicate that they behaved in the same way in terms of financial 
variables, whereas the failed firms are more heterogeneous. A connection between 
reorganization strategies and firms’ financial paths is found. More precisely, using 
various strategies simultaneously seems to improve the financial situation most 
efficiently during the reorganization program. This result is consistent with 
Schendel et al. (1976), which claimed that a set of strategies should be used. 
However, prior studies suggest that efficiency-oriented reorganization strategies 
are the most efficient in the long run (see e.g., Robbins & Pearce 1992; Chowdhury 
& Lang 1996; Laitinen 2008, 2009), whereas in the current essay, the efficiency-
oriented and finance strategies did not positively affect the financial variables of 
firms. This result was consistent with prior studies claiming that finance strategies 
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do not strongly affect the long-term performance of firms and that such strategies 
are mainly used for short-term decline-stemming purposes (see e.g., Laitinen 
2011). 
4.4 The effect of financial and non-financial information 
on survival time of Finnish reorganizing firms 
The fourth essay examines whole life cycle of small limited companies (n=221) 
filing for reorganization under the FCRA. First, this study examines whether the 
financial paths are different within the firms filing a reorganizing petition and 
whether the financial information is connected to survival time in reorganization. 
Second, the essay addresses whether the non-financial variables, either alone or in 
conjunction with financial information, affect survival time in reorganization. It is 
assumed that the longer the survival time, the larger the chance of success. The 
median number of employees is 15, and the pre-filing net (annual) sales are 
629,000 TEUR. 
Because different failure processes have been found among bankruptcy firms 
(Argenti 1976; D’Aveni 1989; Laitinen 1991; Ooghe & DePricker 2008), the current 
study relies on the view that different financial paths exist within reorganizing 
firms as well. Moreover, the financial paths within non-failed reorganizing firms 
are assumed to be different. However, no prior studies have examined the 
connection between financial paths and survival time in reorganization and 
survival analysis has been mainly used to predict reorganization success (e.g., 
Partington et al. 2001; Wong et al. 2007; Fisher 2007; Laitinen 2013). 
Furthermore, nonfinancial variables have been claimed to be important in 
predicting reorganization success (see e.g., Laitinen 2013; LoPucki & Doherty 
2002; Barniv et al. 2002; Routledge & Gadenne 2000), and therefore it is assumed 
in this study that they also affect the time spent in reorganization. The main 
analyses are conducted by using factor, cluster, and survival analyses. This study 
contributes to the existing literature by focusing on financial paths within 
reorganizing firms and the connection between financial paths and/or 
nonfinancial variables and survival time. 
The empirical findings of this essay indicate that six types of financial paths appear 
among firms filing for reorganization. This result supports the previous 
bankruptcy studies indicating that different failure processes appear among the 
firms (Argenti 1976; Weitzel & Jonsson 1989; D’Aveni 1989; Laitinen 1991, 1993; 
Ooghe & De Prijcker 2008; Laitinen & Lukason 2014). The results also provide 
evidence on the connection between pre-filing financial information and survival 
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time. More precisely, it is shown that a pre-filing liquidity variable may affect the 
survival time in reorganization. This result supports the previous studies 
indicating that pre-filing leverage positively affects success during the 
reorganization program (see Routledge & Gadenne 2000; Laitinen 2013). 
Furthermore, the results also provide evidence on the connection between non-
financial variables and survival time. More precisely, one variable, industry 
(dummy: manufacturing), was statistically significant in the model. Thus, 
manufacturing industry may positively affect survival time in reorganization. Prior 
studies found that industry may affect the likelihood of reorganization failure 
(LoPucki 1983; Hotchkiss 1995; Campbell 1996; Routledge & Gadenne 2000; 
LoPucki & Kalin 2001). Similarly, the last model combining financial and non-
financial information was partially supported. There were two statistically 
significant variables in the model: industry (dummy: manufacturing) and one that 
is strongly positively linked to pre-filing liquidity. However, the results were only 
slightly significant. Therefore, the combined model does not outperform the 
financial and non-financial models.  
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1 Introduction 
Efficiency of reorganisation procedures is a matter of importance both for academic 
society and for government and corporate policy (Ravid and Sundgren, 1998). The 
efficient reorganisation procedures force the unviable firms into bankruptcy and viable 
firms into reorganisation. However, occasionally conflicts of interest between equity and 
debt holders and asymmetric information can cause inefficiencies such as forcing a 
financially distressed but viable firm into liquidation and an unviable firm into 
reorganisation (Mooradian, 1994). These filtering errors may trigger large economic 
losses for all stakeholders. Therefore, this disputed nature of reorganisation has 
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encouraged researchers in different countries to analyse and compare the reorganisation 
procedures in different countries. It appears that most countries try to improve their 
procedures by supporting the reorganisation of viable firms and the liquidation of non-
viable. Traditionally, the US Chapter 11 (reorganisation procedure) has been a model for 
many countries (Laitinen, 2009a). 
In Finland, Restructuring of Enterprises Act (comparative to US Chapter 11) was 
legislated in 1993. The concept of reorganisation refers to significant change made to the 
debt, operations or structure of a firm. The object is to rehabilitate a firm that is distressed 
but viable and only temporarily unable to pay its financial obligations (Restructuring of 
Enterprises Act). Many proceedings are interrupted during the process and few cases get 
a confirmed reorganisation plan implying that the process is hampered by serious 
ineffectiveness. More specifically, according to Laitinen (2009a), approximately 60% of 
the reorganisation petitions are approved by the court, and about 75% of firms that filed a 
petition will get a confirmed plan. Moreover, approximately 40–50% of reorganising 
firms will enter bankruptcy during the programme (Laitinen, 2009a). 
Traditionally, the reorganisation studies assume that the certain characteristics of 
firms are important predictors of reorganisation decision and success (Routledge and 
Gadenne, 2000). The example for many studies has been the coalition theory by Bulow 
and Shoven (1978), which shows the conditions under which the bankruptcy would 
occur. However, other line of research (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006) postulates that the 
focus should be on a preventive approach. These preventive studies argue that the failure 
processes of firms are different, and therefore the first symptoms (early warning signals) 
and the timing of financial symptoms vary between the distressed firms (Crutzen, 2009; 
D’Aveni, 1989; Laitinen, 1991). More specifically, some reorganisation studies argue 
that the characteristics of firms in reorganisations are different, which means that the 
failure in reorganisation cannot be caused by certain characteristics of firms but 
the reorganisation process itself (Laakso, 2007; Laitinen, 2008, 2009a; LoPucki and 
Doherty, 2002). However, none of the studies have concentrated solely on reorganisation 
proceeding that is the phase before confirmed reorganisation plan. 
Because of the gap in the previous studies and the amount of interrupted 
reorganisations, this paper examines the failure in reorganisation process by 
concentrating on interrupted reorganisation proceedings and the characteristics of firms in 
these proceedings. The study is based on the sample of 60 firms that have interrupted 
their reorganisation proceedings during the period June 2008–May 2009 under the 
Finnish Company Reorganization Act. Consequently, the research question of this study 
is whether differences could be found between the firms which have interrupted their 
reorganisation proceedings. The Finnish Restructuring of Enterprises Act is comparable 
with reorganisation systems in other countries (see Philippe et al., 2002). Therefore, the 
results reported here have relevance to several countries. 
This study has two main contributions. Firstly, the study contributes to existing 
literature by focusing on the financial and non-financial characteristics of firms, as well 
as the external factors affecting the resolution of reorganisation. Secondly, the method in 
previous studies has traditionally been logistic regression analysis while this study uses 
cluster analysis. In addition, a special feature of the study is that it concentrates on 
interrupted reorganisation proceedings. Therefore, the main interest is whether the 
proceedings are interrupted due to the characteristics of firms. 
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
overview of the previous literature, resulting in the formulation of hypotheses. Section 3 
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includes the variables and Section 4 presents the data and the sample characteristics. In 
Section 5, the methods are introduced. Section 6 reports the results of the tests. Section 7 
concludes this paper with a discussion of the findings and their implications as well as 
limitations. 
2 Prior research and hypotheses 
Traditionally, prior reorganisation studies have concentrated on the characteristics 
of firms in the reorganisation. Typically, these studies try to predict the outcome of 
reorganisation or examine the differences between two groups, such as successful 
reorganisations and liquidations, failed reorganisations or the firms that continue 
operating. Broadly, these studies can be classified into three categories: 
1 prefiling financial and non-financial information 
2 postfiling financial and non-financial information 
3 turnaround strategies used. 
However, the results of the studies are not directly comparable due to the different legal 
frameworks between the countries. 
Firstly, the studies regarding prefiling financial information have confirmed that 
larger amount of free assets (Casey et al., 1986; White, 1981, 1984), good profitability in 
the near future (Casey et al., 1986; White, 1981, 1984), size of the firm (Sundgren, 1998; 
White, 1981, 1984), strong equity commitments by management (White, 1981, 1984), 
higher leverage (Routledge and Gadenne, 2000) and industry-adjusted operating margins 
(Sundgren, 1998) are significant predictors of success. On the other hand, the studies 
regarding prefiling non-financial information have found several variables to affect the 
resolution of reorganisation (Laitinen, 2009b). Examples of variables are as follows: 
industry classification (Campbell, 1996; Hotchkiss, 1995; Routledge and Gadenne, 2000; 
Sundgren, 1998), composition of firm debt (Barniv et al., 2002; Campbell, 1996), 
management change, evidence of fraudulent activity and change in the market price of 
securities in the prefiling period (Barniv et al., 2002). Moreover, the macroeconomic 
conditions are attested to affect distressed firms and the reorganisation process (Altman, 
1971; Levy and Barniv, 1987). 
Secondly, the studies of postfiling performance examine the determinants of success 
or failure of firms that proceed into reorganisation process. For instance, complexity of 
capital structure (LoPucki and Doherty, 2002) and management turnover (Hotchkiss, 
1995) were evidenced to be different between successful and failed reorganisations. In 
addition, the researchers such as Sundgren (1998) and LoPucki and Doherty (2002) have 
stated that there can be found differences in confirmation rates of reorganisation plans 
between the courts. 
Thirdly, turnaround strategies among financially distressed firms have been widely 
studied. The studies tend to focus on the content of successful strategies or the turnaround 
process. The very first studies by Hofer (1980) and others (e.g. Hambrick and Schecter, 
1983; Schendel and Patton, 1976) described turnaround as a two-stage process consisting 
of retrenchment and recovery. O’Neill (1986) added that the selected strategy must be 
compatible with firm characteristics and the conditions of a firm. Later, several 
researchers such as Bibeault (1982) and Pearce and Robbins (1993) questioned the earlier 
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view and argued the turnaround process to consist of decline stemming and recovery 
strategies. More recently, many studies have insisted that the efficiency-oriented actions 
lead to the best performance in the long run (Laitinen, 2000; Smith and Graves, 2005).
2.1 Hypotheses 
Most of the bankruptcy studies seek to find the best possible failure prediction model in 
order to examine the kind of firms that have to be selected to the reorganisation to 
maximise its efficiency. Examples of important studies are Campbell (1996), Casey et al. 
(1986), Fisher and Martel (1995), Hong (1983), Hotchkiss (1995) and Routledge and 
Gadenne (2000). These studies do not consider the failure as a process but assume that 
failure is a steady state. However, it is obvious that firm failure is not a sudden and 
unexpected event. All distressed firms do not behave the same way, but different failure 
processes may be distinguished. Therefore, financial symptoms and their timing depend 
on the causes of the failure and the turnaround strategies used (Crutzen, 2009; D’Aveni, 
1989; Laitinen, 1991). 
Traditionally, bankruptcy studies tend to omit most of the non-financial information 
and try to explain the success in reorganisation by using solely information from the 
financial statements. This is simply because non-financial information data are often 
difficult to obtain due to the confidentiality issues (Poston et al., 1994). Moreover, the 
non-financial variables used usually include only a limited number of variables such as 
firm form (Back, 2005). Arguably, considering non-financial information more 
extensively, the failure or success of a firm can be more fully understood. 
Because this type of reorganisation research has not been conducted earlier, the 
hypotheses cannot be based on findings of earlier studies. Hence, the hypotheses are 
based on failure research and their findings of different failure processes. This study 
forms explanatory failure patterns that can differentiate the firms according to the reasons 
why they fail in reorganisation process. The study is methodically comparable with study 
by Crutzen (2009), which determines six explanatory failure patterns of distressed firms. 
Following prior research, both pre- and postfiling financial and non-financial 
information, as well as turnaround strategies are considered. Consequently, the main 
hypotheses of this study are formed in a null form and they are as follows: 
H1: There can be found different groups of firms among interrupted reorganisation 
proceedings in terms of prefiling financial ratios. 
H2: There can be found differences in non-financial characteristics between the groups 
of firms. 
3 Variables 
Selection of independent variables is based on the prior reorganisation and bankruptcy 
research. The variables are classified into five groups according to the stages of 
reorganisation proceeding: prefiling financial information, prefiling non-financial 
information, reorganisation submission information, reorganisation plan proposal 
information and reorganisation interruption information. 
Firstly, variables of prefiling financial information are chosen on the basis of 
appearance in prior reorganisation and/or bankruptcy studies. The chosen ratios are return 
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on investment (ROI), quick ratio, equity to total assets, average yearly growth rate and 
firm size. Each variable has been found to be a significant predictor of reorganisation or 
bankruptcy in prior reorganisation and/or bankruptcy studies. In order to avoid potential 
multicollinearity problems, only one financial ratio from one financial dimension is 
chosen (see for instance, Chen and Shimerda, 1981; Routledge and Gadenne, 2000). 
Secondly, reorganisation and/or bankruptcy research shows that in addition to the 
financial variables, non-financial variables affect the resolution of reorganisation (Back, 
2005; Laitinen, 2009b). Therefore, prefiling non-financial information is included in the 
study. The information includes the following variables: court (16 dummies), industry 
branch (12 dummies), age of the firm, company legal form (3 dummies), number of 
employees and gender of the entrepreneur or manager (3 dummies). Each variable has 
been carefully selected to present the determinants of resolution of reorganisation. 
Thirdly, the firms in reorganisation can eliminate financial distress and improve the 
overall performance of the business by using corrective turnaround strategies. Hence, 
the current study examines the differences in early warning signals (causes of failure) and 
turnaround strategies used between interrupted firms. The causes of the insolvency 
and interruption of the reorganisation proceeding are divided into six classes which are as 
follows: external causes, top management and planning skills, financial management and 
control skills, marketing management, human resource management and operations 
management. The percentages of causes are calculated for the firms. The variables are 
selected on the basis of several different studies regarding the failure of the firm (see for 
instance, Argenti, 1976; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). On the other hand, the turnaround 
strategies are divided into five groups according to the previous research by Laitinen 
(2000). These groups are efficiency strategies, product strategies, expense strategies, 
asset strategies and finance strategies. The percentages of strategies are calculated for the 
firms. To conclude, reorganisation submission information contains the following 
variables: causes of insolvency (six dummies) and turnaround strategies used before the 
petition (six dummies). Reorganisation plan proposal information contains information 
on used turnaround strategies during the proceeding (six dummies) and suggested 
turnaround strategies (six dummies). Finally, reorganisation interruption information 
contains information from the interruption petition and decision. This class includes the 
causes of the interruption of the proceeding (six dummies). 
4 Data and sample characteristics 
The initial data used in this study consist of Finnish companies (n = 74) that have 
interrupted their reorganisation proceedings during the period June 2008May 2009. The 
data do not comprise all interruptions (n = 104) at that time period because of 
the difficulty in access to materials. The interrupted firms are published by Virallinen 
lehti, and the documents regarding the reorganisations were available at Finnish Courts. 
The documents contained all the information which the interruption decision has been 
based on, such as petition for reorganisation, plan proposal and financial information. 
However, the material does not contain complete financial statements concerning all the 
firms. Thus, the observations of insufficient data (n = 5) as well as the outliers (n = 9)
were excluded. The final sample consists of 60 observations. 
The descriptive statistics of sample firms are presented in Table 1. The three different 
measures of financial characteristics of firms as well as annual growth rate in revenues 
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and size of the firms as measured by total revenue are presented. The mean values of 
financial ratios are as follows: quick ratio 0.35, ROI 0.94, equity to total assets 0.82
and growth 5.99%. The size of the firms as measured by total revenue is approximately 
1,394,876 euros and the median is 464,790 euros, which refers to microfirms (annual 
revenue lower than two million euros) (see Crutzen, 2009, p.58). The mean age of 
the firms indicates that the firms are approximately ten years old when starting the 
proceeding and that the number of employees is approximately 17. The male dummy 
indicates that 85% of firms have a male as a manager. Most of the sample firms (75.00%) 
are limited companies. 
The firms were grouped into categories according to Statistic Finland’s industrial 
classification codes (not tabulated). Evidently, construction is the biggest group 
(25.00%), and the second largest groups are manufacturing (23.33%) and wholesale and 
retail trade (23.33%). 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the sample firms 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Median SD 
Equity to total assets 0.82 8.50 2.77 0.35 1.81 
Quick ratio 0.35 0.31 1.40 0.24 0.32 
Return on investment 0.94 82.60 75.48 1.43 32.03 
Growth 5.99 91.15 128.88 1.23 41.92 
Total revenue 1,394,876.04 43,977.86 14,206,614.98 464,789.52 2,948,665.17 
Age 10.15 1.83 29.44 8.25 7.08 
Number of employees 16.88 0.00 477.00 4.00 64.33 
Male dummy 0.85 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.36 
Female dummy 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.34 
Couples dummy 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.13 
Limited company 0.75 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.44 
Limited partnership/ 
partnership 
0.17 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.38 
Private entrepreneur 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.30 
5 Methods 
The statistical analysis tool in this study is cluster analysis. More precisely, cluster 
analysis was implemented in order to determine different groups of firms in terms of the 
prefiling financial ratios that can explain their failure in reorganisation proceeding. These 
ratios were used to group the similar firms together. All the values of financial ratios 
were standardised because the distances can be greatly affected by differences in scale 
between the dimensions from which the distances are computed (Statsoft, 1995). 
In this study, hierarchical clustering analysis is applied. In the hierarchical clustering 
analysis, the data are not partitioned into a particular cluster in a single step. Instead, a 
series of divisions take place, starting from that the most similar observations or variables 
are amalgamated in one cluster and in the next step again most similar clusters are 
amalgamated. Hierarchical clustering method uses the dissimilarities (similarities) or 
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distances between the objects when formulating the clusters. The distance method in this 
study is Ward’s (1963) method, which differs from the other methods because it uses an 
analysis of variance approach to evaluate the distances between the clusters. By using the 
Ward’s method, the variation inside the groups is not increased too extremely, which 
results in clusters that are as homogeneous as possible (Statsoft, 1995). 
Every financial variable was individually used to test its ability to separate the 
clusters from each other. The Kruskal–Wallis test was applied to test the differences in 
median values of financial ratios and some non-financial factors between the clusters. On 
the other hand, Fisher’s exact test was used to compute the p-values of categorical non-
financial data. The test was used to examine the significance of the association 
(contingency) between the groups (Fisher, 1922, 1954).
6 Results 
This section reports the empirical results of testing the hypotheses defined in Section 2. 
More specifically, the purpose of this study was to define reorganisation interruption 
patterns among a sample of firms in terms of prefiling financial characteristics. In 
addition, non-financial characteristics were examined in order to find differences in non-
financial factors between the clusters. 
6.1 Six homogenous clusters 
After a cluster analysis of 60 cases, 6 clusters (or different groups of homogeneous firms) 
were retained at a linkage distance of 0.05 (Figure 1). The hierarchical clustering is 
represented by a two-dimensional diagram known as dendogram, which illustrates the 
fusions or divisions made at each successive stage of analysis. The horizontal axis shows 
the linkage distance, and each node in the graph (a new cluster formed) represents the 
distance at which the elements were linked together into a new single cluster. Therefore, 
the dendogram shows that the amount of six clusters is a good discriminator, and any 
additional cluster would only focus on marginal information still not integrated in 
previous clusters (Greenacre, 1984; Lebart et al., 1984). 
6.2 Characteristics of firms in different clusters 
Table 2 presents the results of the statistical test used (Kruskal–Wallis test). The results 
of the test indicate that the clusters are statistically significantly different in terms of 
profitability, solvency, liquidity, size of the firms and average yearly growth rate. The 
distribution of financial ratios in different clusters is presented in Appendix. 
In contrast, Fisher’s exact test was used to examine the differences in non-financial 
characteristics between the clusters. The test shows that there were only few statistically 
significant differences in non-financial characteristics between the clusters which can be 
a consequence of a small sample. The statistically significant test results are presented in 
Table 3. 
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Figure 1 The amalgamation tree resulting from the cluster analysis 
Table 2 Kruskal–Wallis test results 
Variable p-value 
Size 0.0099*** 
Growth 0.0013*** 
Equity to total assets 0.0001*** 
Return on investment 0.0001*** 
Quick ratio 0.0001*** 
***Significant at 1% level. 
Table 3 The results of the statistical tests regarding the non-financial variables 
Variable p-value 
Asset strategies (suggested operations) 0.0939* 
Asset strategies (used strategies during the proceeding) 0.0506* 
Marketing management (causes for the interruption) 0.0695* 
Operations management (causes for the interruption) 0.0695* 
*Significant at 10% level. 
In addition, age of the firm, number of employees, industry, company form, gender of 
manager and district of court were considered. However, there were no substantial 
differences in the values of variables between the clusters. For brevity, test statistics for 
these variables are not tabulated. 
The firms included in the first cluster (nine firms) were smallest among the clusters, 
had negative growth rate (–13.35), poor solvency (4.32), poor liquidity (0.09) and 
satisfactory profitability (9.77). The mean values of the solvency and liquidity ratios were 
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the worst among the clusters. On the other hand, the non-financial characteristics of firms 
indicate that the cluster firms have repeated the same strategies before and during the 
proceeding. Most of the efficiency-oriented strategies were implemented. Moreover, 
the strategies suggested in the plan proposal were the same as the strategies already done. 
Because of the repetition of same strategies, the reasons for reorganisation interruptions 
were the same as the early reasons for insolvency. Marketing management (44%), 
external causes (33%), top management and planning skills (22%) as well as financial 
management and control skills (22%) were determined to be the reasons for the 
interruption. Only human resource management was a reason for insolvency in 40% of 
the cases, but not considered as a reason for interruption anymore. 
The largest proportion, approximately one-third of the sample firms, was included 
into the cluster 2 (22 firms). Firms in this cluster had negative growth rate (–5.2), poor 
solvency (0.21), poor liquidity (0.17) and satisfactory profitability (18.66). However, 
the values of ratios were slightly better and the average size of the firms was larger (mean 
revenue 689,061.88 euros) when compared to the firms in the first cluster. In a similar 
vein to the firms in the first cluster, firms in the second cluster had also repeated the same 
strategies during and before the proceeding. Most of the firms had used efficiency 
strategies, expense strategies and asset strategies before and during the proceeding. The 
suggestions in the reorganisation plans contained the same strategies as previously done, 
mainly efficiency strategies (50%) and finance strategies (59%). Lastly, the reasons for 
interruptions were mainly firms’ internal factors, such as financial management and 
control skills (23%), top management (14%) and external factors (14%). In these cases, 
the reasons for interruptions were also the same as the determined reasons for insolvency. 
However, some reasons for insolvency, such as human resource management and 
operations management, were not considered as reasons for interruptions in several cases. 
In contrast, cluster 3 (ten firms) differs from previous clusters by its highly negative 
profitability ratio (39.13). This cluster was similar to clusters 1 and 2 in terms of poor 
solvency (0.37) and poor liquidity (0.34). Although the level of liquidity was slightly 
better (0.34), still it could not be considered as satisfactory. The mean revenue in 
cluster 3 was 668,814.19 euros and the growth rate was negative, 13.58%. In this 
cluster, the most common strategies used before and during the proceedings were 
efficiency strategies, expense strategies and product strategies. The suggestions regarding 
the future strategies were mostly the same as the strategies already used. In this cluster, 
the reasons for interruptions and the reasons for insolvency were as well the same. Most 
of the firms had accused the reasons for interruptions to be in external environment 
(30%) and in financial management and control skills (20%). Some insolvency causes, 
such as top management and planning skills, human resource management and operations 
management, were no more the reasons for interruptions. 
Cluster 4 includes (ten firms) firms with better financial characteristics than previous 
clusters. In contrast to firms in prior three clusters, among the firms in the fourth cluster, 
the average yearly growth rate during the prefiling year was positive (10.87%), liquidity 
satisfactory (0.76) and profitability satisfactory (4.12). Solely, average solvency of firms 
was poor (0.04). In addition, the firms were bigger than other firms as measured by 
average total revenue (843,120.95 euros). In this cluster, the turnaround actions used 
before and during the proceeding and strategies suggested in the plan proposals were the 
same. Most of the firms had used efficiency strategies, product strategies, expense 
strategies and asset strategies. In addition, the original reasons for insolvency were 
mainly the same as the reasons for interruption. The reasons for interruptions were mostly 
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firms’ internal factors such as financial management and control skills (40%), top 
management and planning skills (10%) and marketing management (10%). External 
environment was not the reason for interruptions. 
Cluster 5 (five firms) relates to firms which have mean revenue of 591,558.01 euros 
and high growth rate, 112.87%. The cluster was similar to cluster 4 in terms of other 
aspects, except the profitability ratio, which was positive among cluster 4 firms and 
negative (15.13) among cluster 5 firms. The solvency of the firms was negative (0.38) 
and the liquidity was satisfactory (0.71). However, the operations before and during the 
proceeding differed from each other. For instance, product strategies and asset strategies 
were used before the proceeding but not during it. The suggestions for future strategies 
contained the same strategies already used. In this cluster, other interruption reasons, 
except financial management and control skills, were same as the reasons for insolvency. 
In 80% of cases, financial management and control skills were defined to be reasons for 
insolvency while none of the cases determined this as reason for interruption. On 
the other hand, human resource management was a reason for interruption in 20% of the 
cases but not a reason for insolvency. 
Finally, cluster 6 (four firms) contains big firms with mean revenue of 11,722,816.90 
euros. Median revenue was 5,843,269.47 euros. The firms in cluster 6 shared the worst 
properties among all clusters: poor solvency (0.05), poor liquidity (0.46) and poor 
profitability (32.16). The value of average yearly growth rate was positive (14.14%). 
Before the proceeding, 75% of firms had used no strategies and rest of the firms had used 
efficiency strategies. During the proceeding, all kinds of strategies were used. Similar to 
cluster 5, the reasons for interruptions were different than the reasons for insolvency. The 
reasons for insolvency were in firms’ internal factors such as top management and 
planning skills (50%) and financial management and control skills (50%). On the other 
hand, the only reason for interruptions was marketing management in 25% of cases. 
7 Summary of the study 
The objective of this study was to obtain current reliable information on the interrupted 
reorganisation proceedings and the characteristics of firms in these proceedings under the 
Finnish Company Reorganization Act. This study was based on the final sample of 60 
firms that had interrupted their reorganisation proceedings during the period June 
2008May 2009 under the Finnish Company Reorganization Act. The main objective 
was to examine whether there were systematic differences in the failure processes among 
the sample firms. In addition, this study determined whether the differences could be 
attributed to the differences in firm characteristics. 
The empirical findings of this study indicate that different failure processes were 
identified among interrupted firms in terms of prefiling financial ratios. Six homogenous 
groups of firms were found by using cluster analysis. Across the six groups, there were 
significant differences in terms of profitability, solvency, liquidity, size and growth ratios 
(see Table 4). Thus, the hypothesis 1, i.e. there can be found different groups of firms 
among interrupted reorganisation proceedings in terms of prefiling financial ratios, was 
supported. However, only few non-financial characteristics were statistically significantly 
different between the groups. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was only weakly supported. The 
low relation between the clusters and non-financial variables may be a consequence of 
small sample (n = 60) or the large amount of non-financial (dummy) variables. 
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Table 4 The differences in financial dimensions of clusters 
Cluster Growth Profitability Solvency Liquidity Size 
1 Negative Satisfactory Poor Poor Microfirms 
2 Negative Satisfactory Poor Poor Microfirms 
3 Negative Poor Poor Poor Microfirms 
4 Positive Satisfactory Poor Satisfactory Microfirms 
5 Positive Poor Poor Satisfactory Microfirms 
6 Positive Poor Poor Poor Small firms 
This study suggests that the reasons for the failure cannot be solely the prefiling 
characteristics of firms but the reorganisation proceeding itself. In many cases, the final 
reason for interruption of reorganisation was the same as the early reason for insolvency, 
which can be a consequence of using wrong turnaround strategies. Therefore, identifying 
the reasons for the insolvency and using corrective strategies are essential to succeed in 
reorganisation. In addition, an important role of administrators during the proceeding 
should be taken into account when assessing the success of reorganisations. However, in 
order to investigate the issue more precisely, there should be some data on firms that have 
finished their reorganisation proceeding and gained confirmed reorganisation plans. 
This study has academic and managerial implications. Firstly, this study supports the 
results of the prior studies (Laakso, 2007; Laitinen, 2008; LoPucki and Doherty, 2002) 
and indicates that the failure processes of interrupted firms are not the same. Hence, the 
study suggests that the reasons for the failure cannot only be the characteristics of firms 
but the reorganisation proceeding itself. For instance, filtering of firms before the 
proceeding and the operations during the proceeding should be more efficient, which 
refers to the important role of administrator during the proceeding. Therefore, this study 
assumes that the reorganisation proceeding is inefficient and it should be improved. 
Secondly, the results of this study can help the key actors such as administrators and 
courts in their decision making, as well as clarify the Finnish reorganisation proceedings 
and their quality. Finally, this study demonstrates good applicability of cluster analysis 
approach in this field. 
There are some limitations concerning the data. Firstly, it may be that the data do not 
always necessarily represent the true conditions of the interrupted reorganisations. The 
financial data can be manipulated by using creative accounting and the non-financial data 
are based on the opinions of the debtors, creditors and administrators. Secondly, it should 
be noted that this study examined only a small sample (n = 60) of interrupted 
reorganisations. Finally, the time period was short. 
Future research could extend the time period and concentrate on identifying different 
failure paths which describe the events from the origins of the failure until the failure. 
Future research could, for instance, examine whether the failure can be detected earlier 
for some firms than for other ones. It would also be interesting to concentrate on the 
phase after the plan confirmation and the characteristics of firms in that phase. 
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Appendix 
Financial characteristics of firms in different clusters 
Cluster 
No. of  
firms in  
a cluster Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Median SD 
Total 
revenue 
396,088.00 104,296.92 1,752,589.69 160,185,89 528,546.33 
Growth 13.35 31.27 28.38 21.75 20.47 
Equity to 
total assets 
4.32 8.49 2.78 3.95 1.79 
ROI 9.77 27.36 75.48 9.18 32.04 
1 9 
Quick ratio 0.09 0.04 0.15 0.08 0.04 
Total 
revenue 
689,061.88 43,977.86 4,535,258.90 382,266.56 961,058.45 
Growth 5.20 91.15 42.73 4.88 28.24 
Equity to 
total assets 
0.21 1.47 2.77 0.34 1.08 
ROI 18.66 10.48 50.77 11.93 19.29 
2 22 
Quick ratio 0.17 0.31 0.62 0.13 0.19 
Total 
revenue 
668,814.19 77,912.08 2,374,888.32 489,832.49 670,423.13 
Growth 13.58 58.49 16.83 7.47 23.57 
Equity to 
total assets 
0.37 1.62 0.83 0.46 0.75 
ROI 39.13 82.11 10.24 35.61 20.42 
3 10 
Quick ratio 0.34 0.13 0.69 0.26 0.18 
Total 
revenue 
843,120.95 170,174.68 2,617,013.29 484,206.24 785,597.10 
Growth 10.87 15.55 35.55 12.13 16.45 
Equity to 
total assets 
0.04 0.68 1.09 0.03 0.46 
ROI 4.12 17.42 51.81 1.43 18.66 
4 10 
Quick ratio 0.76 0.455 1.40 0.61 0.31 
Total 
revenue 
591,558.01 142,396.33 1,399,156.12 362,019.97 525,191.34 
Growth 112.87 77.67 128.88 123.48 21.16 
Equity to 
total assets 
0.38 1.97 0.53 0.06 0.96 
5 5 
ROI 15.13 63.79 6.71 0.80 30.02 
  Quick ratio 0.71 0.13 0.99 0.80 0.35 
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Financial characteristics of firms in different clusters (continued) 
Cluster 
No. of  
firms in 
a cluster Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Median SD 
Total 
revenue 
11,722,816.90 8,330,797.34 14,206,614.98 12,176,927.63 2,738,778.72 
Growth 14.14 26.04 82.50 0.04 47.57 
Equity to 
total  
assets 
0.05 0.83 0.90 0.13 0.73 
6 4 
ROI 32.16 82.60 0.57 23.31 39.94 
Quick  
ratio 
0.46 0.28 0.66 0.44 0.16 
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1 Introduction 
Failure prediction has been an important financial research topic for many decades 
providing tools for managers of distressed firms, bankers, lending specialists, accounts 
receivable managers, investors, security analysts, auditors, bankruptcy and reorganisation 
lawyers and judges (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Lensberg et al., 2006; Altman and 
Hotchkiss, 2006). The pioneering work by Beaver (1966) has been a model for several 
studies and the literature on this area is extensive. Most of the failure prediction studies 
have developed different models based on various modelling techniques in order to find 
the best way to predict failure (Zavgren, 1983; Atiya, 2001). However, the existing 
literature is concentrated on large firms even though small firms have vast relative impact 
on economy (see Keasey and Watson, 1987, 1991; Storey et al., 1987; Pompe and 
Bilderbeek, 2005). The main reason for neglecting small firms is the instability, 
unreliability, and manipulation of financial information in these kinds of firms [Balcaen 
and Ooghe, (2006), p.82]. In addition, annual accounts are not often available for small 
firms because only large firms with certain characteristics (asset size, sales level, and/or 
number of employees) are obligated to publish their annual accounts. 
In this paper, we analyse the contribution of financial and non-financial information 
on predicting reorganisation failure of very small entrepreneurial firms reorganising 
under Finnish Company Reorganization Act (FCRA). FCRA establishes a legal 
framework for the reorganisation of firms that are economically viable but currently 
suffering financial difficulties (Philippe and Partners, and Deloitte and Touche, 2002; 
Koskelo, 2003), and it is comparable to other reorganisation systems worldwide such as 
chapter 11 in the USA. In Finland, new tools to predict reorganisation failure are very 
valuable, since approximately 50% of confirmed reorganisation plans will fail (Statistics 
Finland). This rate is very high when compared for example with reorganisation in 
Canada (Fisher and Martel, 1995) but comparable with the consummation rate of  
chapter 11 in the USA (Jensen-Conklin, 1992). 
This paper builds upon three distinct lines of research. First, the existing literature 
reports that the distress models estimated for larger firms cannot be applied to small 
firms, due to specific characteristics related to small firms (see e.g., Altman et al., 2008; 
Keats and Bracker, 1988). However, small firm reorganisations are rarely examined in 
existing literature. Our analysis is further motivated by prior accounting literature that 
examines whether the accrual- or cash-based ratios are the best failure indicators (see 
e.g., Beaver, 1966; Gentry et al., 1985, 1987; Aziz and Lawson, 1989; Gombola and 
Ketz, 1983; Sharma and Iselin, 2003; Casey and Bartczak, 1984; Gombola et al., 1987). 
Interestingly, these studies are unanimous, whether the best prediction models should 
include cash-based ratios at all, or if they should be used in conjunction with  
accrual-based ratios. However, none of the prior studies have examined operating cash 
flows in the context of reorganisations, but some studies have focused for instance on 
bankruptcy prediction (see e.g., Gentry et al., 1985, 1987; Aziz and Lawson, 1989; Casey 
and Bartczak, 1984) or solvency of firms (see e.g., Gombola and Ketz, 1983; Sharma and 
Iselin, 2003). Finally, it has been long acknowledged in failure prediction literature that 
non-financial or qualitative variables may increase the accuracy of the failure prediction 
model. Especially in the context of reorganisation of very small firms, the role of  
non-financial information has been reported to be important (see e.g., LoPucki and 
Doherty, 2002; Routledge and Gadenne, 2000; Barniv et al., 2002; Laitinen, 2008, 2009), 
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even though the literature is scarce (Poston et al., 1994; Altman et al., 2008). In this 
paper, we will test the predictive ability of accrual- and cash-based ratios and  
non-financial information in the context of small firm reorganisations. 
This study is based on the pre-filing financial and non-financial data from a sample of 
68 firms whose reorganisation plan was confirmed in 2000 under FCRA. It makes 85% 
of all reorganising firms in Finland in 2000 (85% of the annual cohort). The sample firms 
are consistent with the typical firms under FCRA in Finland. Exactly 50% of the firms in 
the sample failed during the reorganisation program while the rest of the firms (50%) are 
still operating. The status of the firms (failure/success) was finally examined at the end of 
the year 2010 because the length of the reorganisation programs can be  
5–10 years. Logistic regression analysis (LRA) will be applied to estimate the probability 
of failure and to test the four research hypotheses discussed below. In addition, several 
statistical tests are used in the study. For instance, the Lachenbruch (1975) classification 
accuracy test was used due to small sample size and lack of test data. However, due to the 
small sample size this study should be treated as case or pilot study and therefore more 
research is needed on this area. Hence, the results cannot be with cautious consideration 
generalised to the whole population. 
The present study contributes to current reorganisation research at least in three 
different ways. First, the study focuses on a special situation rarely studied. It makes use 
of pre-filing financial and non-financial information in order to predict failure after the 
reorganisation plan is confirmed by the court. Pre-filing data is extracted from the  
pre-filing financial statements and pre-starting reorganisation plans available to the court 
and creditors. This pre-filing information is the main source available to the courts when 
estimating the probability of successful reorganisation. Second, the study concentrates on 
very small entrepreneurial firms, which is rare in prior reorganisation research. Third, the 
study develops and tests several new hypotheses on the contribution of financial and  
non-financial information. These hypotheses deal with the usefulness of accrual-based 
financial data (Hypothesis 1), the incremental information contained by operating cash 
flow (Hypothesis 2), the information contained by stand-alone non-financial variables 
(Hypothesis 3), and the incremental information contained by non-financial variables as 
combined with financial variables (Hypothesis 4). Evidence gives support for all 
hypotheses. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. The background, purpose and contribution of 
the study are briefly discussed in the introductory section. The FCRA, formulation of the 
four hypotheses and a brief overview of the prior literature are presented in Section 2. 
The data, variables and the statistical methods are presented in Section 3. Section 4 
reports the results of the tests. Finally, the last section concludes this paper with a 
discussion of the findings and their implications as well as limitations. 
2 Prior studies and hypotheses development 
2.1 FCRA 
In order to understand the framework of reorganisations in Finland the main features of 
the FCRA are shortly presented in this section. FCRA was originally legislated in 1993, 
and later in 2007 the reform was legislated to improve the success in reorganisations. 
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Shortly, FCRA is a legal framework for the reorganisation of firms that are economically 
viable but currently suffering financial difficulties (Philippe and Partners, and Deloitte 
and Touche, 2002; Koskelo, 2003). 
FCRA is comparable to other reorganisation procedures worldwide, and therefore, the 
results of this study can be applied to other countries although there are differences, too. 
In the US proceedings, for example, the firms will first go into bankruptcy and after that 
they have two options: liquidation (chapter 7) or reorganisation (chapter 11). Under 
Finnish proceedings, there are two alternatives for financially distressed firms under legal 
proceedings, namely FCRA and bankruptcy. In Finland bankruptcy means as a matter of 
fact liquidation (Laitinen, 2013.) 
FCRA, such as many other reorganisation systems, is plan-oriented and debt 
restructuring plays a major role (see Philippe and Partners, and Deloitte and Touche, 
2002). FCRA can be divided into two larger stages, namely the stage before the 
reorganisation proceedings (reorganisation event) and the stage after the plan 
confirmation (performance event). These stages in FCRA are comparable to events in 
Australia for Voluntary Administration (Laitinen, 2013). Under reorganisation event, the 
court attempts to filter the firms with chances to reorganise from those that eventually 
proceed into bankruptcy (liquidation) (Routledge and Gadenne, 2004). The courts 
evaluate the possibility of survival in reorganisation by concentrating on the financial  
and non-financial information related to the firm. In order to do this, the firms must 
submit fresh financial statements to show their financial situation. If the proceedings are 
opened, a reorganisation plan is prepared and the proposed plan is considered by the 
court. After this, the suggested plan is confirmed if certain conditions are met. The 
reorganisation plan may be approved in three ways: in acceptance of all known creditors, 
in acceptance of the majorities in the groups of creditors, or at the request of the person 
who had prepared the plan (the administrator or the debtor) when the certain conditions 
defined in the law are met (see FCRA § 54). In the second stage (performance event), the 
success to carry out the reorganisation plan is measured. Hence, the firms will either 
succeed in carrying out the plan or they will go bankrupt during the program period 
(Laitinen, 2013). In this study, the performance event is examined. Thus, the study is 
concentrated on the situation where the sample firms try to survive through the 
reorganisation program. 
However, despite the reform of 2007, the failure rate of reorganisations is still fairly 
high in Finland. Approximately 60% of the reorganisation petitions will be approved by 
the courts, and 75% of the firms will get a confirmed reorganisation plan. 40% to 50% of 
the reorganising firms will fail during the reorganisation program (Laitinen, 2009). The 
failure rate is comparable to the failure rate of the USA (Jensen-Conklin, 1992), but in 
Canada, on the other hand, the amount of failed reorganisations is smaller (Fisher and 
Martel, 1995). Even though, a large part of reorganising firms fail during the 
reorganisation program in Finland, the payoff-rate to creditors has proven to be efficient. 
Sundgren (1998) showed that creditors have received a better payoff in reorganisation 
under FCRA than in bankruptcy liquidation. However, during the first years of FCRA, 
the median payback rate to the creditors was 33.5% and simultaneously in the USA it was 
56.4% (Ravid and Sundgren, 1998). 
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2.2 Financial variables in failure prediction 
During the past 45 years firm failure prediction has been one of the most important  
topics of accounting literature. The existing literature suffers however from a generally 
accepted theory of failure and therefore the variables selected are based on statistical or 
empirical considerations (Scott, 1981; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). Most of the failure 
prediction studies use financial variables because they are hard, objective measures and 
based on publicly available information (Micha, 1984; Laitinen, 1992; Dirickx and  
Van Landeghem, 1994). However, the studies are not unanimous which financial 
variables are the best failure predictors. More specifically, for instance, the role of cash 
flow and accrual information in firm failure prediction models has been debated since the 
pioneering work by Beaver (1966). Most of the studies argue that cash flow information 
does not contain incremental information to accrual-based models even though there is a 
clear causal relation between cash flows and firm bankruptcy (Sharma, 2001). Moreover, 
the role of operating cash flow and accrual-based information has not been previously 
examined in the context of reorganisations. 
Despite the lack of reorganisation literature focusing both on cash- and accrual-based 
information, the raw accrual-based financial ratio data is expected to be less useful in 
reorganisations than cash-based data for many reasons. Firstly, all firms are strongly 
distressed prior to reorganisation and it can be difficult to distinguish potential failures 
from non-failures by using accrual-based pre-filing financial data. Moreover, the 
financial structure of firms is restructured in the beginning of the reorganisation 
proceedings, which makes the pre-filing information to lose at least part of its 
information value. Secondly, the reorganising firms are typically small entrepreneurial 
firms whose financial ratios are unstable and, in addition, can suffer from extreme values 
impairing performance of traditional stable prediction models. For instance, the study by 
Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) showed that the failure prediction models based on financial 
data may suffer from the extreme ratio values, errors, and missing values. Thirdly, very 
distressed firms tend to manipulate or manage their annual account figures through 
earnings management in order to hide the actual financial situation of the firm (Argenti, 
1976; Charitou and Lambertides, 2003). In this manipulation, accruals play the central 
role (Sharma, 2001). Hence, the small firms under reorganisation proceedings may suffer 
from these kinds of accounting manipulations, too. Lastly, the financial information of 
small entrepreneurial firms can be unreliable due to insufficient internal control system 
(Keasey and Watson, 1987; Charitou and Lambertides, 2003). Therefore, this may be a 
threat in small reorganising firms too. However, there are some possibilities to improve 
the predictive ability of raw accrual-based information. First, the financial ratios can be 
transformed and divided by an asset concept instead of a flow concept, because assets are 
more stable than flows (ratio stabilisation). Second, by using winsorisation the extreme 
values of ratios can be cut off (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). However, these statistical 
procedures do not cancel the negative effects of financial restructuring and manipulation 
of the value of financial information. 
Due to the problems related to accrual-based financial ratios, the previous accounting 
literature has examined the impact of cash-based information on predicting firm failure. 
One line of accounting research suggests using solely cash-based ratios (Gentry et al., 
1985, 1987; Aziz and Lawson, 1989) or at least including cash-based ratios along 
financial ones in failure prediction models to improve the performance of the model 
(Gombola and Ketz, 1983; Sharma and Iselin, 2003). The other line of research argues 
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that cash-based ratios do not possess incremental information content to accrual models 
(Casey and Bartczak, 1984; Gombola et al., 1987). For instance, the study by Sharma and 
Iselin (2003) suggest that cash-based information has greater information content than 
accrual information in the context of corporate liquidity and solvency. Even without 
managerial manipulation, the accrual-based information containing accruals, allocations 
and transitory items seems to be more irrelevant (Sharma and Iselin, 2003). Shortly, 
evaluating solvency means evaluating the risk that a company will not be able to raise 
enough cash before its debts must be paid [Heath and Rosenfield, (1979), p.48]. 
However, it should be noted that the variability of the results may be caused by different 
statistical techniques and the diversity of the operating cash flow variables used (Sharma, 
2001). 
In the context of small firms, the importance of cash-based information may be even 
more important. Thompson (1986) argued that especially in small firms, the importance 
of cash flow information may be more significant than that of accrual information on 
accounting income. In small firms, the relation between inventories, receivables, payables 
and cash is complex and it changes constantly. By examining the cash flows the future of 
the firm may be more predictable (Thompson, 1986). Furthermore, the cash flow 
information may be important especially in smaller firms because of the possible 
inadequacies in internal control system. For instance, Keasey and Watson (1986, 1987) 
have reported on these inadequacies. The annual account adjustments made by the 
auditor (accommodated annual accounts) may also reduce the quality of accrual-based 
information (Charitou and Lambertides, 2003). 
To summarise, the earlier literature has examined the role of accrual- and cash-based 
information in the context of bankruptcies. The results of the studies are not however 
unanimous in the best failure predictors, and none of the studies have focused on the 
combination effect of accrual- and cash-based variables in the context of reorganisations. 
In order to test the power of accrual- and cash-based ratios, the following hypotheses are 
presented separately: 
H1a Pre-filing accrual-based financial ratios are not significant in reorganisation failure 
prediction. 
H1b Pre-filing winsorised transformed financial ratios are not significant in 
reorganisation failure prediction. 
H2 Pre-filing cash-based operating cash flow includes incremental information over 
accrual financial ratios in reorganisation failure prediction. 
2.3 Non-financial variables in failure prediction 
The existing literature on failure prediction contains various studies examining whether 
the failure prediction models should include financial variables alone or in conjunction 
with non-financial variables. Most of these studies suggest that non-financial variables 
should be included in failure prediction models [see e.g., Keasey and Watson, 1987, 
1988; Barniv et al., (2002), p.497; Fisher and Martel, 2004; Poston et al., 1994; Peel and 
Peel, 1987; Back, 2005; Shumway, 2001). However, the number of reorganisation studies 
focusing on non-financial variables is minimal, even though non-financial information 
would bring incremental information to the failure prediction models (Poston et al., 
1994). 
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The studies on reorganisations have found various different non-financial 
characteristics of firms to affect failure risk (LoPucki and Doherty, 2002; Routledge and 
Gadenne, 2000; Barniv et al., 2002). The empirical results regarding the importance of 
gender of the manager, age of the firm and industry in failure prediction are however 
conflicting. In addition, age of the firm, gender of the manager, and legal form of firms 
are rarely or never studied in prior reorganisation studies but they are typically analysed 
in traditional bankruptcy prediction studies (Laitinen, 2013). In this study, we will 
concentrate on the characteristics related to reorganising firm, reorganisation plan and 
entrepreneur. 
Firstly, one of the most commonly used non-financial variables in reorganisation 
studies is industry. Industry reflects the circumstances of firms business and the 
complexity of business processes, which can affect reorganisation success. Industry has 
been found to have significant effect on failure in many reorganisation studies (see 
LoPucki, 1983; LoPucki and Kalin, 2001; Campbell, 1996; Hotchkiss, 1995; Routledge 
and Gadenne, 2000). Furthermore, Gadenne (1998) suggested that different management 
practices of different industries could be related to success and failure of small firms. 
Secondly, age of the firm (or life cycle stage) has been often used in failure prediction 
models, but rarely in reorganisation studies. However, the evidence in failure prediction 
research is mixed since the pioneering work by Argenti (1976). Argenti (1976) found that 
the failure-rate of newly founded firms is high and that the old firms have also high risk 
of failure without adequate ability to renew. Conversely, Keasey and Watson (1987) and 
Shumway (2001) did not find any significant age-effect but Laitinen (2005) found it. 
Thirdly, the gender of the managing director may also be an important predictor. 
However, the results of the prior studies are conflicting. The study by Watson and 
Robinson (2003) found that the differences related to the genders may be caused by 
differences in industry, age of the firm, family commitments or education and experience 
of the manager. In addition, the certain personal characteristics could be associated to the 
gender of the manager-owner, which may be related to success. Earlier Sexton and 
Bowman-Upton (1990) argued that female entrepreneurs may be more risk averting but 
they have less energy to maintain growth orientation. Du Rietz and Henrekson (2000) 
found that female-owned firms may not perform as well as male-owned firms in terms of 
financial factors such as revenue, profit, growth, discontinuance and failure. 
Fourthly, in the case of small entrepreneurial firms, the legal form of the firm may 
affect the likelihood of reorganisation failure. The legal form of the firm may work as a 
motivator in reorganisations because in reorganisation of partnerships or proprietorships 
the whole personal property of the owner may be covered. Thus, the failure of these kinds 
of firms means simultaneously personal bankruptcy of the owner. In limited companies, 
the financial liability of the owner is limited to the equity invested which can negatively 
affect commitment (Keats and Bracker, 1988). In Finland, Laitinen (1999) found 
significant effects of legal form, when the credit risk estimates are explained by using 
LRA. In Canada, Fisher (2007) found significant non-corporation effect in Canadian 
reorganisation data. 
Fifthly, reorganisation actions can affect the success in reorganisations. The actions 
can be classified as financial and business restructuring actions. Efficiency-oriented 
(active) restructuring actions such as cost cutting during the reorganisations are found to 
be essential factors for successful reorganisations in prior studies (Robbins and Pearce, 
1992; Chowdhury and Lang, 1996; Laitinen, 2008, 2009). Irrespective of the cause of the 
failure efficiency-oriented actions can be associated with successful reorganisations 
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(Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Laitinen, 2000). Conversely, passive financial actions as 
recovery actions (such as remission of non-secured debt) may not be effective when 
reorganising a small firm. 
Lastly, various different studies (Keasey and Watson, 1987, 1988, Peel and Peel, 
1987, Back, 2005; Shumway, 2001) have examined the predictive ability of non-financial 
and financial variables as a combination, and found them to have significant incremental 
information content. Moreover, a recent study by Laitinen (2013) found that  
non-financial information is important stand-alone or as combined with financial 
information when estimating the success in reorganisations. Since, solely few studies 
have examined the non-financial and financial variables in the context of reorganisations 
this study examines the predictive ability of non-financial and financial characteristics of 
failed and reorganising firms, firstly standing alone and secondly in conjunction with 
financial information: 
H3 Pre-filing non-financial information is more efficient than stand-alone financial 
information in failure prediction. 
H4 Pre-filing non-financial information as combined with financial information is more 
efficient than stand-alone financial information and stand-alone non-financial 
information in failure prediction. 
3 Research design and method 
The empirical sample used in this study consists of Finnish firms (n = 68) that were 
reorganising under FCRA and whose reorganisation plans were confirmed by a court in 
2000. These data include about 85% of the cohort, which started reorganisation program 
in 2000 in Finland. A part of the firms in the cohort are excluded due to insufficiency of 
pre-filing financial information. Exactly 50% of these firms failed during the 
reorganisation program while the rest (50%) still continue in business. The success or 
failure was assessed at the end of 2010 because the length of the reorganisation plans can 
be 5–10 years. Hence, all firms operating (not bankrupt) at the end of 2010 were 
classified as successful and bankrupt firms as failed. 
The sample firms are very small which differentiates the study from the prior studies. 
The median number of employees in the sample firms prior to reorganisation proceedings 
is 3.0 employees and the average pre-filing net (annual) sales is 550 thousands of Euros 
(TEUR). About 27% of the firms are service firms, while 20% are transportation firms 
and 12% are construction firms. More than half of the firms (56%) are not limited 
companies, which mean that they are proprietorships or partnerships with increased 
financial risk in personal bankruptcy. The sample firms are similar to typical reorganising 
firms in Finland irrespective of the year. 
The first two hypotheses of the study deal with financial variables. The financial data 
are extracted from the pre-filing financial statements available to the court and creditors 
before the reorganisation decision. The variables selected into the prediction models are 
supported by bankruptcy theory and related empirical evidence (see e.g., Scott, 1981; 
Laitinen, 1991; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). The first model (1) to test H1a includes the 
original raw variables reflecting the following financial dimensions: 
1 profitability (return on investment ratio) 
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2 liquidity (quick ratio) 
3 solvency (equity ratio) 
4 size (logarithmic revenue). 
The logarithmic transformation is used because size distribution is skewed. The ratios in 
the second model (2) to test H1b are similar but winsorised and transformed and they are 
as following: 
1 winsorised EBIT to total assets 
2 winsorised financial assets to total assets 
3 equity to total assets 
4 logarithmic assets. 
The distributions are winsorised 5% from upwards and downwards, and this cut-off point 
was the best of several alternatives compared. Thus, the cut-off point of extreme values is 
set equal to lower and upper 5th percentile. The third model (3) to test H2 is similar to 
second model (2) but the winsorised operating cash flow to total assets is included to test 
the effect of cash-based cash flow. 
The third and fourth hypotheses of the study deal with non-financial information. The 
fourth model (4) to test H3 uses only non-financial data by including 11 non-financial 
variables while the fifth model (5) to test H4 combines financial and non-financial 
information. The 11 non-financial variables are selected on the basis of prior studies in 
reorganising firms (Laitinen, 2008, 2009). The variables selected are as following: 
1 industry (dummies: transportation, service, construction) 
2 age of the firm 
3 gender of the managing director (dummy: female or a married couple) 
4 legal form of the firm (dummy: not a limited company) 
5 court in which the reorganisation plan is confirmed (metropolis dummy: Vantaa, 
Helsinki, Espoo) 
6 remission rate of non-secured debt 
7 reason for financial distress (dummy: difficulties in market) 
8 suggested reorganisation actions (dummies: focusing on core functions, focusing on 
marketing). 
In this setting, variables 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8 are discussed and justified above while 
variables 5 and 7 (court and reason of distress) are used as control variables. The  
non-financial data are extracted from confirmed reorganisation plans available to the 
court and creditors. In all, five different models are used to test the four hypotheses. The 
financial and non-financial variables used in models 1–5 are presented in Appendix 1. 
All statistical estimations were done with the SAS statistical package (see SAS 
Institute Inc., 2012.) In the present study, (binary) LRA is applied for all five models in 
order to predict the failure in reorganisation. If the firm failed during the reorganisation 
plan, Y = 1, otherwise Y = 0 for non-failed firms. LRA does not require multivariate 
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normal independent variables or equal covariance matrices between the groups that are 
the assumptions required in linear discriminant analysis (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989). 
The LRA creates a score, a logit L, for every firm. The independent variables are 
assumed to be linearly related to L. This score is used to determine the probability of 
failure in reorganisation as follows: 
( )0 1 1..
1 1Probability of failure ( 1| )
1 1 n nb b X b XL
P Y X
e e− + +−
= = =
+ +
 
where bi (i = 0, …, n) are regression coefficients and n is the number of independent 
variables Xi (i = 1, …, n). 
The five logistic regression models are estimated using the independent variables 
described in Appendix 1 by the maximum likelihood method. The hypotheses are 
assessed by the following statistical tests. First, the significance of coefficients is tested 
by the Wald statistic. Second, the strength of association is assessed by standard tests 
such as Nagelkerke R-square and –2 log likelihood. Third, the linearity of logit is tested 
by the Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) Chi-square test. This test is performed by dividing 
the predicted probabilities into deciles and then computing a chi-square to compare the 
predicted and observed frequencies. Higher p-value refers to good fit to the data.  
The likelihood ratio test compares the specified model with the unrestricted model 
(goodness-of-fit). Moreover, the accuracy ratio is used to measure the accuracy of the 
estimated model in relation to the perfect model. The accuracy ratio (AR or AUC,  
area-under-curve) is extracted from the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC) and 
it is based on cumulative accuracy profiles (Sobehart et al., 2000). In addition, Somers D 
and percent concordant will measure as well the accuracy of the model. However, the 
Lachenbruch-validated binary classification accuracy (together with AUC) is used as the 
primary test to assess the four research hypotheses. Lachenbruch-validated classification 
accuracy test is useful for studies of small sample size [see Jones, (1987), p.152] although 
it also has weaknesses (Stevenson et al., 2007). Therefore, Lachenbruch test is used in 
this study because of a small sample size and because no test data were available for the 
study (see Lachenbruch, 1975). When using Lachenbruch procedure, a model is 
constructed using n – 1 observations in order to predict the missing observation. After 
that the process is repeated n times and lastly the misclassification rate is produced by 
using the percentage misclassified (Lachenbruch, 1975). Lastly, Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) and Schwarz criterion (SC) are used to measure the relative quality of the 
estimated models. Variance inflation factor (VIF) is used as an indicator of the 
multicollinearity. 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Appendix 2 presents the descriptive statistics of financial and non-financial data for  
failed (bankrupted) and non-failed reorganisations for models 1–5. Because of the  
non-normality of the variable distributions the univariate differences between the failed 
and non-failed firms are tested by a non-parametric Kruskall-Wallis test. The test results 
are presented in Appendix 2. Kruskall-Wallis test tests the similarity of the location of the 
52 Acta Wasaensia
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   154 E-L. Kärkinen and E.K. Laitinen    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
distributions of the variables in both groups. The results of the test for model 1 show that 
equity to total assets is the only statistically significant variable in model 1. In models 2 
and 3, the only statistically significant variables are winsorised equity to total assets. In 
model 5, there are statistically significant differences in five of the 11 variables reflecting 
non-financial dimensions of firms. The most significant differences between failed and 
non-failed reorganisations are found in winsorised equity to total assets, reason for 
financial distress (dummy: difficulties in market), legal form of the firm (dummy: not a 
limited company), court in which the plan is confirmed (dummy: Vantaa, Espoo or 
Helsinki) and suggested reorganisation actions (dummies: focusing on marketing and 
focusing on core functions). 
Table 1 Values of the VIF for the independent variables 
VIF Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Quick ratio 1.065     
Equity to total assets 1.223     
Return on investment 1.023     
Ln revenue 1.164     
Winsorised financial assets to total 
assets 
 1.072 1.072  1.432 
Winsorised equity to total assets  1.960 2.288  3.320 
Winsorised EBIT to total assets  1.526 2.652  3.179 
Winsorised Ln assets  2.106 2.187  4.518 
Winsorised Operating cash flow to 
total assets 
  3.685  3.965 
Gender (female or a married couple)    1.315 1.377 
Legal form of the firm (not a limited 
company) 
   1.317 1.845 
Court (Vantaa, Espoo or Helsinki)    1.139 1.244 
Age of the firm    1.303 2.117 
Reason for financial distress: market    1.290 1.399 
Suggested action: focusing on core 
functions 
   1.213 1.319 
Suggested action: focusing on 
marketing 
   1.263 1.362 
Industry: transportation    1.719 1.823 
Industry: service    1.711 1.820 
Industry: construction    1.178 1.269 
Remission rate of non-secured debt    1.391 1.575 
Notes: The table reports the VIFs for the five models of the paper. The dependent 
variable for each model is reorganisation failure (Y = 1 for failed firms and 0 for 
non-failed firms). The independent variables for each model are defined in 
Appendix 1. 
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The correlations presented in Appendix 3 indicate that the estimated financial models 
may be affected by multicollinearity. Firstly, operating cash flow ratio is negatively 
correlated with equity to total assets ratio (–0.66) and size of the firm (ln assets) (–0.67). 
The negative correlations may be resulted from the situation where the assets of the firm 
decrease due to smaller investments and the cumulative losses reduce the asset size even 
more. The smaller asset size may dominate any sales movements (see Altman, 1968). 
Hence, the equity to total assets ratio and size of the firm (ln assets) may dominate the 
operating cash flow ratio. Secondly, operating cash flow ratio is strongly positively 
correlated (0.78) with EBIT to total assets ratio. This indicates that accrual-based 
variables are stand-alone basis irrelevant, but as combined with cash-based ratios  
accrual-based ratios do contribute to the prediction of failure. Thirdly, non-financial 
variables are moderately correlated as well. For instance, industry (dummy: service) is 
negatively correlated with reason for financial distress (dummy: difficulties in market), 
remission rate of non-secured debt and size of the firm (ln assets). Dummy for legal form 
of the firm (not a limited company) is negatively correlated with equity to total assets and 
size of the firm (ln assets) and positively correlated with operating cash flow to total 
assets and EBIT to total assets. Age of the firm is positively correlated with size of the 
firm (ln assets). However, none of the correlation coefficients were above 0.8 which is a 
boundary for serious multicollinearity (see Lewis-Beck, 1980). Moreover, the values of 
the VIF for the independent variables are not very high (over 10) which does not refer to 
serious multicollinearity (Table 1). 
4.2 Logistic regression models 
Table 2 presents the estimation results for LRA separately for the five models. First, the 
financial variables in model 1 contain raw traditional accrual financial ratios. None of the 
variables are statistically significant which supports Hypothesis 1. Second, model 2 
includes winsorised total assets-based financial ratios. However, none of the variables in 
second model are statistically significant, and therefore, the Hypothesis 1b is also 
supported. Third, model 3 contains operating cash flow information along with 
winsorised total assets-based traditional ratios of model 2. In this model, operating cash 
flow to total assets is the most significant variable followed by equity to total assets and 
EBIT to total assets. The rest of the variables (financial assets to total assets and ln assets) 
are however insignificant. Therefore, by adding operating cash flow ratio to the model, 
equity to total assets and EBIT to total assets show also significance. This refers to the 
complementarity between accrual- and cash-based information. However, the parameter 
signs of the operating cash flow ratio and equity to total assets ratio are positive referring 
to negative effect on survival likelihood. On the other hand, the parameter sign of EBIT 
to total assets is negative which indicates that the higher the EBIT to total assets, the 
higher the chance to survive in reorganisation. This conflicting result may be technically 
due to multicollinearity but practically because the firms having high profitability but low 
cash flows may be good cases in reorganisation. The positive sign of equity ratio may 
indicate that by using financial restructuring financial support is provided to the firm until 
its equity ratio is positive. Therefore, the lower the pre-filing equity ratio, the more 
financial support is provided. 
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Table 2 Parameters of the logistic regression model 
Parameter Coefficient Wald statistic p-value 
Model 1: Original raw data    
 Intercept 0.832 0.424 0.5149 
 Quick ratio 0.225 0.130 0.7182 
 Equity to total assets 0.001 1.012 0.3143 
 Return on investment –0.001 0.930 0.3361 
 Ln revenue –0.143 0.466 0.4948 
Model 2: Winsorised total assets-based ratios    
 Intercept 1.171 0.511 0.4745 
 Winsorised financial assets to total assets –0.011 0.461 0.4970 
 Winsorised equity to total assets 0.003 1.252 0.2631 
 Winsorised EBIT to total assets –0.004 0.424 0.5152 
 Winsorised Ln assets –0.102 0.153 0.6957 
Model 3: Operating cash flow included    
 Intercept 0.468 0,108 0.7926 
 Winsorised financial assets to total assets –0.015 0,731 0.3962 
 Winsorised equity to total assets 0.008 4,062 0.0468** 
 Winsorised EBIT to total assets –0.025 4,462 0.0352** 
 Winsorised Ln assets 0.003 0,002 0.9915 
 Winsorised operating cash flow to total assets 0.034 5,975 0.0142** 
Model 4: Non-financial variables-model    
 Intercept 1.807 2.554 0.1100 
 Gender (female or a married couple) –2.876 5.725 0.0167** 
 Legal form of the firm (not a limited company) –1.705 4.569 0.0326** 
 Court (Vantaa, Espoo or Helsinki) –2.378 2.921 0.0874* 
 Age of the firm –0.039 0.414 0.5199 
 Reason for financial distress: market –0.660 0.926 0.3359 
 Suggested action: focusing on core functions –0.535 0.406 0.5241 
 Suggested action: focusing on marketing –3.241 9.619 0.0019*** 
 Industry: transportation –1.610 2.160 0.1417 
 Industry: service 0.820 0.869 0.3513 
 Industry: construction –2.093 2.407 0.1208 
 Remission rate of non-secured debt 2.866 3.323 0.0682* 
Notes: The table reports the LRA for the five models. The independent variables for each 
model are defined in Appendix 1. The dependent variable for each model is 
reorganisation failure (Y = 1 for failed firms and Y = 0 for non-failed firms). 
Statistical significance is based on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% are 
denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 2 Parameters of the logistic regression model (continued) 
Parameter Coefficient Wald statistic p-value 
Model 5: Combined model    
 Intercept 4.377 1.096 0.2951 
 Winsorised financial assets to total assets –0.038 1.067 0.3017 
 Winsorised equity to total assets 0.028 3.408 0.0649* 
 Winsorised EBIT to total assets –0.090 4.593 0.0321** 
 Winsorised Ln assets 0.110 0.026 0.8709 
 Winsorised operating cash flow to total assets 0.107 4.891 0.0270** 
 Gender (female or a married couple) –5.950 4.352 0.0370** 
 Legal form of the firm (not limited company) –2.627 2.508 0.1133 
 Court (Vantaa, Espoo or Helsinki) –5.064 5.720 0.0168** 
 Age of the firm 0.0390 0.119 0.7303 
 Reason for financial distress: market –2.975 4.711 0.0300** 
 Suggested action: focusing on core functions –0.972 0.743 0.3888 
 Suggested action: focusing on marketing –6.347 7.538 0.0060*** 
 Industry: transportation –2.017 1.617 0.2035 
 Industry: service 2.657 3.769 0.0522* 
 Industry: construction –4.742 4.003 0.0454* 
 Remission rate of non-secured debt 4.564 2.429 0.1191 
Notes: The table reports the LRA for the five models. The independent variables for each 
model are defined in Appendix 1. The dependent variable for each model is 
reorganisation failure (Y = 1 for failed firms and Y = 0 for non-failed firms). 
Statistical significance is based on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% are 
denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
Lastly, model 4 utilises solely non-financial information and model 5 as a combined 
model uses both financial and non-financial variables. The empirical results support both 
hypotheses related to models (Hypothesis 3 and 4). In model 4, there are statistically 
significant coefficients for five variables and in model 5 there are statistically significant 
coefficients for nine variables. In model 4, the coefficients are statistically significant for 
the following variables: dummy for suggested reorganisation action: focusing on 
marketing, dummy for legal form (not a limited company), dummy for gender, dummy 
for remission rate of non-secured debt and dummy for court. The rest of the variables 
(dummy for age of the firm; dummy for reason for financial distress: market; dummy for 
suggested action: focusing on core functions; dummy for industry: transportation; dummy 
for industry: service and dummy for industry: construction) were insignificant. Therefore, 
the firms that are limited companies and managed by male will fail more often than firms 
that are not limited companies (proprietorships or partnerships) and managed by female 
or a married couple. In addition, the firms that do not have efficiency-oriented (active) 
reorganisation action (focusing on marketing) in their reorganisation plans will fail more 
56 Acta Wasaensia
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   158 E-L. Kärkinen and E.K. Laitinen    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
often. These results support the importance of non-financial variables in failure prediction 
models. Especially the study supports findings of efficiency-oriented reorganisation 
actions. On the other hand, the court dummy indicates that the firms processed in courts 
Helsinki, Espoo or Vantaa may be more successful in reorganisation. However, 
previously Sundgren (1998) found that the firms processed in some other courts than 
Helsinki, Espoo or Vantaa may be more successful. 
In model 5, there are statistically significant coefficients for nine variables. The  
non-financial variables show the highest significance but the difference between them 
and the best financial variable (operating cash flow to total assets) is small. The 
statistically significant coefficients for variables are the same as in model 4 despite the 
variables dummy for legal form of the firm and dummy for remission rate of non-secured 
debt. On the other hand, three insignificant coefficients for variables in model 4 (dummy 
for industry: service, dummy for industry: construction and dummy reason for financial 
distress: market) are significant in model 5. This results from financial information 
included in model 5. The statistically significant financial variables are the same as in 
model 3. The suggested reorganisation action dummy (focusing on marketing) is the most 
significant in model 5 followed by court dummy, reason for financial distress dummy: 
market and gender dummy. The rest of the non-financial variables (dummy for age of the 
firm; dummy for suggested action: focusing on core functions; dummy for industry: 
transportation; dummy for legal form of the firm (not limited company); dummy for 
remission rate of non-secured debt; winsorised Ln assets and winsorised financial assets 
to total assets) are insignificant. 
The results reported in Table 2 evidently demonstrate the complementarity between 
accrual and cash-based information and the importance of non-financial information. 
Firstly, the coefficients of accrual-based financial ratios became statistically significant 
when adding operating cash flow to the model (model 3). This refers to the importance of 
cash-based information when predicting reorganisation failure. Secondly, the model 
containing non-financial variables alone and the last model including both financial and 
non-financial information contain various statistically significant coefficients. In all, the 
best model seems to be the last model containing both financial and non-financial 
information. 
4.3 Goodness of models 
The model summary tests for all five models are reported in Table 3. Firstly, the 
Nagelkerke R-square is highest for the model 5 (0.56), which refers to a good strength of 
fit. However, for models 1–2 this strength is poor and for models 3–4 moderate. In 
models 1, 2, 3 and 4, the values of Nagelkerke R-squares are 0.04, 0.06, 0.17 and 0.37, 
respectively. On the other hand, the probability levels of likelihood ratio test for models 3 
and 4 are approximately 0.03 and 0.0011, which reflects that the probabilities of the 
models are sufficient. The probability level of model 5 is less than 0.0001, which reflects 
a very good significance of the model. Furthermore, the Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) 
test shows that the logit is linear in all models except for model 1. The higher the 
probability, the better is linearity. 
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Table 3 Results of statistical tests for the logistic regression models (p-values in parentheses) 
Statistical tests Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
AIC 101.335 100.434 93.966 87.347 73.192 
SC 112.432 111.532 107.283 113.981 110.923 
–2 Log L 91.335 90.434 81.966 63.347 39.192 
Nagelkerke R2 0.042 0.055 0.166 0.365 0.555 
Likelihood Ratio 2.933 
(0.5691) 
3.834 
(0.4289) 
12.302 
(0.0309) 
30.921 
(0.0011) 
55.076 
(<.0001) 
Somers’ D 0.311 0.287 0.434 0.708 0.896 
Percent concordant 65.600 64.400 71.700 85.400 94.800 
AUC 0.656 0.644 0.717 0.854 0.948 
Hosmer and Lemeshow 
goodness-of-fit Chi-square 
18.612 
(0.0171) 
12.932 
(0.1142) 
4.949 
(0.7630) 
7.268 
(0.5080) 
4.176 
(0.8410) 
Notes: The table reports the results of the statistical tests for the logistic regression 
models (p-values in parentheses). The independent variables for each model are 
defined in Appendix 1. The dependent variable for each model is reorganisation 
failure (Y = 1 for failed firms and Y = 0 for non-failed firms). 
Secondly, the accuracy of the models is tested by the area under the curve (AUC), 
Somers D and percent concordant. The accuracy tested by AUC is very good for model 5 
and low for models 1 and 2. The ROC curves presented in Appendices 4 and 5 
demonstrate the accuracies for models 3 and 5. The curve does not refer to any good 
accuracy in model 3, but in model 5 the accuracy is very good. The differences between 
the ROC-curves were tested by two sample z-test. The results of the test show that there 
are differences in ROC-curves between almost all models, despite the models 1 and 2. 
The interpretation of Somers D and percent concordant is similar as that for AUC. 
Lastly, Table 4 shows the Lachenbruch-validated classification accuracy of the 
estimated logistic regression models. The classification accuracy (cut-off value 0.5) for 
models 1 (51.5%) and 2 (42.6) is extremely low supporting hypothesis 1. However, the 
classification accuracy for model 3 (60.3%) clearly outperforms that of previous models 
although still being low. It shows that the effect of operating cash flow on the 
performance of the model is significant supporting Hypothesis 2. For model 4, the overall 
classification accuracy (cut-off value 0.5) is 61.8% exceeding that of model 3. This result 
supports Hypothesis 3 showing that non-financial variables include useful information for 
predicting failure in reorganisation. However, combined model 5 clearly reports the 
highest classification accuracy (70.6%). It implies that when predicting failure in small 
business reorganisation, a model with financial and non-financial information will  
lead to the best accuracy supporting Hypothesis 4. The differences between  
Lachenbruch-validated classification accuracies were tested by binomial proportion test. 
The statistically significant differences were found between all other models despite 
between models 1 and 2 and between models 3 and 4. 
 
 
 
58 Acta Wasaensia
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   160 E-L. Kärkinen and E.K. Laitinen    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Table 4 Classification table for the estimated models 
Probability level (cut-off point) All firms Non-failed Failed 
Model 1: Original raw data    
 0.46 48.5 76.5 20.6 
 0.48 48.5 64.7 32.4 
 0.50 51.5 50.0 52.9 
 0.52 51.5 32.4 70.6 
 0.54 48.5 23.5 73.5 
Model 2: Winsorised total assets-based ratios    
 0.46 47.1 73.5 20.6 
 0.48 47.1 70.6 23.5 
 0.50 42.6 58.8 26.5 
 0.52 39.7 52.9 26.5 
 0.54 39.7 44.1 35.3 
Model 3: Operating cash flow included    
 0.46 52.9 64.7 41.2 
 0.48 55.9 64.7 47.1 
 0.50 60.3 64.7 55.9 
 0.52 60.3 64.7 55.9 
 0.54 57.4 58.8 55.9 
Model 4: Non-financial variables-model    
 0.46 61.8 61.8 61.8 
 0.48 60.3 58.8 61.8 
 0.50 61.8 58.8 64.7 
 0.52 61.8 58.8 64.7 
 0.54 66.2 58.8 73.5 
Model 5: Combined model    
 0.46 69.1 67.6 70.6 
 0.48 72.1 67.6 76.5 
 0.50 70.6 64.7 76.5 
 0.52 70.6 64.7 76.5 
 0.54 70.6 64.7 76.5 
Notes: The table reports the Lachenbruch validated classification accuracy for the logistic 
regression models (p-values in parentheses). The independent variables for each 
model are defined in Appendix 1. The dependent variable for each model is 
reorganisation failure (Y = 1 for failed firms and Y = 0 for non-failed firms). 
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5 Summary and discussion 
The purpose of the study was to analyse the contribution of pre-filing financial and  
non-financial information in predicting reorganisation failure of small entrepreneurial 
firms. The study is motivated by earlier literature reporting that the distress models 
estimated for larger firms cannot be applied to small firms. Moreover, the existing failure 
prediction literature is unanimous whether to use financial and non-financial information 
in combination and whether to use accrual- and/or cash-based ratios in the models. 
However, none of the prior studies have examined operating cash flows in the context of 
reorganisations. Moreover, the reorganisation studies including both financial and  
non-financial information are scarce. 
Based on the sample of small Finnish firms (n = 68) reorganising under FCRA, the 
findings reported in this paper demonstrate that the best failure prediction model may be 
built as a combination of financial and non-financial information. In this combined 
model, operating cash flow is a very significant variable along the best non-financial 
ones. These results are consistent with the prior failure prediction studies emphasising the 
importance of cash-based financial ratios (see e.g., Gentry et al., 1985, 1987; Aziz and 
Lawson, 1989) and non-financial information [see e.g., Keasey and Watson, 1987, 1988; 
Barniv et al., (2002), p.497; Fisher and Martel, 2004; Poston et al., 1994; Peel and Peel, 
1987; Back, 2005; Shumway, 2001]. However, this was the first research to study the 
explanatory power of cash-based ratios in the context of reorganisations. Moreover, there 
are solely few reorganisation studies examining the financial and non-financial 
characteristics of firms. 
The research question of the study is important for reorganisation practice, since  
pre-filing information is the main source of information used by the court when assessing 
probability of successful reorganisation for a firm applying for FCRA. This information 
is used to reflect the pre-filing situation of the firm but also, together with reorganisation 
plan, possibilities for survival in the future. The results of this study provide tools as well 
for managers of distressed firms, bankers, lending specialists, accounts receivable 
managers, investors, security analysts, auditors, bankruptcy and reorganisation lawyers 
and judges. Because FCRA is a plan-oriented reorganisation act as in most countries, the 
results of this study would have general value beyond FCRA and Finland. The sample 
size is however small and larger sample size would be needed to test the hypotheses 
properly. Hence, more research in this area is needed. 
5.1 Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis assumed that the predictive ability of traditional accrual financial 
ratios based on original raw financial information in predicting reorganisation failure of 
small entrepreneurial firms is low (H1a). Empirical evidence supported the hypothesis 
H1a because none of the coefficients of the ratios were statistically significant leading to 
insignificant classification ability. Hypothesis H1b expected that the predictive  
ability of traditional accrual-based model cannot be increased by using winsorised 
transformed-based ratios. The hypothesis H1b was as well supported by the results. 
The second hypothesis (H2) assumed that the predictive ability of accrual-based 
financial ratios can be increased by using (cash-based) operating cash flow ratio. This 
hypothesis was supported by evidence because the model three (3) including operating 
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cash flow information contained statistically significant coefficients for three variables: 
operating cash flow to total assets, equity to total assets and EBIT to total assets. The 
resulted model was statistically significant and was found to have moderate classification 
accuracy both in the estimation sample and in Lachenbruch validation. 
The third hypothesis (H3) assumed that stand-alone non-financial variables include 
important information for reorganisation failure prediction. The results of the study 
supported the hypothesis, because the model four (4) contained statistically significant 
coefficients for five variables: dummy for gender of the managing director (female or a 
married couple), dummy for legal form of the firm (not limited-company), court (Vantaa, 
Espoo or Helsinki), remission rate of non-secured debt and dummy for suggested 
reorganisation action: focusing on marketing. In addition, the model showed moderate 
classification accuracy. The fourth hypothesis (H4) expected that non-financial variables 
include incremental information over financial information. Empirical results supported 
the hypothesis and indicated that substantially better predictions can be obtained by using 
non-financial data. The combined model (model 5) contained statistically significant 
coefficients for six non-financial variables and three financial variables. The significance 
of operating cash flow showed to be of the same significance than best non-financial 
variables. Consequently, empirical results support both H1a on the insignificance of 
original raw accrual-based financial information and H1b on the insignificance of 
transformation and winsorisation. In addition, the results support H2 on the importance of 
cash-based (operating cash flow) information and H3 and H4 on the importance of  
non-financial information in predicting reorganisation failure. 
5.2 Implications 
This study gave several implications for cash flow, bankruptcy and reorganisation 
research. Previous studies have not examined cash flows in the context of small firm 
reorganisations even though cash flow is important for distressed firms. Distressed firms 
tend to manipulate their annual account figures but cash-based ratios cannot be 
manipulated same way as accrual-based ratios. The main finding of the study is that 
including operating cash flow information in the prediction model includes incremental 
information but that it simultaneously makes the information of equity ratio and EBIT to 
total assets ratio statistically significant. However, the parameter signs are inconsistent. 
The sign of coefficients of equity to total assets and operating cash flow to total assets are 
positive while the coefficient of EBIT to total assets is negative. The negative sign of 
EBIT to total indicates that the higher the EBIT to total assets, the higher the chance to 
survive in reorganisation. This conflicting result may be caused by multicollinearity or 
because the firms with higher profitability but lower cash flows, may be the good cases 
for successful reorganisation. In addition, the lower the equity ratio the more financial 
support is provided to the firm until its equity ratio is positive. All in all, these financial 
ratios should be used as a combination when predicting survival or failure in 
reorganisation by courts. 
In addition, the study showed clearly the importance of non-financial variables in 
prediction of reorganisation failure. Evidence showed that the active reorganisation 
action (focusing on marketing) is important for survival in reorganisation. It also showed 
that gender of the managing director (dummy: female or a married couple) and legal form 
of the firm (dummy: not a limited company) are significant determinants of non-failed 
reorganisations. The firms that are limited companies and managed by male will fail 
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more often than firms that are not limited companies (proprietorship or partnership) and 
managed by female or a married couple. In addition, the court dummy (Helsinki, Espoo 
or Vantaa) and reason for financial distress (dummy for difficulties in market) can 
contribute to survival. The reorganisations processed in courts Helsinki, Espoo or Vantaa 
will be more successful and if the reason for financial distress has been difficulties in 
market the firms will not fail in reorganisations that often. This kind of qualitative 
information is not exposed to extreme values, instability, or manipulation such as raw 
financial information, which stresses their importance. 
Overall, the results presented in this study imply that the most efficient prediction 
model can be built as a combination of financial and non-financial information. In this 
combined model, operating cash flow is a very significant variable along the best  
non-financial ones. Thus, evidence implies that the combination effect of accrual and  
cash-based ratios found in model 3 and the combination of financial and non-financial 
variables in model 5 are effective in predicting survival or failure of a firm reorganising 
under FCRA. Due to the similarities between the reorganisation systems worldwide the 
results may be applied to other countries as well. 
5.3 Limitations 
In interpreting the findings of the study, it is also necessary to consider the following 
limitations. First, this study examined only a small sample (n = 68) of reorganisations, 
even though the sample included almost all Finnish firms with a reorganisation plan 
confirmed by court in 2000. Due to the small sample size, the results cannot be properly 
generalised to the whole population. Therefore, the research should be regarded as a case 
or pilot study. In further research, larger sample size could be applied by using cohorts 
from several years. Second, the data includes solely pre-filing information due to lack of 
post-filing financial information. Pre-filing information is important as a filter when 
selecting firms for reorganisation while post-filing information can be used later when 
assessing the feasibility of reorganisation plans. Third we used solely one single 
observation (i.e., one annual account) for each firm, which relates to the snapshot 
character of the annual account. In the future, a longer time series data could be used 
when estimating the potential of successful reorganisation. 
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Appendix 1 
Table A1 Independent variables used in models 
Variables Definition 
Model 1  
 Ln revenue Ln revenue 
 Return on investment Return on investment 
 Equity to total assets Equity to total assets 
 Quick ratio Quick ratio 
Model 2  
 Winsorised Ln total assets Winsorised Ln total assets 
 Winsorised EBIT/total assets Winsorised EBIT/total assets 
 Winsorised equity to total assets Winsorised equity to total assets 
 Winsorised financial assets/total assets Winsorised financial assets/total assets 
Model 3  
 Winsorised Ln total assets Winsorised Ln total assets 
 Winsorised EBIT/total assets Winsorised EBIT/total assets 
 Winsorised equity to total assets Winsorised equity to total assets 
 Winsorised financial assets/total assets Winsorised financial assets/total assets 
 Winsorised operating cash flow/total 
assets 
Winsorised operating cash flow/total assets 
Model 4  
 Gender  
(female or a married couple) 
Gender of the manager  
(female or a married couple) 
 Legal form of the firm  
(not a limited company) 
Legal form of the firm  
(not a limited company) 
 Court  
(Vantaa, Espoo or Helsinki) 
The case processed in courts  
Vantaa, Espoo or Helsinki 
 Age of the firm Age of the firm when  
reorganisation plan confirmed 
 Reason for financial distress: market Difficulties in market reported in 
reorganisation application 
 Suggested action: focusing  
on core functions 
Dummy: focusing on core functions 
 Suggested action: focusing on marketing Dummy: focusing on marketing 
 Industry: transportation Industry: transportation 
 Industry: service Industry: service 
 Industry: construction Industry: construction 
 Remission rate of non-secured debt Remission rate of non-secured debt 
Note: The table reports the independent variables for each model (models 1–5). 
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Table A1 Independent variables used in models (continued) 
Variables Definition 
Model 5  
 Winsorised Ln total assets Winsorised Ln total assets 
 Winsorised EBIT/total assets Winsorised EBIT/total assets 
 Winsorised equity to total assets Winsorised Equity to total assets 
 Winsorised financial assets/total assets Winsorised Financial assets/total assets 
 Winsorised operating  
cash flow/total assets 
Winsorised Operating cash flow/total assets 
 Gender  
(female or a married couple) 
Gender of the manager  
(female or a married couple) 
 Legal form of the firm  
(not a limited company) 
Legal form of the firm (not a limited company) 
 Court  
(Vantaa, Espoo or Helsinki) 
The case processed in courts  
Vantaa, Espoo or Helsinki 
 Age of the firm Age of the firm when  
reorganisation plan confirmed 
 Reason for financial distress: market Difficulties in market reported in 
reorganisation application 
 Suggested action: focusing on core 
functions 
Suggested action in reorganisation  
application focusing on core functions 
 Suggested action: focusing on marketing Suggested action in reorganisation  
application focusing on marketing 
 Industry: transportation Industry: transportation 
 Industry: service Industry: service 
 Industry: construction Industry: construction 
 Remission rate of non-secured debt Remission rate of non-secured debt predented 
in reorganisation application 
Note: The table reports the independent variables for each model (models 1–5). 
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Appendix 2 
Table A2 Descriptive statistics (variables in models 1–5) 
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Appendix 3 
Table A3 Correlation coefficients between financial and non-financial variables (models 1–5) 
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Appendix 4 
Figure A1 ROC curve for model 3 including operating cash flow information (see online version 
for colours) 
 
Appendix 5 
Figure A2 ROC curve for model 5 combining financial and non-financial information  
(see online version for colours) 
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Financial Paths of Reorganizing Firms After Reorganization Plan 
Confirmation  
 
 
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine the financial paths of small entrepreneurial firms 
(n=59) that are reorganizing under the Finnish Company Reorganization Act (FCRA, comparable 
to chapter 11 in the Bankruptcy Act in the US). The reorganization plans of firms were confirmed 
in 2000, and up to 55% of the firms failed during the first four years of reorganization and were 
forced into bankruptcy. The rest of the firms continued to operate. The financial data consist of 
financial statements for the year of plan confirmation and the subsequent three years. This study 
examines 1.) whether different financial paths can be found within the group of failed firms and 
within the group of non-failed firms (H1) and 2.) whether specific reorganization strategies are 
connected to the financial paths of firms (H2). Factor and cluster analyses are applied in the study. 
The empirical evidence supports both hypotheses. 
 
Keywords: reorganization; failure; entrepreneurial firms, non-financial characteristics, 
reorganization strategies, factor analysis, cluster analysis 
 
JEL classification: G Financial Economics G3 Corporate Finance and Governance G33 
Bankruptcy; Liquidation G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance 
 
 Acta Wasaensia 71 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
During the past decades the reorganization processes around the world have been claimed to be 
inefficient, since the processes have forced viable firms into bankruptcy and non-viable firms into 
reorganization (see e.g., Laitinen, 2013). Inefficient processes cause large economic and social 
losses for each stakeholder of a firm, and therefore, it is important to investigate reorganization 
processes of firms by identifying paths and strategies which lead to failure and non-failure of firms. 
Utilizing financial time series data and non-financial information, this study investigates Finnish 
small firms implementing reorganization programs under the Finnish Company Reorganization 
Act (FCRA, comparable to chapter 11 in the Bankruptcy Act in the US). More precisely, the study 
investigates whether the financial paths within the group of failed firms and within the group of 
non-failed firms are different (hypothesis 1) and whether the reorganization strategies are 
connected to financial paths of firms (hypothesis 2). In this context, “financial paths of firms” refer 
to the development of financial variables for the year of reorganization plan confirmation and the 
subsequent three years. The findings of the study will increase academic understanding of how 
reorganizing firms fail or survive and whether the strategies used are connected to financial paths 
of firms.  
 
Previous reorganization research, typically employing financial information from prior to 
reorganization filing, assumes that all firms fail according to the same process and that therefore, 
a single observation (usually an annual account) has been considered sufficient for each firm 
(Johnson, 1970; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). However, failure-prediction models do not work 
properly if the firms do not go through similar failure processes (Laitinen, 1991; Laitinen, 1993). 
In prior bankruptcy studies different failure paths have been found for different firms (Argenti, 
1976; Weitzel and Jonsson, 1989; D’Aveni, 1989; Laitinen, 1991, 1993; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 
2008; Laitinen and Lukason, 2014) but within the reorganization studies the failure processes have 
not been studied. Hence, in this study, the financial paths within the group of failed firms and 
within the group of non-failed firms are examined.  
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Because the FCRA is plan-oriented, like most reorganization processes, the role of the 
reorganization strategies applied during the process is important. The strategies typically refer to 
the changes in the organization and the business of a reorganizing firm, and they are used to 
improve the financial performance and to make a firm viable. Empirical evidence regarding the 
efficiency of different types of strategies used in voluntary reorganizations (see Smith and Graves, 
2005) has been found, but within legal reorganizations, the subject remains largely neglected (see 
Routledge and Gadenne, 2000, 2004; LoPucki and Doherty, 2002; Laitinen, 2011, 2013). 
However, none of the prior studies have examined the connection between reorganization 
strategies and the financial paths of firms, despite the fact that understanding of the reasons for 
these paths requires an analysis of the strategies behind the paths. Hence, this study will fill the 
gap in previous studies and examine the connection between reorganization strategies and the 
financial paths of firms during the reorganization program. 
 
Using a sample of 59 firms with confirmed reorganization plans, both the financial and non-
financial characteristics (mainly referring to the reorganization strategy) of the firms are examined. 
Typical for Finnish reorganizing firms, the sample firms are very small. Financial information is 
extracted from the financial statements for the year of reorganization plan confirmation and the 
subsequent three years. The sample includes solely firms with confirmed reorganization plans in 
year 2000 because the firms in that particular year are consistent with typical Finnish reorganizing 
firms. Non-financial information is extracted from the confirmed reorganization plans available to 
the court and creditors. Non-financial information refers to the reorganization strategies suggested 
in reorganization plans and other background information for the firm, its industry, and the 
reorganization process. 
 
The empirical findings of this study indicate that there are different financial paths within the group 
of failed firms and within the group of non-failed firms. In addition, a connection between 
reorganization strategies and the financial paths of firms is found. Firstly, within the group of failed 
firms, three financial paths are found. Most of the firms follow the chronic failure path. Rest of the 
firms follow the suddenly collapsing path, which has two subtypes, namely path with decreasing 
values of financial variables and path with increasing values of financial variables. These three 
paths are partially consistent with those three given in literature (given in D’Aveni, 1989; Laitinen, 
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1991). For instance, D’Aveni (1989) and Laitinen (1991) found as well a path with lingering firms 
and a path with rapidly declining firms. In the current study, within the group of non-failed firms, 
two financial paths are found. The first path is followed by firms with solvency problems, while 
the second path is followed by firms whose financial variables seem to substantially improve. 
Hence, there are more financial paths among failed firms than among non-failed firms, which may 
indicate that especially the failed firms may behave more differently. Secondly, the current study 
found that using various strategies simultaneously seems to be the most efficient option improving 
financial situation the most during the reorganization program. This result is consistent with the 
prior study by Schendel et al. (1976), which claimed that a set of strategies should be used instead 
of a single strategy. Most studies have, however, suggested using efficiency-oriented strategies 
(see, e.g. Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Chowdhury and Lang, 1996; Laitinen, 2008, 2009). The 
findings also show that the financial variables of firms applying the efficiency and finance 
strategies do not develop positively. The finding of inefficiency of finance strategies is consistent 
with prior studies claiming that these strategies do not strongly affect the long-term performance 
of firms, but such strategies are mainly used for short-term decline stemming purposes (see, e.g. 
Laitinen, 2011). Lastly, the results of the study show that the reorganization strategies and financial 
paths of failed firms are connected. However, no connection between the reorganization strategies 
and financial paths of non-failed firms is found. 
 
This study contributes to current reorganization research in at least six ways. Firstly, this study 
focuses on financial paths of reorganizing firms, which have largely been neglected in prior 
studies. In particular, this study uses post-confirmation financial information, while prior studies 
are mainly based on pre-confirmation financial information. Secondly, this study concentrates on 
very small entrepreneurial firms, which are consistent with typical Finnish reorganizing firms. 
However, most empirical studies on reorganization are focused on large, publicly owned firms. 
Thirdly, non-financial variables are examined in the study, which has been rare in prior 
reorganization studies. Fourthly, the connection between reorganization strategies and the 
financial paths of reorganizing firms is examined. Lastly, this study forms clusters in terms of 
financial and non-financial information, which is new in reorganization research. In prior studies, 
logistic regression analysis or discriminant analysis is typically applied. 
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The current paper is structured as follows. The second section summarizes the FCRA and the 
related literature. In addition, the section focuses on the development of the hypotheses. Section 3 
presents the data and variables and describes the methodology used to test the hypotheses. Section 
4 presents the results. In the final section, the main findings, limitations, and implications of the 
research are summarized.  
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2. Related literature and hypotheses development 
 
 
2.1 Reorganization procedure in Finland 
 
In Finland, the FCRA provides an opportunity for financially distressed but viable firms to 
rehabilitate their businesses, to ensure continued viability, and facilitate debt arrangements. The 
FCRA came originally into force in 1993 (Act 1993/47), and later, in 2007, the reform was 
legislated to improve the success of reorganizations (amendments up to 247/2007 included). 
Another option within the legal context in Finland is legal bankruptcy procedure (comparable to 
liquidation via chapter 7 in the US) (Laitinen, 2013). However, the payback-rate is higher in 
reorganizations because in 96.8% of bankruptcy liquidations, the creditors receive nothing. Hence, 
bankruptcies can cause large economic losses and other negative consequences. (Laitinen 2013). 
In the first years of the FCRA, the median payback-rate was 33.5 % in Finland (Sundgren, 1998), 
while it was 56.4% in the US (Ravid and Sundgren, 1998). The comparisons of different 
reorganization systems performed by Philippe et al. (2002) and Laakso (2012) reveal that the 
FCRA is somewhat different from other reorganization acts worldwide, even though the FCRA, 
like many other reorganization systems, is plan-based and debt-restructuring plays a major role 
(for a comparison of different systems see Philippe et al., 2002; Couwenberg, 2001 ). 
 
The purpose of the FCRA is to produce a reorganization plan including both business and debt 
restructuring that is aimed at recovering the firm. The FCRA can be divided into two larger stages: 
the stage before the reorganization plan confirmation (the reorganization event) and the stage after 
the plan confirmation (the performance event). These stages are comparable to Voluntary 
Administration in Australia (Laitinen, 2013; Routledge and Gadenne, 2000). In the reorganization 
event, the role of the courts is important because the courts evaluate the possibility of surviving 
reorganization by concentrating on the financial and non-financial information related to the firm. 
If the firm is selected for reorganization, reorganization proceedings are opened, and a 
reorganization plan is prepared. The plan is considered by the court and confirmed if certain 
conditions are met. The reorganization plan may be approved in three ways: upon the acceptance 
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of all known creditors, upon the acceptance of the majorities among the groups of creditors, or at 
the request of the person who prepared the plan (the administrator or the debtor) when certain 
conditions defined in the law are met (see FCRA § 54). The second stage of the FCRA (the 
performance event) refers to the reorganization plan implementation. In this stage, the firms will 
carry out the plan or fail and go bankrupt during the program (Laitinen, 2013). Most reorganization 
studies concentrate on the reorganization event, while this study focuses on the performance event.  
 
In light of the empirical evidence of prior studies, the reorganization procedure in Finland seems 
to be inefficient. Altogether, 4,482 reorganization petitions were submitted by the firms to the 
courts from 2003 to 2013. The annual number of reorganization petitions has been approximately 
500 since 2009 (Statistics Finland). Around 60% of these petitions have been approved by the 
courts, and approximately 75% of these firms will obtain a confirmed reorganization plan. 
Furthermore, 40-50% of the firms will fail during the reorganization program. Therefore, the 
failure rate among Finnish firms is very high but comparable to the failure rate in the US (Jensen-
Conklin, 1992). On the other hand, the failure rate is smaller, for example, in Canada (Fisher and 
Martel, 1995). 
 
2.2 Financial paths of reorganizing firms 
 
Prior reorganization studies have mainly focused on predicting the failure of reorganization. 
Because failure in reorganization means, as a matter of fact, bankruptcy under the Finnish 
Bankruptcy Act (FBA), reorganization-failure-prediction studies are related to firm-failure-
prediction studies indicating bankruptcy (Laitinen, 2013). Most prior studies have focused on 
predicting the failure of firms (see, e.g., literature reviews by Dimitras et al., 1996; Altman and 
Narayanan, 1997; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006), while studies on failure processes are scarce. Failure 
process studies have examined either the whole lifecycle of firms or the final stages before the 
collapse. The terminology used in prior failure studies is mixed because some studies have used 
terms such as “trajectory” (Argenti, 1976; du Jardin, 2010; 2015), “patterns” (D’Aveni, 1989; 
Crutzen, 2009; Crutzen and Van Caillie, 2010), “process” (Laitinen, 1991; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 
2008), “pathways” (Moulton et al., 1996), and “extinction” (Sheppard and Chowdhury, 2005), and 
some of these are applied in different ways in different studies. In this study, the term “financial 
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path” is used referring to the financial variables for the year of reorganization plan confirmation 
and the subsequent three years (years 2000-2003) which presents the financial situation of firms 
during the first four years of reorganization. 
 
Despite the large number of static failure-prediction studies, firm failure cannot be considered a 
sudden and unexpected event (Luoma and Laitinen, 1991). Firstly, almost all classic statistical 
failure-prediction models use only a single observation (usually based on annual accounts) for 
each firm (Johnson, 1970). When using a single observation, it is assumed that annual accounts 
are independent “repeated measurements,” even though the observations are not entirely 
independent. It is also difficult to know when to observe a firm, which may introduce a selection 
bias in the resulting model (Mensah, 1984; Shumway, 2001). For instance, a healthy firm suffering 
from temporary difficulties may be classified as failing by the model. Hence, it is more natural and 
justified to consider the time-series behavior of failing firms, instead of a cross-sectional analysis. 
 
The pioneering work of Argenti (1976) was one of the first to present failure as a process consisting 
of three types of failure trajectories. The firms belonging to the first type of failure group are newly 
founded, and the performance of these firms is constantly poor before the failure. The second 
group contains young firms that have excellent figures before the failure. The last group includes 
mature firms whose performance has been good or excellent for a number of years or decades. 
However, at some stage, major change occurs, and without responding to this change, the firm will 
collapse. Argenti’s study is based on the entire lifecycle of a firm. After the seminal work by 
Argenti (1976), few studies on the failure processes of firms have been published. These studies 
have found a small number of distinct failure processes, and the focus has been on the financial 
variables of firms (e.g., Laitinen, 1991; Laitinen, 1993), the non-financial variables (Crutzen and 
Van Caillie, 2010), or both the financial and non-financial variables (e.g., Hambrick and D’Aveni, 
1988; D’Aveni, 1989; Moulton et al., 1996). However, some of these studies lack large-scale 
empirical proof (e.g., Argenti, 1976; Ooghe and de Prijcker, 2008). However, none of the studies 
have examined the financial paths of reorganizing firms, even though doing so might increase the 
understanding of failure prediction. In the same way, all firms do not survive in the same manner, 
which weakens the prediction of survival. Therefore, this study is the first to examine the financial 
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paths of reorganizing firms. The paths are identified by using factor and cluster analyses. Hence, 
the first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: Different financial paths exist within the group of failed reorganizing firms and within the 
group of non-failed reorganizing firms 
 
2.3 Financial variables in the reorganization literature 
 
Firm failure-prediction studies mainly use financial variables because the financial data are based 
on hard, objective, publicly available information (Laitinen, 1992). The most commonly used 
financial variables are those representing the profitability, liquidity, leverage, cash flow, and 
efficiency of firms (Dimitras et al., 1996). The variables used in the studies are selected on 
empirical grounds because the existing literature suffers from prevailing theories (Scott, 1981; 
Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006).  
 
Prior reorganization studies examining the reorganization decisions (event 1) have found that size, 
capital structure (equity-to-assets ratio), liquidity, and profitability have a positive impact on the 
likelihood of a reorganization decision. However, when predicting failure during the 
reorganization program (event 2), these results cannot be applied in total, due to the fact that 
financial restructuring will affect the leverage position of a firm positively. For instance, the study 
by Routledge and Gadenne (2000) found that firms that reorganize successfully are more profitable 
and more highly leveraged and have higher short-term liquidity than before reorganization. Hence, 
pre-filing leverage is suggested to positively affect success during the reorganization program due 
to debt forgiveness (see Laitinen 2013, Routledge and Gadenne, 2000).  
 
However, previous failure prediction studies are not unanimous regarding the role of accrual- and 
cash-flow-based information. Several studies suggest using only cash-based variables (Gentry et 
al., 1985, 1987; Aziz and Lawson, 1989) or at least including cash-based variables along with 
financial variables (Gombola and Ketz, 1983; Sharma and Iselin, 2003), while other studies claim 
that only accrual-based variables are needed in the models (Casey and Bartczak, 1984; Gombola 
et al., 1987). However, there are several reasons why cash-based variables should be included in 
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the models of small distressed firms. Firstly, distressed firms tend to hide the actual financial 
situation by manipulating or managing their annual accounts, which makes accrual-based 
information more vulnerable to managerial manipulation (Argenti, 1976; Charitou and 
Lambertides, 2003). Secondly, most of the distressed firms are small, and the financial variables 
of small firms are typically unstable and contain extreme values, which may affect the accrual-
based models more strongly than cash-based models (see Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). Moreover, 
the internal control systems of small firms may be insufficient (Keasey and Watson, 1987; 
Charitou and Lambertides, 2003), which decreases the prediction accuracy of accrual-based 
information. However, the predictive ability of accrual-based information can be improved by 
dividing the ratios by an asset concept, which is more stable than a flow concept. Moreover, the 
extreme values of financial variables can be eliminated by winsorizing the variables (Balcaen and 
Ooghe, 2006). 
 
2.4 Non-financial variables in reorganization literature 
 
Even though the existing failure prediction studies have mainly focused on financial variables, the 
use of non-financial or qualitative failure indicators is recommended as well (Laitinen, 2008; 
2009). Non-financial information is not exposed to extreme values, instability, or manipulation, 
which is often true of financial information. Furthermore, the values of non-financial information 
are not changed in financial restructuring, as financial information is. Especially in the case of very 
small firms, this can be critical (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). According to the literature on 
reorganization, many non-financial failure predictors have been suggested. For instance, the 
background characteristics of the firm, business and management, information on owner-managers 
(entrepreneurs), and the reorganization strategies used have been found to be important in prior 
studies, even though the results of the studies are mixed. However, this study focuses on the 
connection between reorganization strategies and the financial paths of firms. Other non-financial 
variables related to the firm, its industry, and its reorganization process is only used to interpret 
the contents of the clusters. 
 
Prior research has provided evidence regarding the efficiency of various types of reorganization 
strategies. The strategies are largely studied in voluntary reorganizations (see Smith and Graves, 
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2005) and rarely studied in legal reorganizations (Routledge and Gadenne, 2000, 2004; LoPucki 
and Doherty, 2002; Laitinen, 2008, 2009), and studies of micro-firms are scarce (Laitinen, 2011). 
However, the literature is not unanimous regarding how these strategies should be classified and 
which strategies are the most efficient in improving performance (Smith and Graves, 2005). One 
of the most important studies related to reorganization strategies within voluntary reorganizations 
is that of Schendel et al. (1976). The study grouped strategies into efficiency-oriented and 
entrepreneurial-oriented strategies. The efficiency oriented strategies deal with internal processes 
of an organization (Cameron, 1983). These strategies refer to improvement of efficiency of the 
company and they are used in order to better use the organizational resources (Woo and Cooper, 
1981). As such, they deal with the internal processes of an organization. An example of efficiency-
oriented actions is cost-cutting. On the other hand, entrepreneurial turnaround actions are more 
market-oriented. They deal with resource acquisition and revenue generation (Cameron, 1983) or 
on changes in market niches (Hambrick and Schecter, 1983). Examples of entrepreneurial 
strategies are diversification, vertical integration, new market share thrusts and divestment. 
However, Schendel et al (1976) suggest that a set of strategies should be used, rather than one 
particular strategy. 
 
Hoffman (1989) classified reorganization strategies into operational and strategic actions. That 
study suggests that operational actions should be applied when the firm has internal failure causes, 
whereas strategic actions should be applied when the cause of the failure is external. Later several 
researchers such as Bibeault (1982), Robbins and Pearce (1992), and Arogyaswamy et al. (1995) 
argued that strategies should be classified into decline-stemming and recovery strategies. The 
findings of their studies suggest that decline-stemming strategies stabilize the financial conditions 
of a firm, while recovery strategies can be used after stabilization. Overall, the prior literature has 
suggested that efficiency-oriented (active) reorganization strategies, such as cost-cutting, seem to 
be the most important in reorganizations (Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Chowdhury and Lang, 1996; 
Laitinen, 2008, 2009; Smith and Graves, 2005). In addition, Robbins and Pearce (1992) and 
Laitinen (2000) claim that efficiency-oriented strategies should be used regardless of the cause of 
failure. In contrast, passive financial actions (such as the remission of non-secured debt) may not 
be effective in the long run (see e.g Laitinen, 2000; Laitinen, 2011) when reorganizing a small firm 
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because financial actions only concentrate on improving the financial situation of the firm but not 
the profitability. In summary, we present the following general hypothesis: 
 
H2: Reorganization strategies are connected to the financial paths of reorganizing firms 
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3. Research design and method 
 
 
3. 1 Data 
 
The original sample consists of all Finnish firms (n=89) whose reorganization plans were 
confirmed by the courts in 2000. Firms with insufficient pre-filing non-financial information (n=5) 
or financial information (n=25) are excluded from the analysis. More precisely, the firms excluded 
due to insufficient pre-filing financial data include those that are not obliged to use the double-
entry accounting system. Hence, the final sample consists of 59 firms, which is approximately 
66% of the cohort that started the reorganization program in 2000. 
 
Because of the length of the reorganization programs (5-10 years), the status of the firms 
(failure/success) was examined at the end of 2010. The distribution of the length of the 
reorganization programs at the time of interruption is presented in Figure 1. In total, approximately 
half of the firms failed (n=28) by the end of 2010 and were forced into bankruptcy. For 2001, 2002, 
and 2003, the number of failed firms was 1, 10, and 13, respectively. Between the years 2004 and 
2010 solely four firms have failed. Later, the interruptions were examined at 2016 and the number 
of failed reorganizations between the years 2010 and 2016 was 14. Therefore, in total, 42 firms 
have interrupted their reorganization process by 2016, and solely 17 firms are still operating. 
 
The secondary data are obtained from reorganization petitions, including pre-filing financial 
statements (income statements and balance sheets for the previous year) and reorganization plans 
confirmed by the courts. The financial data consist of financial statements for the year of 
confirmation and the subsequent three years (2000-2003). However, the legal form of a firm may 
affect its annual accounts because more than half of the sample firms (64.4%) are limited 
companies (corporations), with the others being non-limited. The annual accounts may differ 
between limited and non-limited companies due to drawings by the owners in non-limited 
companies. These drawings replace the salaries in the annual accounts of non-limited companies, 
and they indicate a reduction of the owners' equity, which affects the balance sheet of a firm. 
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Because the drawings do not affect the income statements of the firm, as salaries do, the 
profitability may be better in non-limited companies than in limited companies. 
 
The sample consists of typical firms filing a petition for reorganization under the FCRA because 
the firms in the sample are very small and distressed. The median number of employees in the 
sample prior to reorganization is three employees. The average pre-filing net (annual) sales are 
264,400 Euros (TEUR). The firms fall into different industrial categories. About 32.2% of the 
firms are manufacturing firms, 23.7% are service firms, and 11.9% are transportation firms. 
Industry is controlled in the study by including the industry dummy as a background variable when 
interpreting the clusters.  
 
3.2. Variables 
 
The hypotheses of the study deal with financial and non-financial variables. Financial variables 
are used in order to examine whether different financial paths exist within the group of failed firms 
and within the group of non-failed firms (H1) and also to test the connection between 
reorganization strategies and the financial paths of firms (H2). The financial variables are extracted 
from the post-filing financial statements for the year of reorganization plan confirmation and the 
subsequent three years (2000-2003). The study includes five financial variables that reflect the 
profitability, liquidity, solvency, size, and cash flow of firms during the first four years of 
reorganization (2000-2003). The variables are presented in Appendix 1. The variables selected are 
LN ASSETS for years 1-4, FATA for years 1-4, ETA for years 1-4, EBIT for years 1-4, and OPCF 
for years 2-4. The variables for the first year (2000) do not include OPCF, because the changes 
related to OPCF could not be calculated due to a lack of data from the previous year. The variables 
are winsorized by 5 percent, both upwards and downwards (this cutoff point was the best of several 
alternatives considered). Thus, the cutoff point for extreme values is set equal to the lower and 
upper 5th percentiles. In addition, all selected variables are divided by assets. This is advantageous 
because asset concepts are more stable over time than cash-flow concepts. The financial variables 
and ln assets measuring the size of the firm are found to be important factors in prior bankruptcy 
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theory and related empirical evidence (see, e.g., Scott, 1981; Jones, 1987; Laitinen, 1991; Dimitras 
et al., 1996; Altman and Narayanan, 1997; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). 
 
The non-financial variables reflect the reorganization strategies used in the reorganization plans of 
firms. The strategy variables are used in order to cluster the firms in terms of their reorganization 
strategies (H2). The strategy dummies selected for the analysis (n=14) are as follows: 1) changing 
the manager, 2) organizational changes, 3) changing the firm’s legal form, 4) focusing on core 
business, 5) improving production efficiency, 6) increasing revenue, 7) improving the planning of 
activities, 8) improving the control of activities, 9) the realization of fixed assets, 10) the realization 
of current assets, 11) the additional deployment of equity, 12) searching for new sources of debt, 
13) focusing on marketing, and 14) cutting expenses. The dummies receive a value of 1 when the 
firm is using the strategy and a value of 0 otherwise. The variable groups are named based on a 
study by Laitinen (2000), and similar factors are found in the prior literature on voluntary 
reorganizations (see Smith and Graves, 2005). Within legal reorganizations, the effect of 
reorganization strategies is largely neglected (see Routledge and Gadenne, 2000, 2004; LoPucki 
and Doherty, 2002; Laitinen, 2008, 2009). 
 
Other non-financial variables are used to reflect the background information of the firm, its 
industry, and its reorganization process. Hence, the background variables are only used to interpret 
the contents of the clusters. The background variables selected are 1) industry (dummies: 
transportation, service, construction), 2) the age of the firm, 3) the gender of the managing director 
(dummy: female or a married couple), 4) the legal form of the firm (dummy: not a limited 
company), 5) the remission rate of non-secured debt, 6) the reason for financial distress (dummy: 
difficulties in the market), and 7) payment default (dummy). Industry is measured by three binary 
(dummy) variables referring to the transportation, service, and construction industries. The dummy 
variable receives a value 1 if the firm is operating in that particular industry and receives 0 
otherwise. The age of the firm is calculated in years as the period from the founding year to the 
year of reorganization plan confirmation (2000). Thirdly, the gender of the owner-manager is 
measured by a dummy variable that is 1 for firms managed by females or couples. Firms managed 
by male managers receive a value of 0. The legal form of the firm (not a limited company) receives 
a value of 0 for limited companies and 1 for non-limited companies. The remission rate of non-
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secured debt is calculated as the percentage of remission used by the firms. The difficulties-in-the-
market dummy variable, showing the reason for the financial distress, receives a value of 1 when 
the reason for distress prior to reorganization has been the market. The payment default dummy 
receives a value of 1 if the firm has defaulted on payments prior to reorganization in 1999-2000. 
The non-financial variables selected are found in bankruptcy and reorganization studies, though 
the results of these studies are mixed. Reorganization studies using these variables are scarce, even 
though these variables may include incremental information about financial ratios (see, e.g., 
Barniv et al., 2002; Fisher and Martel, 2004; Poston et al., 1994; Laitinen, 2013). 
 
3.3 Statistical methods 
 
Factor and cluster analyses, Kruskal-Wallis test, and Fisher’s exact test are applied in order to test 
the hypotheses. Firstly, factor and cluster analyses are used to find the financial paths within the 
cluster of failed firms and those within the cluster of non-failed firms. The analyses are applied 
separately for both groups. By using factor analysis, the financial variables presented in Chapter 
3.2 are reduced to a small number of independent latent dimensions of the financial variables. 
These dimensions are used in the cluster analysis to extract a taxonomy of firms and illustrate the 
differences in the financial characteristics of firms. More precisely, the factor scores are used in 
the cluster analysis to classify the firms into groups. The highest factor score of a firm is associated 
with the most important characteristic of a specific firm. Later, the financial paths of firms are 
examined by interpreting the median values of the variables presented in Section 3.2. However, 
the samples for the four years are unequal due to interrupted reorganizations, and therefore, the 
financial paths represent the financial variables of the remaining firms for every year. The 
differences between the median financial and non-financial variables in the hypothesized clusters 
are tested via a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis statistic. 
 
Secondly, the factor and cluster analyses and Kruskal-Wallis test are similarly applied when testing 
the connection between reorganization strategies and the financial paths of firms (H2). Factor 
analysis is first used to extract factors related to 14 explanatory variables concerning the 
reorganization strategies. The factor scores are then used in the cluster analysis to group the firms 
according to the strategies. Afterwards, the difference in the medians of the financial and strategy 
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variables in the hypothesized clusters is tested via a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis statistic. These 
differences are also tested for the background variables to facilitate the interpretation of the 
clusters. Lastly, the connection between the financial variables and reorganization strategies is 
tested via Fisher’s exact test. 
 
In the current study, the eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule (K1 or Kaiser criterion, see Kaiser, 1960) 
is used in order to determine the number of factors. Hence, the factors that have eigenvalues greater 
than one are retained for interpretation. In addition, in the current analysis, the typology of firms 
is interpreted via an orthogonal Varimax solution, which leads to the factors being statistically 
linearly independent of one another. A Varimax solution refers to a situation in which the variables 
receive high loadings on the factor in question and low loadings on other factors. Therefore, the 
coefficient of correlation between them is zero, and there is no multicollinearity (Fabrigar et al., 
1999).  
 
The clustering method used in the current study is hierarchical cluster analysis. The study uses 
rotated factor scores as input variables for the cluster analysis because they are standardized and 
uncorrelated. In the hierarchical cluster analysis, a series of divisions takes place, starting with the 
most similar observations or variables being amalgamated in one cluster. In the next step, the 
remaining most similar clusters are amalgamated. The hierarchical clustering method uses the 
dissimilarities (similarities) or distances between the objects when formulating the clusters. The 
distance method used in this study is Ward’s (1963) method, which uses an analysis of variance 
approach to evaluate the distances between the clusters. By using Ward’s method, the variation 
within the clusters is not increased by too extreme a degree, which results in clusters that are as 
homogeneous as possible (Statsoft, 2001).  
 
The significance of differences in medians between the clusters is tested via a non-parametric 
Kruskal-Wallis statistic. Here, the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test is based on the Wilcoxon 
scores of the location of the distributions and has been used to test whether the distribution of a 
variable has the same location parameter across the clusters of firms (Statsoft, 2001). Lastly, the 
connection between financial variables and reorganization strategies is tested via Fisher’s exact 
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test, which is used to examine the significance of the association (contingency) between the 
clusters (see: Fisher, 1922, 1954). 
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4. Empirical results 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for financial variables for the first four years of reorganization for the 
entire sample are reported in Appendix 2. The median values of the variables demonstrate that the 
sample firms are very small, non-profitable, and indebted. The cash flows of the sample firms are 
minor, and the liquidity of firms is moderate. Interestingly, during the first four years, the size of 
the firms remained stable, and the solvency of firms decreased. The profitability and cash flows of 
firms increased slightly. However, the observations are relatively heterogeneous in all respects. 
For example, the lowest ETA, representing solvency, is -846.26, whereas the largest ETA amounts 
to 90.76. In terms of EBIT, representing profitability, the range is from -133.83 to 344.04.  
 
Appendix 3 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients of the selected financial variables. Some 
interesting remarks can be made regarding this table. For example, LN ASSETS is correlated with 
several variables. It is positively correlated with ETA and negatively correlated with FATA and 
EBIT over the sample period. Moreover, in 2003, LN ASSETS is negatively correlated with 
OPCF. Hence, the larger firms may be more solvent during reorganization, but their liquidity and 
profitability may be lower. The correlations presented show that there may be some 
multicollinearity between the variables. However, none of the correlation coefficients are above 
0.8, which can be considered the boundary of serious multicollinearity (see Lewis-Beck, 1980). 
 
4.2 Testing Hypothesis 1 - Identification of financial paths 
 
Financial paths of failed firms 
 
The factor analysis applied to the failed reorganizing firms reveals that each factor has special 
characteristics of its own. By using eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule and scree test (see chapter 
3.3) the number of factors is restricted to three. The model of three factors accounts for about 51% 
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of the total variation of the initial variables for failed firms. The factor loadings in the Varimax 
rotated factor matrices are reported in Table 1. The factor loadings demonstrate how the variables 
are connected to one another and to the factors. The variables with high (absolute) loadings are 
strongly associated with the hidden dimension behind the factor solution. For example, the first 
latent variable (Factor 1) links various variables together. The factor is strongly associated with 
the development of ETA and LN ASSETS in the first three years of reorganization. The loadings 
for EBIT(2), EBIT(3) and OPCF(3) are negative. This indicates that increasing the EBIT and 
OPCF during these years will decrease the value of the factor score. The second factor (Factor 2) 
is especially linked to FATA during the first three years of reorganization. The loadings for 
OPCF(2) and LN ASSETS(4) are negative, indicating that these characteristics decrease the value 
of the factor score. Lastly, the third factor (Factor 3) links together EBIT(1), EBIT(4), OPCF(4), 
FATA(4), and ETA(4). The loadings for FATA(4) and ETA(4) are negative, and hence, they 
decrease the value of the factor score.  
 
(TABLE 1 HERE) 
 
Next, the factor scores are used as inputs in the cluster analysis to find different financial paths 
within the group of failed firms and within the group of non-failed firms. The number of clusters 
is restricted to three because the fourth cluster does not add to the explanatory power and the 
sample is small. After reducing the number of clusters to two, almost all firms are grouped into 
the first cluster. Hence, having three clusters is optimal. The first cluster of failed firms contains 
14 firms, while the second cluster includes six firms, and the third cluster includes eight firms. 
 
Last, the financial paths of firms in each cluster are examined. The median values of financial 
variables are presented in Table 2. However, the financial variables are not available for all years, 
due to insufficient financial data and interrupted reorganizations. Hence, the median values 
demonstrate the values of existing firms during the first four years. Table 2 illustrates that three 
types of financial paths can be found.  
 
The first type of financial path symbolizes a chronic failure due to poor performance according to 
most of the variables during the studied four-year period. During the first three years, the values 
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of ratios have collapsed in a steady manner, and there are no sudden changes. However, during the 
fourth year, the values of LN ASSETS, EBIT, OPCF, and FATA, representing size, profitability, 
cash flow, and liquidity, have suddenly increased, even though the value of EBIT remains 
negative. EBIT increased the most from the third year (-36,473) to the fourth year (-5,61). Thus, 
despite the increase of variables during the fourth year of reorganization, it may be relatively easy 
to predict the bankruptcy of firms during the program due to the negative values of the variables 
throughout the years. 
 
The second type of path can be characterized as sudden failure because the values of the financial 
variables of firms (n=6) have changed rapidly during the four years. The firms connected to this 
type of financial path attempt to solve their problems early in the reorganization process because 
the values of the variables increased a great deal during the second year of reorganization. 
However, during the third year, the values of FATA and ETA decreased again, and during the 
fourth year, all values other than ETA decreased again, and all values of variables other than 
FATA(4) are negative during the fourth year. Hence, only the liquidity of these firms is good 
during the fourth year. The values of EBIT(4), ETA(4), and OPCF(4) are very low, which 
inevitable leads to liquidity problems. Hence this type of firms can be characterizes as sudden 
failures with decreasing values of financial variables. 
 
The third type of financial path symbolizes sudden failure as well because the values of the 
financial variables of firms (n=9) change rapidly between the years. However, almost all financial 
variables are higher during the fourth year of reorganization than during the first year and the firms 
are larger as well. Only FATA is lower during the fourth year. During the fourth year, financial 
variables other than ETA are positive, which indicates better financial performance during the 
fourth year. In addition, the values of FATA, EBIT, and OPCF are positive every year. OPCF also 
shows the highest values in this cluster. Only ETA is negative every year. Hence, the firms in this 
cluster perform better than the firms in the second cluster in terms of EBIT and OPCF. Therefore 
this failure process can be characterized as sudden failure with increasing values of financial 
variables.  
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Table 2 presents the Kruskal-Wallis test results. The results show that there are statistically 
significant differences in some variables between the clusters. These variables are LN ASSETS(1), 
LN ASSETS(2), FATA(1), FATA(2), FATA(3), EBIT(3), EBIT(4), OPCF(3), and OPCF(4). 
Therefore, the empirical findings support Hypothesis 1 regarding the different financial paths 
within the cluster of failed firms. In addition, this result is consistent with prior literature reporting 
various failure processes.  
 
(TABLE 2 HERE) 
 
Financial paths of non-failed firms 
 
The results of the factor analysis for non-failed firms (n=31) are presented in Table 3. As above, 
the eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule and scree test (see chapter 3.3) are used in order to find the 
optimal number of factors (see Cattel, 1966). By interpreting these, the number of factors is 
restricted to three for this group of firms. The models of these three factors account for about 76% 
of the total variation of the initial variables for non-failed firms. The results indicate that the first 
factor is linked to LN ASSETS in all four years of reorganization and also to ETA(3) and ETA(4). 
However, the loadings for EBIT(1) and OPCF(4) are negative, which indicates that they decrease 
the value of the factor score. The second factor is associated with EBIT(2), EBIT(3), EBIT(4), 
OPCF(2), and OPCF(3). The loadings for ETA(1) and ETA(2) are negative in this factor. Lastly, 
the third factor is strongly associated with the time-series development of FATA. 
 
(TABLE 3 HERE) 
 
Afterwards, two clusters of firms are formed by using the factor scores. The number of clusters is 
restricted to two because the third cluster does not add to the explanatory power and the sample is 
small. The first cluster includes 21 firms, while the second cluster contains ten firms. The median 
values of financial variables demonstrate the financial paths of firms, and these median values are 
reported in Table 4. The first type of financial path among non-failed firms (n=21) characterizes 
those firms whose FATA and EBIT values improved from Year 1 to Year 4. However, ETA is 
poor every year, and it continues deteriorating until Year 3. After that, it increases a bit during 
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Year 4. LN ASSETS decreased in the fourth year in comparison to the first year. Hence, the first 
type of financial path can be characterized as that experienced by firms with solvency problems. 
 
The second type of financial path is similar to the first path, but the firms (n=10) perform better in 
terms of financial variables in this cluster. Only ETA is negative every year, and EBIT is negative 
during the first year. Most of the values of the variables are drastically higher during the fourth 
year than in the first year. LN ASSETS and OPCF remain stable over the years. However, the 
firms are smaller during the fourth year. Therefore, the second type of path symbolizes firms whose 
financial variables are improving substantially. 
 
Lastly, the Kruskal-Wallis test results reported in Table 4 show that there are statistically 
significant differences in certain variables between the clusters. Firstly, LN ASSETS and FATA 
are statistically significantly different every year. Secondly, ETA(1) and EBIT(2) are statistically 
significantly different. Thus, these results support Hypothesis 1 regarding the differing financial 
paths of firms within the cluster of non-failed firms.  
 
(TABLE 4 HERE) 
 
Additional tests 
 
The analyses in the previous sections indicate that the financial paths of firms within the clusters 
of failed firms and within the cluster of non-failed firms are different. In the following, the 
differences in financial information between all clusters are examined by using a Kruskal-Wallis 
test. Overall, the results reported in Table 5 show that the differences in several financial variables 
between clusters are statistically significant. Firstly, FATA and LN ASSETS are statistically 
significant every year. Secondly, ETA(1), EBIT(2), EBIT(3), and OPCF(4) appear to be 
statistically significant. Furthermore, non-financial background information is examined 
separately for the failed and non-failed firms and between all clusters of failed and non-failed firms 
by conducting Kruskal-Wallis tests. However, the results lack significance, because the only 
statistically significant variable is the age of the firm between the clusters of non-failed firms. 
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(TABLE 5 HERE) 
 
4.3 Testing Hypothesis 2 – The effect of reorganization strategies 
 
The results of the factor and cluster analyses in the previous sections indicate that the financial 
paths between the firms in the clusters of failed and non-failed firms are different. In the following, 
the connection between reorganization strategies and financial paths is examined by applying 
several tests. First, the reorganization strategy groups are identified by using factor analysis. Four 
factors were chosen because the factor solution of these four factors explains 53% of the variation, 
the sample is small, and the fifth factor does not significantly add to the explanatory power. The 
factor loadings for the Varimax rotated factor matrix are presented in Table 6. The variable groups 
represented in Table 6 are named after the study by Laitinen (2002). 
 
(TABLE 6 HERE) 
  
As can be seen from Table 6, the first latent variable (Factor 1) is especially linked to efficiency 
improvement strategies. The second factor (Factor 2) is associated with efficiency improvement 
and expense strategies. The expense-cutting strategies obviously also relate to improving 
efficiency. On the other hand, the loading for increasing revenue (product strategy) is negative, 
which indicates that increasing revenue will decrease the value of the factor score. The third latent 
variable (Factor 3) refers, above all, to finance strategies. The variables “additional equity 
deployment” and “searching for new sources of debt” have the highest loadings on this factor. The 
loading for improving production efficiency is negative, which indicates that improving 
production efficiency will decrease the value of the factor score. Finally, the fourth factor is 
associated with asset strategies and the “focusing on marketing” product strategy. 
 
As discussed earlier, the factor scores are next used in order to categorize the firms when 
performing the hierarchical cluster analysis (see Appendix 4). The number of clusters is restricted 
to three because the fourth cluster does not add to the explanatory power and the sample is small. 
The first cluster includes 29 firms, while the second and third clusters contain 19 and eleven firms, 
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respectively. The strategies are reported in Table 7, and the five most important measures are 
presented in bold.  
 
(TABLE 7 HERE) 
 
As Table 7 indicates, firms (n=29) in the first cluster (cluster 1) have used, above all, product and 
expense strategies. Eighty-six percent of these firms have used the “cutting expenses” expense 
strategy. Thus, the first cluster contains firms that have used product and expense strategies. The 
firms in the second cluster (n=19) deal mostly with the efficiency and finance strategies. Of the 
efficiency strategies, “focusing on core business” and “improving control of activities” are the 
most often used strategies among the firms. Interestingly, the firms in this cluster use finance 
strategies more than the firms in other clusters. Hence, the second cluster contains firms using 
efficiency and finance strategies. Lastly, the firms in the third cluster (n=11) use various strategies. 
Of all the strategies, only “searching for new sources of debt” is not actively used, while the 
“changing the firm legal form” (64%), “improving planning of activities” (73%), and “improving 
control of activities” (73%) efficiency strategies are most often used. Furthermore, 36% of firms 
have used the “realization of current assets” asset strategy, which distinguishes these firms from 
the firms in the other clusters. Hence, the third cluster contains firms that have used various 
strategies. The differences between the clusters are tested via the Kruskal-Wallis test. The test 
results reported in Table 7 demonstrate that there are statistically significant differences in various 
variables between the clusters. 
 
In order to show the financial paths of the firms in the three clusters, the median values of the 
financial variables are reported in Appendix 5. As can be noted from Appendix 5, the financial 
paths of firms are different between the clusters. In the first cluster (Cluster 1), FATA and ETA 
are relatively stable during the first four years of reorganization. However, ETA remains poor 
every year. On the other hand, EBIT and OPCF increase, whereas LN ASSETS remains stable. 
EBIT increased from year 1 (-0,58) to year 4 (16,71). Thus, product and expense strategies may 
impact the profitability and cash flows of firms positively, as well as stabilize the liquidity and 
solvency of firms. EBIT, OPCF, and FATA are also highest among the firms in this cluster. In the 
second cluster (Cluster 2), the median values of financial variables decrease over all years of 
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reorganization. Only EBIT varies considerably between years. LN ASSETS is slightly higher in 
the fourth year in comparison to the first year. Thus, the efficiency and finance strategies applied 
in Cluster 2 do not positively affect the financial variables of firms. Lastly, in the third cluster 
(Cluster 3), the values of all financial variables other than FATA improve during the years 
examined. However, FATA is still positive during the fourth year. The firms are also larger during 
the fourth year in comparison to the first year. In addition, this cluster is the only cluster with 
positive ETA values (measuring solvency). Hence, using various strategies may improve the 
financial conditions of firms. 
 
These results are consistent with the prior studies to a degree. First, the findings related to the third 
cluster are consistent with the prior study by Schendel et al. (1976), suggesting that a set of 
strategies should be used rather than one particular strategy. The efficiency and finance strategies 
applied in Cluster 2 do not positively affect the financial variables of firms. This result is consistent 
with prior studies claiming that finance strategies do not strongly affect the long-term performance 
of firms; rather, they are mainly used for short-term decline-stemming purposes (see, e.g., Laitinen, 
2011). However, the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test show only a few significant differences in 
the financial variables between the clusters. These differences are related to LN ASSETS(3) and 
LN ASSETS(4).  
 
Afterwards, the frequency distributions of three clusters of firms related to reorganization 
strategies and five clusters of firms related to financial paths are introduced (see Table 8). Then, 
the connection between clusters of financial variables and reorganization strategies is examined 
by using Fisher’s exact test. However, the results of Fisher’s exact test show no connection 
between the reorganization strategy clusters (three clusters) and all the financial paths of the failed 
and non-failed firms (five clusters), but the results of the test show that there is a clear connection 
between the strategy clusters and financial paths of failed firms (three clusters) because the p-value 
of Fisher’s exact test is 0,0302. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is partly supported because a connection 
between the reorganization strategies and financial paths of failed firms has been found. 
 
(TABLE 8 HERE) 
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Background information on firms 
 
Because the role of non-financial information during reorganizations has been found important in 
prior studies, the current study examines non-financial background information between the 
clusters by applying Kruskal-Wallis tests. The test results reported in Table 9 demonstrate that 
there are no statistically significant differences between the clusters. However, some interesting 
remarks can be made. For instance, in Panel 1 of Table 9, it is demonstrated that the share of 
production and service firms is largest among all three clusters. Furthermore, approximately 50% 
of firms in each cluster experienced payment defaults prior to reorganization plan confirmation.  
 
(TABLE 9 HERE) 
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5. Summary and discussion 
 
 
This paper examined Finnish firms (n=59) reorganizing under the Finnish Company 
Reorganization Act (FCRA). More precisely, it was examined whether there are different financial 
paths within the cluster of failed firms and within the cluster of non-failed firms and whether 
certain reorganization strategies are connected to the financial paths of firms during the year of 
reorganization plan confirmation and the subsequent three years (years 2000-2003). Only firms 
with confirmed reorganization plans in year 2000 were used because the firms are typical firms 
reorganizing under the FCRA. The study was motivated by earlier bankruptcy literature reporting 
that different financial processes can be found for the failing firms (Argenti, 1976; D’Aveni, 1989; 
Laitinen, 1991; Ooghe and DePricker 2008) and that various turnaround strategies affect firm 
performance in different ways. Prior research has provided evidence regarding the efficiency of 
different types of turnaround strategies within voluntary reorganizations (see Smith and Graves, 
2005), but within legal reorganizations, the subject is largely neglected (see Routledge and 
Gadenne, 2000, 2004; LoPucki and Doherty, 2002; Laitinen, 2008, 2009). In Finland, Laitinen 
(see, for example, 2011; 2013) has examined the efficiency of the reorganization strategies of firms 
reorganizing under the FCRA. However, this study was the first to study the financial paths of 
reorganizing firms and the effect of certain reorganization strategies on the financial paths of firms. 
 
The empirical findings of this paper were in line with the previous bankruptcy literature 
emphasizing the difference between financial paths of firms. In this study, three financial paths 
were found within the failed firms and two paths within the non-failed firms supporting the first 
hypothesis (H1). The most common path among the failed firms was the chronic failure path, 
which was followed by 14 firms. The rest of the firms followed the suddenly collapsing path with 
two subtypes, namely path with decreasing values of financial variables and path with increasing 
values of financial variables during the years. These paths were partly consistent to those in the 
previous literature. For instance, in the studies by Laitinen (1991) and D’Aveni (1989) paths 
symbolizing chronic failures and rapid declines were found as well. In the current study, within 
the group of non-failed firms, two financial paths were found. The firms following the first path 
had solvency problems, while the second path contained firms whose financial variables seemed 
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to substantially improve. Most of the non-failed firms (n=21) followed the first path, which may 
indicate that most of the non-failed firms behave in the same way in terms of financial variables, 
while the failed firms are more heterogeneous.  
 
Lastly, the connection between reorganization strategies and financial paths was examined. The 
results were not totally in line with the previous studies. While most previous studies suggest that 
efficiency-oriented reorganization strategies are the most efficient in the long run (see, e.g. 
Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Chowdhury and Lang, 1996; Laitinen, 2008, 2009), in the current 
study, the efficiency-oriented and finance strategies applied in Cluster 2 did not positively affect 
the financial variables of firms, because the median values of financial variables decreased 
throughout all the years of reorganization. This result was consistent with prior studies claiming 
that finance strategies do not strongly affect the long-term performance of firms and that such 
strategies are mainly used for short-term decline-stemming purposes (see, e.g., Laitinen 2011). In 
contrast, using various strategies was found to be the most effective option because the financial 
variables were improved the most during the reorganization program when the firms applied 
various strategies, as seen in Cluster 3. Similarly, a previous study by Schendel et al. (1976) 
suggested that a set of strategies should be used rather than one particular strategy. On the other 
hand, the product and expense strategies applied in Cluster 1 may affect profitability and cash 
flows positively and may stabilize liquidity and solvency of firms. However, there were only few 
statistically significant differences in financial variables between the clusters. Later, in Fisher’s 
exact test a clear connection between the clusters of reorganization strategies and clusters of failed 
firms was found. However, no connection between all financial paths of failed and non-failed firms 
and reorganization strategies was found. Therefore, this result implies that the reorganization 
strategies may be connected to the financial paths of failed firms, and hence, Hypothesis 2 was 
partly supported.  
 
The study carries several theoretical and practical implications for legal reorganization practice in 
WKHFRQWH[WRIVPDOOHQWUHSUHQHXULDO¿UPV)LUVWO\WKHVWXG\IRXQGGLIIHUHQWILQDQFLDOSDWKVZLWKLQ
the cluster of failed firms and within the cluster of non-failed firms reorganizing under the FCRA. 
In total, three financial paths were found among failed firms, and two paths were found among 
non-failed firms. Hence, the failed firms behaved especially differently during the FCRA, and 
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therefore, the failure of firms may not be easy to predict. However, many prior studies assume that 
all firms fail in the same way, which is obviously not the case in the context of reorganizations. 
Secondly, the results of the study showed that the reorganization strategies and financial paths of 
failed firms were connected. There were, however, no connections between the reorganization 
strategy clusters and financial paths of non-failed firms. Thirdly, the results of the study showed 
that approximately half of the firms failed during the program, which indicates that the 
reorganization process may not be efficient enough in Finland. In particular, the role of the 
supervisor should be emphasized in Finland because the supervisor should take into account the 
financial situation of the firm and suggest corrective strategies as early as possible. Due to the 
similarities between the reorganization systems worldwide, the results may be applied to other 
countries as well. Moreover, this pilot study hopefully initiates a series of research projects on this 
topic. In addition, in the future, it will be interesting to examine the pre-filing financial paths of 
firms as well. 
 
In interpreting the findings of this study, it is also necessary to consider the following limitations. 
First, the sample of the study was small, even though the sample included almost all Finnish firms 
with a reorganization plan confirmed by a court in 2000. Hence, the results of this study cannot be 
properly generalized to the entire population, and this research should be regarded as a case or 
pilot study. Second, the samples for the four years were unequal due to interrupted reorganizations. 
Hence, the financial variables demonstrated the financial paths of the remaining firms only. Third, 
the data may not represent the actual conditions of interrupted reorganizations because the 
financial data could be manipulated or the non-financial information could be false, because the 
non-financial information is partly based on the opinions of debtors, creditors, and administrators. 
Fourth, because the sample included only small firms, the results may not be applicable to larger 
firms. Fifth, the study focused only on Finnish firms, and the results are not fully generalizable, 
although Finnish procedure is largely consistent with most procedures worldwide (see, e.g., 
Philippe et al., 2002; Couwenberg 2001). Sixth, the time period examined was short, and the 
procedure can last longer than four years, although most of the firms had already failed during the 
first four years. Seventh, due to drawings by the owners, the annual accounts of limited companies 
were different than the annual accounts of partnerships or proprietorships, which may have 
affected the results. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Rotated factor loadings for failed firms 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Year 1    
Ln assets (1) 0,646 -0,381 -0,099 
Financial assets/Total assets (1) 0,187 0,753 0,140 
Equity/Total assets (1) 0,825 0,147 0,000 
EBIT/Total assets (1) -0,088 0,069 0,157 
Year 2    
Ln assets (2) 0,607 -0,501 -0,113 
Financial assets/Total assets (2) 0,001 0,911 -0,024 
Equity/Total assets (2) 0,843 0,169 0,106 
EBIT/Total assets (2) -0,495 0,295 -0,109 
OPCF/Total assets (2) 0,120 -0,525 0,106 
Year 3    
Ln assets (3) 0,757 -0,266 0,058 
Financial assets/Total assets (3) -0,170 0,422 0,098 
Equity/Total assets (3) 0,796 0,052 0,112 
EBIT/Total assets (3) -0,675 0,209 0,123 
OPCF/Total assets (3) -0,596 0,108 0,229 
Year 4    
Ln assets (4) 0,174 -0,458 0,203 
Financial assets/Total assets (4) -0,080 0,339 -0,455 
Equity/Total assets (4) -0,113 0,178 -0,535 
EBIT/Total assets (4) -0,088 0,128 0,792 
OPCF/Total assets (4) -0,010 0,011 0,922 
Variance explained by the factor: 26,29 13,05 11,59 
Cumulative proportion of total variance: 26,29 39,33 50,93 
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Table 3.  Rotated factor loadings for non-failed reorganizations 
 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Year 1       
Ln assets (1) 0,545 -0,419 -0,363 
Financial assets/Total assets (1) -0,312 0,425 0,523 
Equity/Total assets (1) 0,448 -0,562 -0,306 
EBIT/Total assets (1) -0,207 0,159 0,155 
Year 2       
Ln assets (2) 0,599 -0,541 -0,319 
Financial assets/Total assets (2) 0,251 0,272 0,838 
Equity/Total assets (2) 0,551 -0,772 0,021 
EBIT/Total assets (2) -0,339 0,802 0,123 
OPCF/Total assets (2) -0,183 0,786 0,016 
Year 3       
Ln assets (3) 0,825 -0,214 -0,333 
Financial assets/Total assets (3) -0,297 -0,013 0,852 
Equity/Total assets (3) 0,896 -0,072 0,062 
EBIT/Total assets (3) -0,176 0,742 -0,022 
OPCF/Total assets (3) 0,167 0,912 0,010 
Year 4       
Ln assets (4) 0,827 -0,208 -0,371 
Financial assets/Total assets (4) -0,196 -0,219 0,859 
Equity/Total assets (4) 0,915 -0,213 0,032 
EBIT/Total assets (4) -0,432 0,732 0,170 
OPCF/Total assets (4) -0,827 0,242 0,095 
Variance explained by the factor:  46,37 14,81 10,89 
Cumulative proportion of total variance: 50,55 65,35 76,24 
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Table 4. Median values of financial variables for non-failed reorganizing firms 
  Cluster 1 Cluster 2   
Variable N Median N Median K-W probability level 
Year 1           
LN ASSETS 20 12,57 9 11,17 0,0016** 
FATA 20 7,19 9 24,3 0,0022*** 
ETA 20 -2,64 9 -140,88 0,0019*** 
EBIT 11 -0,96 9 -3,29 0,9249 
Year 2           
LN ASSETS 19 12,52 10 11,49 0,0132** 
FATA 19 4,46 10 25,87 0,0018*** 
ETA 19 -19,86 10 -15,37 0,5509 
EBIT 19 7,21 10 20,21 0,0896* 
OPCF 20 0,13 10 0,24 0,5975 
Year 3           
LN ASSETS 19 12,19 10 10,96 0,0051*** 
FATA 19 5,12 10 28,71 <0,0001*** 
ETA 19 -34,39 10 -46,17 0,7136 
EBIT 19 17,74 10 17,13 0,7831 
OPCF 20 0,2 10 0,16 0,9649 
Year 4           
LN ASSETS 19 12,14 9 10,97 0,0034*** 
FATA 19 7,56 9 34,86 0,0002*** 
ETA 19 -18,52 9 -61,62 0,3132 
EBIT 19 9,29 9 21,57 0,2477 
OPCF 20 0,2 9 0,24 0,3704 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 p-levels, respectively 
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Table 5. Differences in median values between all clusters of failed and non-failed firms 
Variable K-W probability level 
Year 1   
LN ASSETS 0,0011*** 
FATA 0,0001*** 
ETA 0,0133** 
EBIT 0,6781 
Year 2   
LN ASSETS 0,0012*** 
FATA 0,0001*** 
ETA 0,5671 
EBIT 0,0056*** 
OPCF 0,2564 
Year 3   
LN ASSETS 0,0346** 
FATA <0,0001*** 
ETA 0,9583 
EBIT 0,0231** 
OPCF 0,1079 
Year 4   
LN ASSETS 0,0473** 
FATA 0,0009*** 
ETA 0,6626 
EBIT 0,1300 
OPCF 0,0863* 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 p-levels, respectively  
 
  
 
 Acta Wasaensia 111 
 
42 
 
  
Table 6. Rotated factor loadings for the sample firms 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
1. Efficiency strategies         
Changing the manager 0,54 0,305 -0,16 0,121 
Organizational changes 0,3 0,746 0,235 0,026 
Changing the firm legal form 0,52 0,044 -0,14 -0,14 
Improving planning of activities 0,82 -0,07 0,025 0,058 
Improving control of activities 0,78 0,015 0,144 0,024 
Focusing on core business -0,31 0,419 0,185 0,079 
2. Product strategies         
Improving production efficiency 0,16 0,428 -0,57 0,389 
Focusing on marketing  0,14 0,129 0,03 0,66 
Increasing revenue -0,1 -0,55 0,039 0,254 
3. Asset strategies         
Realization of fixed assets -0,38 0,316 -0,23 -0,47 
Realization of current assets 0,25 0,13 -0,11 -0,66 
4. Expense strategies         
Cutting expenses -0,27 0,587 -0,38 0,375 
5. Finance strategies         
Additional deployment of equity -0,07 -0,01 0,565 0,155 
Searching for new sources of debt 0,04 0,248 0,782 0,084 
Variance explained by the factor:  17,22 14,14 11,34 9,83 
Cumulative proportion of total variance: 17,22 31,36 42,7 52,52 
Notes: The table reports the factor loadings for reorganization strategies and the variance explained by the factor. 
Non-financial variables receive a value of 1 when the firm is using the strategy and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 7. The percentage of strategies used in the three clusters of companies 
  Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 K-W probability level 
1. Efficiency 
strategies 
    
Changing the 
manager 0,17 0,00 0,36 0,0276** 
Organizational 
changes 0,24 0,11 0,18 0,5015 
Changing the firm 
legal form 0,10 0,00 0,64 <0,0001*** 
Improving planning 
of activities 0,17 0,21 0,73 0,0019*** 
Improving control of 
activities 0,24 0,32 0,73 0,0160** 
Focusing on core 
business 0,38 0,26 0,09 0,1956 
2. Product 
strategies        
Improving 
production 
efficiency 0,79 0,00 0,36 <0,0001*** 
Focusing on 
marketing  0,48 0,26 0,27 0,2349 
Increasing revenue 0,10 0,37 0,09 0,0492** 
3. Asset strategies        
Realization of fixed 
assets 0,28 0,16 0,18 0,5978 
Realization of 
current assets 0,00 0,00 0,36 0,0001*** 
4. Expense 
strategies        
Cutting expenses 0,86 0,11 0,09 <0,0001*** 
5. Finance 
strategies     
Additional 
deployment of equity 0,17 0,37 0,09 0,1481 
Searching for new 
sources of debt 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,0380** 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 p-levels, respectively 
 
Notes: The table reports the factor loadings for non-financial variables (presented in Chapter 3.2). Non-financial 
variables receive a value 1 when the firm is using the strategy and 0 otherwise. K-W level shows the significance of 
the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test statistic based on the Wilcoxon scores of the location of the distributions. 
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Table 8. Frequency distributions of firms 
    Strategy clusters   
    1 2 3 Total 
Financial paths of failed and 
non-failed firms           
Cluster 1, non-failed firms Frequency 9 8 4 21 
  Percentage 31,03 42.11 36.36   
Cluster 2, non-failed firms Frequency 6 2 2 10 
  Percentage 20.69 10,53 18.18   
Cluster 1, failed firms Frequency 9 3 1 13 
  Percentage 31,03 15.79 9,01   
Cluster 2, failed firms Frequency 0 4 2 6 
  Percentage 0.00 21,05 18.18   
Cluster 3, failed firms Frequency 5 2 2 9 
  Percentage 17,24 10,53 18,18   
 
 
Table 9. The mean values of background variables of three clusters 
  Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 K-W probability level 
Panel 1. Industry        
Production 0,38 0,21 0,36 0,6457 
Transportation 0,07 0,21 0,09 0,5750 
Service 0,24 0,21 0,27 0,7837 
Construction 0,10 0,16 0,00 0,2226 
Panel 2. Other 
information       
 
Gender of the 
manager: 0,28 0,16 0,18 0,3372 
Firm legal form 0,41 0,32 0,27 0,4545 
Payment default 0,55 0,42 0,45 0,6326 
Failure rate 0,48 0,47 0,45 0,9975 
Age of the firm 11,93 12,95 12,72 0,1121 
Number of employees 5,7 8,2 10,5 0,6532 
Remission rate 0,62 0,59 0,50 0,8944 
 *,**,*** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 p-levels, respectively 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. The length of the reorganization programs before reorganization interruption 
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Appendix 3. Correlations of financial variables  
Year 
2000 
LN 
ASSETS FATA ETA EBIT   
LN 
ASSETS 1,0000 -0,3300** 0,5910*** -0,16330   
FATA -0,3300** 1,0000 -0,13089 0,1047   
ETA 0,5910*** -0,13089 1,0000 -0,09634   
EBIT -0,16330 0,1047 -0,09634 1,0000   
Year 
2001 
LN 
ASSETS FATA ETA EBIT OPCF 
LN 
ASSETS 1,0000 
-
0,4257*** 0,6121*** 
-
0,4354*** -0,0369 
FATA -0,4257*** 1,0000 0,0076 0,2333* -0,2764** 
ETA 0,6121*** 0,0076 1,0000 -0,5452*** -0,3285** 
EBIT -0,4354*** 0,2333* 
-
0,5452*** 1,0000 0,1999 
OPCF -0,0369 -0,2764** -0,3285*** 0,1999 1,0000 
Year 
2002 
LN 
ASSETS FATA ETA EBIT OPCF 
LN 
ASSETS 1,0000 
-
0,3989*** 0,6385*** 
-
0,3795*** -0,1829 
FATA -0,3989*** 1,0000 -0,2419 0,1212 -0,0840 
ETA 0,6385*** -0,2419 1,0000 -0,3149** -0,0991 
EBIT -0,3795*** 0,1212 
-
0,3149*** 1,0000 0,6321*** 
OPCF -0,1829 -0,0840 -0,0991 0,6321*** 1,0000 
Year 
2003 
LN 
ASSETS FATA ETA EBIT OPCF 
LN 
ASSETS 1,0000 -0,3669** 0,7152*** 
-
0,5007*** 
-
0,6090*** 
FATA -0,3669** 1,0000 -0,1522 0,1359 0,2021 
ETA 0,7152*** -0,1522 1,0000 -0,5254*** 
-
0,7304*** 
EBIT -0,5007*** 0,1359 
-
0,5254*** 1,0000*** 0,7136*** 
OPCF -0,6090*** 0,2021 
-
0,7304*** 0,7136*** 1,0000 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 p-levels, respectively 
118 Acta Wasaensia
 
49 
 
Appendix 4. Clusters of strategies 
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THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION ON SURVIVAL TIME OF FINNISH REORGANIZING 
FIRMS 
The co-author of this essay is Nina Sormunen 
 
 
Abstract: The objective of our study is to examine small entrepreneurial firms (n=167) filing 
a petition for reorganization under the Finnish Company Reorganization Act, which is 
comparable to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act in the United States. Approximately 77 
percent of the final sample firms interrupted the reorganization process after filing a petition 
for reorganization. In particular, the study examines whether the financial paths are different 
within the firms filing for reorganization and whether the pre-filing financial and non-financial 
information or both are connected to survival time in reorganization. In this study it is assumed 
that longer the survival time the better the chance of success. The findings of this study indicate 
that different financial paths can be found within firms filing a petition for reorganization. The 
results also provide evidence on the connection between pre-filing financial information and 
survival time. Especially a pre-filing liquidity variable, may be connected to survival time in 
reorganization. Furthermore, the results show evidence on the connection between non-
financial information and survival time. However, the combined model, including both 
financial and non-financial information does not outperform models based on financial or non-
financial variables.  
 
 
Keywords: reorganization; failure; entrepreneurial firms, non-financial characteristics, 
survival analysis, cluster analysis 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Over the past several decades, the failure of firms has been the subject of much research and 
discussion at both academic and professional levels  (Dimitras, Zanakis and Zopoudinis, 1996: 
Altman and Narayanan, 1997; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Altman, Iwanicz-Drozdowska, 
Laitinen & Suvas, 2016). Inefficient processes have forced viable firms into bankruptcy and 
non-viable firms into reorganization, and the failure rate among reorganizations has been high. 
These inefficiencies cause large economic and social losses for stakeholders. Utilizing financial 
and non-financial information, this study examines small firms (=167) that filed a petition for 
reorganization under the Finnish Company Reorganization Act (FCRA), which is comparable 
to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act in the United States, during the years 2001 and 2002. The 
failure rate is high among the sample firms since approximately 77 percent failed after filing a 
petition for reorganization. The purpose of this study is to examine whether the financial paths 
are different within firms filling for reorganization (Hypothesis 1) and whether the pre-filing 
financial information, non-financial information (Hypothesis 2) or both (Hypothesis 3) are 
connected to the survival time in reorganization (Hypothesis 4). In this context, “financial path” 
refers to the development of financial variables for the pre-filing year, for the year of filing and 
the subsequent years.  
 
This paper builds upon four distinct lines of research. First, prior studies report that static 
models, concentrating on a single observation of a firm (usually an annual account) (Johnson, 
1970; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006), may not work properly if the firms do not go through similar 
failure processes (Laitinen, 1991; Laitinen, 1993). In bankruptcy studies, different failure 
processes have already been found (see eg. Argenti, 1976; Weitzel and Jonsson, 1989; 
D’Aveni, 1989; Laitinen, 1991, 1993; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008; Laitinen, Lukason and 
Suvas, 2014) but, to our knowledge, within reorganization studies failure processes have not 
been studied. Second, because the traditionally used statistical models (probit and logistic 
regression) examine whether the firm is distressed in terms of certain covariates, survival 
analysis takes into account the time to an event, which can be for example bankruptcy. 
However, only a few reorganization studies have used survival analysis (see e.g., Partington, 
Russel, Stevenson and Torbey, 2001; Fisher, 2007; Wong, Partington, Stevenson and Torbey, 
2007; Laitinen, 2013), while it is used more often in bankruptcy studies (see LeClere, 2000 for 
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a literature review). Third, our analysis is further motivated by accounting literature 
emphasizing the role of non-financial variables (see e.g., Poston, Harmon and Gramlich, 1994; 
Barniv, Agarwal and Leach, 2002; Fisher and Martel, 2004; Laitinen, 2013), and the combined 
effect of financial and non-financial variables (see e.g., Keasey and Watson, 1987, 1988; Peel 
and Peel, 1987; Shumway, 2001; Back, 2005) in failure prediction models. Finally, prior 
studies concentrate mainly on large firms whereas in this study only small firms are examined. 
The distress models estimated for larger firms cannot be applied to small firms, due to specific 
characteristics related to small firms (see e.g., Keats and Bracker, 1988; Altman, Sabato and 
Wilson, 2008). Moreover, the annual accounts in small firms may be more instable, unreliable, 
and manipulated because there may not be internal control systems in smaller firms (Balcaen 
and Ooghe, (2006), p.82). 
  
The empirical findings of this study show that the financial paths within the firms filing a 
petition for reorganization are different. More precisely, six types of financial paths are found 
in terms of profitability, liquidity, solvency, cash flow, and size. Moreover, both failed and 
non-failed firms have followed all financial paths. Thus, the financial paths of firms filing for 
reorganization are different and the failures may be hard to distinguish from non-failures. 
Second, the findings of this study indicate that there may be a connection between pre-filing 
financial information and survival time in reorganization. One variable reflecting pre-filing 
liquidity was connected to survival time in reorganization. Third, the results show that one non-
financial variable (industry: dummy manufacturing) was connected to survival time indicating 
that non-financial information may be connected to survival time. Fourth, the combined model, 
including both financial and non-financial variables, contains two statistically significant 
variables linked to liquidity for the pre-filing year and industry. However, the results are only 
marginally statistically significant, suggesting that the combined model does not outperform 
models based on financial or non-financial variables. Therefore, in addition to demonstrating 
that the financial paths within the failed and within the non-failed reorganizing firms are 
different, this study further contributes to the literature by revealing that pre-filing financial 
and non-financial information may be connected to survival time in reorganization. 
Furthermore, our study adds to the extant reorganization literature by focusing on small firms, 
which is very rare in prior reorganization research (see e.g., Laitinen, 2013). These results will 
increase academic understanding of the factors that affect the failure risk of a small 
entrepreneurial firm. The information provided by our study can be used by courts when 
deciding which firms could successfully reorganize, or by the stakeholders (entrepreneurs, 
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administrators, consultants) of the distressed firm when preparing a reorganization plan. 
Moreover, the results reported here may have relevance outside Finland for predicting 
reorganization failure for a small entrepreneurial firm. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The background, purpose, and contribution of the study 
are briefly discussed in the introductory section. The context of reorganization in Finland and 
a short literature review are presented in the second section. The data, variables, and statistical 
methods are outlined in the third section. In the fourth section the results of the statistical tests 
are reported. In the final section, the findings, limitations, and implications of the research are 
summarized. 
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.2. Context of reorganizations and literature review 
 
 
2.1 Reorganization process in Finland 
 
In Finland, the reorganization proceedings of a business are stipulated by the Finnish Company 
Reorganization Act (47/1993; amendments up to 247/2007 included) that came into force on 8 
February 1993. The purpose of reorganization proceedings is to rehabilitate a distressed 
debtor’s viable business, to ensure its continued viability, and to facilitate debt arrangements. 
Additionally, reorganization proceedings can be instigated to avoid bankruptcy, which under 
Finnish legislation means liquidation. The difference between the Finnish and US systems is 
that in the United States, firms will first go into bankruptcy, and then into liquidation (Chapter 
7) or reorganization (Chapter 11). The purpose of the reorganization proceedings is to produce 
a reorganization plan, including both business and debt restructuring, in order to recover the 
firm. According to Laitinen (2013) reorganization process includes five steps that are as 
following: 
1 Filing a reorganization petition by the debtor or a creditor 
2 Court’s decision to open the proceedings 
3 Preparation of the reorganization plan by an administrator appointed 
4 Consideration of the proposed plan by a court 
5 Confirmation of the plan by a court 
 
However, it has been shown that the FCRA can be inefficient in terms of picking up and 
rejecting reorganization petitions (Laitinen, 2013). The courts approve approximately 60 
percent of applications for reorganization, and of those about 75 percent lead to an approved 
reorganization plan. Many of these businesses, however, are unsuccessful in implementing the 
reorganization plan and go bankrupt during the program. According to Laitinen (2013), this 
occurs in up to 50 percent of the reorganizing firms. This failure rate is high when compared 
to Canada (Fisher and Martel, 1995) but similar to the consummation rate of Chapter 11 in the 
USA (Jensen-Conklin, 1992). The comparisons of different reorganization systems performed 
by Philippe and Partners, (2002) and Laakso (2012) reveal that the FCRA is somewhat different 
from other reorganization acts, even though it, like many other reorganization systems, is plan-
based, and debt-restructuring plays a major role (for a comparison of different systems see 
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Couwenberg, 2001; Philippe et al., 2002;). There are several differences between the Finnish 
and United States systems. First, in the United States the debtor prepares the plan, while in 
Finland an administrator is appointed to prepare the plan (Laitinen, 2013). Second, the plan 
consummation does not occur immediately after the plan confirmation in the United States but 
changes to reorganization plan can still be made until the effective date. In Finland, the plans 
are consummated right after the plan confirmation. Third, the priority of creditors is also 
different in the United States than in Finland since there are more classes of creditors in the 
United States. (Laakso, 2012.)  
 
2.2 A review of the literature  
 
Over the past several decades, failure prediction has been one of the most widely addressed 
topics in accounting literature (see e.g., Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006; Balcaen and Ooghe, 
2006; Lensberg et al. 2006). Both reorganization and bankruptcy studies have examined the 
topic, but because failure in reorganization refers usually to bankruptcy, the reorganization 
literature is strongly related to bankruptcy literature (Laitinen, 2013). The classic failure 
prediction models use a single observation (usually an annual account) to predict firm failure 
(Johnson, 1970; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006), but these models have several problems. For 
example, such models require that relationships between predictors and between the event 
measure and predictors remain stable even though the statistical significance of predictors is 
shown to vary in the years prior to distress (Zavgren, 1983; Zavgren and Friedman, 1988; 
Laitinen, 2005). One single cross-sectional model cannot be optimal for every year, as the first 
symptoms and their timing vary between financially distressed firms (D’Aveni 1989; Laitinen, 
1991). Another issue with these models is that a healthy firm may suffer from temporary 
difficulties and, as a result, be classified as failing. This evidence indicates that the prediction 
of company failure should not depend solely on a single annual account, but on multiple 
accounts, or on the change in financial position (Shumway, 2001). 
 
To consider the time series behavior of financial variables, several bankruptcy studies have 
focused on failure processes of firms, while reorganization studies have largely neglected the 
topic. Previous bankruptcy studies have found various taxonomies of failure processes, most 
of which follow the one established in Argenti’s (1976) seminal study. However, it should be 
noticed that there are various terms used in prior studies. The studies have used terms such as 
“trajectory” (Argenti, 1976; du Jardin, 2010; 2015), “patterns” (D’Aveni, 1989; Crutzen and 
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Van Caillie, 2010), “process” (Laitinen, 1991; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008), “pathways” 
(Moulton, Thomas and Pruett, 1996), and “extinction” (Sheppard and Chowdhury, 2005). 
Many of these terms have been applied in different ways, which can affect the interpretation 
of the results. Some studies have attempted to find archetypes of failing firms without 
considering the time dimension, while other studies have assessed patterns of decline over time. 
In this study, only the term “financial path” is used. Moreover, this study takes into account 
the time dimension by using survival analysis to examine the impact of several variables on 
survival time in reorganization. In this study it is assumed that longer the survival time the 
better the chance of success. Survival analysis is primarily used in other fields of research, such 
as medicine, marketing, economics, and political science (Fisher, 2007), but rarely in 
accounting studies. In a study by LeClere (2000), 12 studies using survival analysis to predict 
financial distress were presented. Along with these studies, Luoma and Laitinen (1991), 
Catanach and Perry (2001), Shumway (2001), Turetsky and McEven (2001), and Duffie, Saita 
and Wang (2007) have used survival analysis to predict financial distress. Furthermore, 
survival analysis has been used to predict reorganization success by Partington et al. (2001), 
Fisher (2007), Wong et al. (2007), and Laitinen (2013), but the focus of these studies is 
different from this study. The benefit of using survival analysis is its ability to use censored 
observations and time-invariant or time-varying covariates to explain the survival time 
preceding financial distress (Laitinen, 2005).  
 
Argenti (1976) conducted one of the first studies related to failure processes of firms. He found 
three different failure processes in terms of financial variables. The first process describes firms 
with poor performance from the beginning while the second process characterizes firms with 
fantastic figures before failure. The last failure process encompasses firms with good or 
excellent performance before sudden partial collapse, which is followed by a more stable 
phase, then a rapid decline to insolvency. After Argenti’s study, D’Aveni (1989) examined a 
small sample of firms filing for bankruptcy and found three patterns of decline: lingering firms, 
gradually declining firms, and rapidly declining firms. Similarly, Laitinen (1991) identified 
three different failure processes for bankruptcy firms. On the other hand, Ooghe and De 
Prijcker (2008) found four failure processes in their study relating the fundamental causes of 
bankruptcy to the financial and non-financial consequences. However, none of the studies 
examined the financial paths of reorganizing firms. The financial paths of reorganizing firms 
differ from financial paths of bankruptcy firms because reorganizing firms have to be viable 
when filing for reorganization whereas bankruptcy firms are non-viable. 
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2.2.1 Financial variables in failure prediction  
 
Traditionally failure prediction literature is concentrated on financial variables, as they are hard 
objective measures based on publicly available information (see e.g., Micha, 1984; Laitinen, 
1992; Dirickx and Van Landeghem, 1994). The most commonly used variables represent 
profitability, liquidity, leverage, cash flow, and efficiency of firms (Dimitras et al.1996). The 
variables are based on statistical or empirical considerations as the existing failure prediction 
literature suffers from a generally accepted theory of failure (Scott, 1981; Balcaen and Ooghe, 
2006). However, it is stated that financial information may be problematic in smaller firms 
because the smaller firms may not have internal control systems (Keasey and Watson 1986; 
1987) or the annual accounts may be adjusted by the auditor (Charitou and Lambertides 2003). 
Moreover, financial information is claimed to be more instable in failing firms (Dambolena 
and Khoury, 1980).  
 
Several reorganization studies are based on the coalition behavior theory first adopted by 
Bulow and Shoven (1978), who used the theory to examine whether a firm would liquidate or 
continue under the US bankruptcy regime. Later, White (1980, 1984, 1989) applied coalition 
theory to reorganizations under the reorganization regime in the United States and claimed that 
the coalition of equity holders, secured creditors, and unsecured creditors affects the liquidation 
risk of a firm. The factors affecting the decision-making of coalitions are equity commitments, 
leverage, future profitability, secured debt in the capital structure and pay-off rate in 
reorganization compared to liquidation. Even though coalition theory is originally used to 
determine whether a firm would liquidate or continue under the reorganization procedure, it is 
also widely adopted in studies predicting reorganization success or failure. These studies have 
found that size, capital structure, liquidity, and profitability are important when examining 
which kind of firms should be selected into reorganization and which kind of firms will 
successfully implement their reorganization plans predicting firm failure (Fisher & Martel, 
1995; Campbell, 1996; Frost-Drury, Greinke & Shailer, 1998; Routledge & Gadenne, 2000). 
However, when predicting success or failure during a reorganization program, financial 
restructuring used as a reorganization action should be taken into account. For instance, the 
findings of Routledge and Gadenne (2000) suggest that firms that are more profitable, more 
highly leveraged, and have higher short-term liquidity prior to reorganization, reorganize more 
successfully. Hence, pre-filing leverage appears to positively affect success during the 
reorganization program. These conflicting results may be due to debt restructuring (see also 
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Laitinen, 2013). Based on this discussion about failure paths and importance of financial 
variables, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: There are different financial paths within firms filling for reorganization  
 
H2: Pre-filing financial information is connected to survival time in reorganization 
 
2.2.2 Non-financial variables in failure prediction 
 
Although previous failure prediction studies primarily concentrate on financial variables, 
several studies suggest that non-financial variables may provide additional information to 
models based on financial variables (see e.g., Keasey and Watson, 1987, 1988; Peel and Peel, 
1987; Poston et al., 1994; Shumway, 2001; Barniv et al., 2002; Fisher and Martel, 2004; Back, 
2005). Non-financial information may not be exposed to manipulation, which is often the case 
with financial information. Especially in the case of very small firms, this can be critical 
(Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). However, the number of reorganization studies focusing on non-
financial variables is minimal and the results of the studies are mixed (see e.g., Routledge and 
Gadenne, 2000; Barniv et al., 2002; LoPucki and Doherty, 2002; Laitinen, 2013). The non-
financial variables used in this paper are presented in more detail in the following sections.  
 
A company’s industry reflects the environment of a firm’s business and the complexity of its 
business processes. However, evidence related to industry is mixed among the studies on 
reorganizations (Smith and Liou, 2007; Laitinen, 2013). While several studies claim that 
industry has a significant effect on failure (LoPucki, 1983; Hotchkiss, 1995; Campbell, 1996; 
Routledge and Gadenne, 2000; LoPucki and Kalin, 2001), LoPucki and Doherty (2002) did not 
find any industry effect.  
 
In general, younger firms demonstrate higher failure rates (Laitinen, 2013). However, while 
bankruptcy studies have examined the age affect (see e.g., Argenti, 1976; Keasey and Watson, 
1987; Shumway, 2001; Laitinen, 2005), prior studies on reorganization have rarely done so. 
The pioneering work by Argenti (1976) found that failure rates of newly founded firms and old 
firms without adequate ability to renew are high. Age was also found to be significant in 
research conducted by Laitinen (2005) and Altman, Sabato, and Wilson (2010). However, 
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studies by Keasey and Watson (1987) and Shumway (2001) did not find any significant age 
effect. In addition, the size of the firm affects the success of reorganization, as large firms are 
more likely to reorganize successfully (LoPucki, 1983; Eisenberg and Tagashira, 1994; 
Campbell, 1996). 
 
Researchers such as Sundgren (1998) and LoPucki and Doherty (2002) have stated that there 
are differences in confirmation rates of reorganization plans among courts. Sundgren (1998) 
examined Finnish firms reorganizing under the FCRA and claimed that some courts might be 
more restrictive than others, which may affect the likelihood of reorganization in that particular 
court district. Similarly, LoPucki and Doherty (2002) examined reorganization in the 
bankruptcy courts of United States and found that failure rate in one particular court district is 
higher, which may be caused by the reorganization process itself, not the characteristics of 
firms.  
 
In addition to examining the effect of non-financial variables separately, failure prediction 
studies have also explored the combination effect of non-financial and financial variables. 
Studies by Peel and Peel (1987), Keasey and Watson (1987; 1988), Shumway (2001), Back 
(2005), and Laitinen (2013) have found evidence that the best failure prediction model may be 
built upon a combination of financial and non-financial information. Based on the discussion 
above, we propose the following hypotheses:  
 
H3: Non-financial variables are connected to survival time in reorganization 
 
H4: Non-financial variables provide additional information to models related to financial 
variables when assessing survival time in reorganization  
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3. Research design and method 
 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The original sample used in this study consists of all limited companies (n=552) that filed for 
reorganization in 2001–2002 under the FCRA. This is about 91 percent of the cohort, which 
filed for reorganization in 2001 and 2002. However, the firms with insufficient financial 
information are excluded, leaving 167 firms. The status (survival or failure) of the firms is 
examined at the end of 2013 because the length of the reorganization programs varies between 
5–10 years. The firms that exist at the end of 2013 are defined as successful; otherwise, 
reorganization is considered as failed.  
 
The financial and non-financial information about the firms are obtained from the largest 
Finnish credit information company, Suomen Asiakastieto Oy (http://www.asiakastieto.fi). The 
data include published annual financial statements and background information about the firms 
relating to the research period, the accounting years 2000–2012. These firms are considered 
small because the median number of employees is 15 and the pre-filing net (annual) sales are 
629,000 Euros. The sample includes only limited companies that are not publicly traded and 
that have published their financial statements. 
 
In Figure 1, the actual cumulative survival function for the sample firms is presented. The 
function shows that the number of failures declines linearly in the first seven years after 
reorganization application. After the first seven years, about 30 percent of the firms survived. 
At the end of the research period, only 23.36 percent of reorganizing firms survived. 
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Figure 1. Actual survival function for the sample firms (N = 167) 
 
 
3.2 Variables 
 
The hypotheses of this study incorporate both financial and non-financial variables. Financial 
variables are used to examine whether the financial paths within the firms filing a petition for 
reorganization are different (H1) as well as to test the connection between pre-filing financial 
information and survival time in reorganization (H2). Non-financial variables are used to 
determine whether they alone (H3) or in conjunction with financial information (H4) are 
connected to survival time in reorganization.  
 
The financial variables included in the study are profitability (EBIT to total assets, EBIT), 
liquidity (financial assets to total assets, FATA), solvency (equity to total assets, ETA), size 
(logarithmic assets, LN ASSETS), and cash flow (operating cash flow to total assets, OPCF). 
The financial data used consists of financial statements for the pre-filing year (-1), for the year 
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of filing (0), and for the subsequent years. To test Hypothesis 1, all financial variables are used, 
while only pre-filing values of variables are used to test Hypothesis 2, as the values of 
subsequent years are highly correlated. Only OPCF could not be presented for the pre-filing 
year, because the changes related to OPCF could not be calculated due to lack of data from the 
previous year. The distributions of variables are winsorized 5 percent from upwards and 
downwards (this cut-off point was the best of several alternatives compared). Moreover, 
logarithmic transformation is used for the size variable because its distribution is skewed. 
Because a large percentage of firms fail during the first years of reorganization, the financial 
statements are not available for all 12 years for all firms. The financial variables and LN 
ASSETS measuring the size of the firm are selected because they have been found to be 
important factors in prior bankruptcy theory and related empirical evidence (see e.g., Scott, 
1981; Jones, 1987; Laitinen, 1991; Dimitras et al., 1996; Altman and Narayanan, 1997; Balcaen 
and Ooghe, 2006). 
 
The non-financial variables reflect background information about the firm, its industry, and its 
reorganization process. To determine their effect on survival time (H3 and H4), we selected 
the following variables: industry (dummies: manufacturing and service), age of the firm, court 
in which the reorganization plan is confirmed (metropolis dummy: Helsinki, Espoo, or Vantaa), 
and number of employees. Industry is measured by two dummy variables referring to the 
service and manufacturing industries. The dummy variable is equal to 1 if the firm is operating 
in the particular industry and 0 otherwise. The age of the firm is calculated in months, from its 
founding year to the year of filing a reorganization petition. The court dummy (Helsinki, 
Espoo, or Vantaa) is 1 if the reorganization is processed in the courts of Helsinki, Espoo, or 
Vantaa, and 0 otherwise. The number of employees is calculated as the 
total number of employees at the time of filing. The variables that provide information about 
the stages of reorganization are reorganization proceedings, reorganization plan, reorganization 
plan interrupted, and reorganization finished. The dummies reflecting the stage in the 
reorganization process (dummies 6–9) are assigned a value of 1 if the firm has reached that 
particular stage in reorganization. The non-financial variables used in this paper are selected 
based on prior failure prediction studies, however, such studies using these variables are scarce 
(see e.g., Poston et al., 1994; Barniv et al., 2002; Fisher and Martel, 2004; Laitinen, 2013). 
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3.3 Statistical methods 
 
The financial paths of firms and the connection between the variables and survival time are 
examined with factor, cluster, and survival analyses. As a first step, the pre-filing financial 
variables are reduced to a small number of independent latent dimensions of the financial 
variables by using factor analysis. The number of factors is selected by using the eigenvalue-
greater-than-one rule (K1 or Kaiser criterion, see Kaiser, 1960) indicating that the factors with 
eigenvalues greater than one are retained for interpretation. Moreover, orthogonal Varimax 
rotation is used as it leads to factors that are statistically linearly independent of each other. 
The Varimax solution refers to situations in which the variables have high loadings on the 
factor in question and low loadings on other factors. Therefore, the coefficient of correlation 
between the factors is zero and there is no multicollinearity. (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum 
and Strahan, 1999.) Next, the rotated factor scores are used in cluster analysis to extract a 
taxonomy of firms and illustrate the differences between the clusters of firms. The rotated 
factor scores are chosen for the analysis because they are standardized and uncorrelated. The 
clustering method applied is hierarchical cluster analysis, in which the dissimilarities or 
distances between the objects are used when formulating the clusters. The distance method 
used in this study is Ward’s (1963) minimum variance method, which minimizes the variance 
within the clusters at each stage of grouping. Thus, the clusters formed are as homogeneous as 
possible (Statsoft, 2001.) After the formulation of the clusters, the financial paths of firms are 
examined via the Kruskal-Wallis test. Similarly, the non-financial characteristics between the 
clusters of firms are tested via Kruskal-Wallis test.  
 
Next, the connection between pre-filing financial information and survival time (H2) is 
examined by survival analysis using the Cox proportional hazards model. The factor scores 
representing the latent dimensions of pre-filing financial variables are used in the analysis. In 
this study, survival time is measured as the time from the filing of a petition for reorganization 
to the time of failure (bankruptcy) or successful implementation of the plan. The assumption 
is that the longer the survival time, the better the chance of success. The hazard function is 
estimated by using a method of maximizing the log likelihood function. We also use the Cox 
proportional hazards model to examine whether the non-financial variables either alone (H3) 
or in conjunction with the pre-filing financial variables (H4) are connected to survival time in 
reorganization.  
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The hypotheses are assessed using various statistical tests. First, the significance of the 
coefficients is determined using the Wald test statistic. Goodness-of-fit is evaluated using the 
-2log likelihood function, the likelihood-ratio statistic, and the overall chi-square. The p-value 
of the test demonstrates whether the covariate effect is assumed to be different from zero when 
the p-value of the test is less than a conventional significance level. When these circumstances 
are met, at least one of the covariates is significant. The accuracy ratio (AR) is used to measure 
the accuracy of the estimated model in relation to the perfect model. The closer the AR is to 1, 
the higher the discriminative power of the model. (Sobehart et al., 2000). 
 
To assess the sample-sensitivity of the hold-in classification results, a bootstrapping procedure 
is applied. 200 sub-samples are randomly chosen from the original sample and the Cox 
proportional models are estimated for each. The binary classification accuracy in each sub-
sample is then calculated. However, due to lack of validation data, the statistical models used 
in this study should be considered explanatory rather than predictive models. 
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4. Results 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for the sample firms are reported in Table 1. The table shows that 80 
percent of the firms that file for reorganization are accepted to start reorganization proceedings 
and approximately 60 percent of these firms have a reorganization plan confirmed. However, 
77 percent of all firms that filed for reorganization fail during the reorganization process only 
23 percent complete their reorganization programs.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 depicts firms’ survival time in reorganization proceedings. According to the table, most 
of the firms fail during the first three years of reorganization and approximately 40 percent fail 
before the first year is over. The non-failed firms typically complete their reorganization 
programs 3–6 years after application. The program completion date is not available for 16 firms 
and therefore they are not included in the table.  
 
 
  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Stage in reorganization N Mean 
Petition for reorganization denied dummy 13 0,078 
Withdrawal of the petition for reorganization dummy 10 0,060 
Reorganization proceedings dummy 134 0,802 
Reorganization program dummy 100 0,599 
Interruption during the reorganization programme dummy 61 0,365 
Interruption during the whole process dummy 128 0,767 
Reorganization program completed dummy 39 0,234 
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Table 2. Survival time in reorganization 
  Non-failed firms Failed firms 
Years Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
<1 0 0,00 51 39,84 
1 1 2,56 25 19,53 
2 1 2,56 19 14,84 
3 5 12,82 11 8,59 
4 1 2,56 6 4,69 
5 5 12,82 4 3,13 
6 3 7,69 5 3,91 
7 1 2,56 2 1,56 
8 1 2,56 2 1,56 
9 3 7,69 1 0,78 
10 2 5,13 1 0,78 
11 0 0,00 1 0,78 
 
 
The descriptive statistics of the financial variables for the years -1 and 0 are provided in 
Appendix 1. As shown, the failed firms are smaller than the non-failed firms, and most of the 
mean values of financial variables are slightly higher among the failed firms. According to the 
table, both the mean values of pre-filing liquidity as measured by FATA and pre-filing 
solvency as measured by ETA are slightly higher among the failed firms. Similarly, mean 
values of cash flow as measured by OPCF for the year of filing and profitability for the year of 
filing as measured by EBIT are higher among the failed firms. On the other hand, mean values 
of pre-filing profitability as measured by EBIT and ETA for the year of filing (year 0) are lower 
among the failed firms. However, the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test show no statistically 
significant differences between the groups of failed and non-failed firms. This may indicate 
that firms filing a petition for reorganization may be similar in terms of financial characteristics 
(see Barniv et al., 2002, p. 497). Therefore, pre-filing financial variables may not be useful 
when trying to distinguish potential failures from non-failures in terms of pre-filing financial 
figures. 
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Appendix 2 presents the correlation matrix for the financial and non-financial variables for the 
year -1. Overall, correlations between the variables are modest. The highest correlation (0.576) 
occurs between the size of the firm (LN ASSETS) and number of employees. Thus, it is 
obvious that there are not any significant multicollinearity problems with the independent 
variables.  
 
4.2 Testing hypothesis 1 to identify financial paths of firms 
 
To examine the financial paths of firms, factor and cluster analyses are first used. The factor 
analysis technique is applied to condense the pre-filing financial variables into a small number 
of independent latent dimensions. The obtained factor scores are used in cluster analysis to 
extract a taxonomy of firms. Finally, the financial variables for the years -1, 0, and the 
subsequent years are examined to demonstrate the financial paths of firms. The differences 
between the financial variables in clusters of firms are examined using the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
 
Table 3 shows the Varimax rotated factor loadings for the factors of financial variables. These 
factors represent latent financial paths. The number of factors is restricted to three, since using 
Kaiser criterion, the factors that have eigenvalues greater than one are retained for 
interpretation (Kaiser, 1960). According to the table, the three factors account for about 85 
percent of the total variation of the initial variables for the firms. The highest loadings, noted 
in bold in the table, show that each factor has special characteristics of its own. Factor 1 is 
strongly associated to ETA while Factor 2 is connected to the liquidity of the company (FATA). 
Factor 3 links the size of the firm (ln assets) and EBIT. The loading of EBIT is negative.  
 
Table 3. Rotated factor loadings 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
FATA -0,070 0,898 -0,178 
LN ASSETS 0,002 -0,371 0,839 
EBIT -0,551 -0,369 -0,588 
ETA 0,946 -0,125 0,031 
Variance explained by the factor: 39,267 28,771 16,546 
Cumulative proportion of total variance: 39,267 68,039 84,585 
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After the factor analysis, the factor scores are used as inputs in cluster analysis to group the 
firms together. The cluster analysis method used here is hierarchical clustering, represented by 
a two-dimensional diagram known as a dendogram (Appendix 3). The horizontal axis of the 
dendogram shows the linkage distance, and each node in the graph (a new cluster formed) 
represents the distance at which the elements are linked together into a new single cluster. The 
dendogram shows that the number of six clusters is a good discriminator and any additional 
cluster would focus on marginal information that cannot be integrated into the other clusters 
(Greenacre, 1984; Lebart, Morineau and Warwick, 1984). Hence, six clusters are retained at a 
linkage distance of 0.10. The first cluster of failed firms contains 22 firms, while the second 
cluster includes 38 firms, the third 24, the fourth 33, the fifth 23, and the sixth cluster 17 firms. 
Thus, the Hypothesis 1 is supported due to a finding of six distinct independent clusters.  
 
To examine the financial paths of firms, the median values of financial variables for the clusters 
of firms are presented in Appendix 4. The values are presented for the pre-filing year, for the 
year of filing, and the subsequent years. However, due to interruptions during the 
reorganization process, the number of firms is not the same for all years and therefore the 
financial paths only encompass firms continuing their reorganization processes. The Kruskal-
Wallis test is applied to interpret the differences between the financial paths. The results of the 
test reveal significant differences in financial paths. More precisely, LN ASSETS is statistically 
significantly different between the financial paths every year, while ETA, EBIT, FATA, and 
OPCF are statistically significantly different between the paths during several years. The 
differences are particularly evident during the pre-filing year. 
 
As stated earlier, the financial paths presented in Appendix 4 demonstrate the values of 
financial variables for the remaining firms, or the ones that did not fail during the 
reorganization process. As can be seen in the appendix, the first type of financial path 
characterizes large firms (n=22) with relatively stable financial variables. More precisely, LN 
ASSETS, EBIT, and FATA do not fluctuate much over the years. While ETATA is higher in 
year 10 in comparison to year -1, OPCF is lower in year 10 than in year -1. The second type of 
path represents relatively small firms (n=38) that have problems with solvency and profitability 
as well as sudden changes in liquidity and cash flow. ETATA is extremely low in year 10 (-
45.19) and the lowest among the clusters of firms. The third type of financial path encompasses 
firms (n=34) with increasing liquidity and solvency but decreasing profitability. The cash flow 
increases through the years but in year 10, it collapses. The firms are relatively stable in terms 
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of LN ASSETS. The firms (n=33) following the fourth path show positive development 
through the years, and are relatively stable in terms of size and liquidity. While solvency and 
cash flow increase through the years, profitability decreases. Similarly, the fifth type of path 
characterizes firms (n=23) whose financial variables are stable or developing positively. 
Moreover, their cash flow and liquidity are the highest among the clusters of firms. However, 
the firms in Cluster 5 interrupt their reorganization process earlier than the other firms, 
evidenced by the fact that only five firms continued under the reorganization process after the 
first year. The sixth path represents firms (n=17) with drastically changing liquidity, cash 
flows, and size. Their solvency is increasing from extremely low to higher values, but 
profitability is decreasing through the years. The amount of interruptions during the first years 
is also high in this group, and after the second year in reorganization, only six firms continued 
their proceedings. The development of financial variables is summarized in Table 4. In table 4 
it is shown that the financial paths of the firms in clusters are different.  
 
Table 4. The development of values of financial variables 
 
Ln assets EBIT/TA FATA ETA OPCF/TA 
Cluster 1 Increasing Stable Stable Increasing Decreasing 
Cluster 2 Decreasing Decreasing Varying Decreasing Varying 
Cluster 3 Stable Decreasing Increasing Increasing Varying 
Cluster 4 Stable Decreasing Stable Increasing Increasing 
Cluster 5 Stable Stable Stable Increasing Increasing 
Cluster 6 Varying Decreasing Varying Increasing Varying 
 
4.3 Additional tests 
 
The analyses in the previous sections indicate that the financial paths are different within the 
firms. Next, the differences in non-financial information between all clusters are examined by 
using a Kruskal-Wallis test. The results of the test, reported in Appendix 5, show that the only 
statistically significant differences between all clusters of firms are age of the firm, number of 
employees, and number of reorganization programs confirmed. However, several critical 
observations should be noted. The firms following Path 5 (Cluster 5) seem to differ from other 
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firms in terms of several variables. With a mean age of only 20 months, they are the youngest. 
The number of employees is high as well. Moreover, the number of reorganizations started is 
lowest in this cluster (70 percent) and only 26 percent of those that file a petition for 
reorganization receive a confirmed reorganization plan. In contrast, in Cluster 2, 71 percent of 
the firms have their reorganization programs confirmed. In Cluster 5, only 13 percent of firms 
complete their reorganization programs. Furthermore, only 13 percent of the firms in this 
cluster are reorganized under the courts of Helsinki, Espoo, or Vantaa, which are the largest 
courts in Finland. In contrast, in Cluster 3 almost 40 percent of the firms are reorganized under 
these courts. Appendix 5 also shows that the oldest firms are in Cluster 1, where 32 percent of 
the firms complete their reorganization programs. The firms in Clusters 4 and 6 seem to be 
most similar in terms of non-financial variables.  
 
4.4 Summary 
 
The findings reported in the previous sections demonstrate that there are several differences 
among the firms following the six financial paths. The firms following Path 1 (Cluster 1) are 
more successful, as 32 percent have completed their reorganization programs. This may be 
because these firms are older, larger, and have relatively stable financial variables. For those 
firms following Path 2, the confirmation rate of reorganization plans is high (71 percent), but 
76 percent have interrupted the reorganization process. One reason for the interruptions may 
be the larger number of confirmed reorganization plans. The characteristics of the firms may 
also be a factor, as the firms are smaller, have problems with solvency and profitability, and 
show varying liquidity and cash flows during the years. Meanwhile, the firms following Path 
5 differ from other firms in terms of the age of the firm, number of employees, and courts. 
These firms interrupt the reorganization process earlier than other firms, and fully 87 percent 
of the firms interrupt the process. However, the firms following Path 5 have financial variables 
that are stable or developing positively. 
 
  
 Acta Wasaensia 141 
 22 
4.5 Testing hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 to determine survival prospects of firms 
 
In the current study, the Cox proportional hazards model is used to explain the survival 
prospects of firms. The factor scores obtained in factor analysis of pre-filing financial variables, 
as well as non-financial variables, are used in the analyses. Therefore, three different types of 
models are used. The first model uses the factor scores obtained in factor analysis of financial 
variables, the second includes non-financial information, and the third examines the 
combination effect of factor scores and non-financial information. The results of the statistical 
tests are presented in Tables 5–7.  
 
 
Table 5. Statistical model based on the pre-filing financial information 
Panel 1. Goodness-of-fit tests of the Cox regression model 
- 2 Log Likelihood functions Overall (score) Change from previous block 
Model Initial Chi-square p-value Chi-square p-value 
1191,08 1197,463 6,481 0,09 6,387 0,094 
Panel 2. Parameters of the model 1 
 
 
Panel 2 of Table 5 reveals that Factor 2 is highly significant. The significant positive 
relationship between Factor 2 and survival time indicates that the higher the value of this factor, 
the longer the survival time in reorganization. Factor 2 is especially linked to pre-filing 
liquidity, suggesting pre-filing liquidity may be connected to survival time. Thus, this result 
partially supports Hypothesis 2. In prior studies, similar results regarding the importance of 
pre-filing liquidity have been found (see Routledge and Gadenne, 2000; Laitinen, 2013). The 
goodness-of-fit tests of the model 1 imply that the Cox regression model differs only slightly 
from zero (Panel 1). 
 
 
  Coefficient Wald-statistic p-value 
Factor  1  0,135 1,806 0,179 
Factor 2  0,198 4,551 0,033** 
Factor 3  -0,074 0,549 0,459 
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Table 6. Statistical model based on the non-financial information 
Panel 1. Goodness-of-fit tests of the Cox regression model 
- 2 Log Likelihood functions Overall (score) Change from previous block 
Model Initial Chi-square p-value Chi-square p-value 
1182,484 1197,463 14,684 ,197 14,979 0,183 
Panel 2. Parameters of the model 2                                                                                                
 
Panel 2 of Table 6 shows a significant negative relationship between industry (dummy: 
manufacturing) and survival time, indicating that the likelihood of survival is higher when the 
industry is not manufacturing. Such a result partially supports Hypothesis 3. Previous research 
demonstrates that industry classification has been found to be a significant predictor of the 
reorganization outcome (see e.g., LoPucki, 1983; Hotchkiss, 1995; Campbell, 1996). However, 
goodness-of-fit tests of the model 2 imply that the Cox regression model does not differ from 
zero (Panel 1). 
 
Variable Coefficient Wald p-value 
Court 0,276 1,722 0,189 
Age of the firm -,013 1,404 ,236 
Number of employees 0,064 1,066 0,3083 
Industry service ,000 ,000 ,999 
Industry manufacturing -,424 4,251 0,039** 
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Table 7. Statistical model based on financial and non-financial information 
Panel 1. Goodness-of-fit tests of the Cox regression model 
- 2 Log Likelihood functions Overall (score) Change from previous block 
Model Initial Chi-square p-value Chi-square p-value 
1178,174 1197,463 19,348 0,152 19,289 0,154 
Panel 2. Parameters of the model 3.                                                                                             
Variable Coefficient Wald p-value 
Court 0,280 1,737 0,188 
Age -0,011 0,937 0,333 
Number of employees 0,072 1,075 0,2844 
Manufacturing -0,361 2,985 0,084* 
Service 0,079 0,089 0,765 
Factor 1 0,096 0,862 0,353 
Factor 2 0,184 3,516 0,061* 
Factor 3 -0,058 0,241 0,624 
 
Panel 2 of Table 7 indicates that the results of the combined model do not outperform the 
financial and non-financial models, because the only statistically significant variables are 
Factor 2 and industry (dummy: manufacturing). These are the same variables as in models 1 
and 2. Moreover, industry (dummy:manufacturing) is only marginally significant. Thus, the 
empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis 4. This result is not consistent with prior 
literature emphasizing the combination effect of financial and non-financial variables in failure 
prediction models (see e.g., Peel and Peel, 1987; Keasey and Watson, 1987, 1988; Shumway, 
2001; Back, 2005). The goodness-of-fit tests of the model 3 imply that the Cox regression 
model does not differ from zero (Panel 1). 
 
 
4.6 Classification accuracy of the models 
 
Table 8 shows the classification accuracies for the three types of models. Model 1 contains pre-
filing financial information, model 2 non-financial information and model 3 is a combined 
model. The classification accuracies for the 200 bootstrapping samples and the estimation 
sample are presented in Panels 1–3. The bootstrapping samples are randomly selected so that 
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the proportion of failed firms varies across the samples, reflecting real-world conditions, where 
the proportion of failed firms is not constant or known. Panel 4 shows more general 
classification accuracy in terms of the accuracy ratio (AR).  
 
 
Table 8. Classification accuracy of the models  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Panel 1. Correctly classified non-failed firms (n=28)       
Estimation sample 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Lower quartile 0,922 0,922 0,922 
Median 0,945 0,945 0,945 
Upper quartile 0,964 0,964 0,964 
Panel 2. Correctly classified failed firms (n=139)       
Estimation sample 0,796 0,796 0,796 
Lower quartile 0,439 0,439 0,441 
Median 0,468 0,470 0,473 
Upper quartile 0,571 0,571 0,587 
Panel 3. Overall classification accuracy (%)       
Estimation sample 0,873 0,873 0,873 
Lower quartile 0,689 0,689 0,689 
Median 0,708 0,708 0,719 
Upper quartile 0,755 0,755 0,762 
Panel 4. Accuracy ratio (AR) in the estimation sample 0,990 0,978 0,968 
 
In bootstrapping samples the firms are first divided into two groups in terms of cut-off value 
to test the classification accuracy of the models. The cut-off value is calculated from the 
survival function representing the survival time, denoting which firms are expected to fail and 
which are expected to survive. The cut-off value is chosen to be 0.77, which is the cut off point 
for failed and non-failed firms in the estimation sample. Therefore, firms with a probability of 
survival greater than 0.77 are expected to survive and the firms with a probability of survival 
equal or lower to 0.77 are expected to fail. 
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According to the results presented in Table 8, the financial, non-financial, and combined 
models perform equally in the estimation sample. All models correctly classify all non-failed 
firms and approximately 80 percent of failed firms. Overall classification accuracy is 87 
percent. In the bootstrapping samples, the financial and non-financial models are only slightly 
outperformed by the combined model when the overall classification accuracy and the 
classification accuracy of failed firms are compared. The classification accuracies are very low 
in bootstrapping samples, especially among failed firms (0.439-0,587). However, ARs in the 
estimation sample are very high for all models, although it is highest for the model 1, 
approximately 99 percent.  
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5. Summary and discussion 
 
 
In this paper we examine Finnish small firms (n=167) filing a petition for reorganization under 
the FCRA. More precisely, the financial paths of reorganizing firms and the connection 
between pre-filing financial and non-financial variables and survival time in reorganization are 
examined. This pre-filing information reflects the financial position of the firm before filing 
for reorganization. Our empirical analysis is motivated by the documented differences between 
failure processes of bankruptcy firms. Moreover, the existing accounting literature suggests 
that non-financial information should be taken into account when predicting reorganization 
outcome.  
 
Our empirical findings indicate that six financial paths can be found in terms of pre-filing 
profitability, solvency, liquidity, size, and cash flow. This indicates that financial paths, rather 
than a single annual account, should be considered when predicting failure in reorganization. 
Thus, the Hypothesis 1 is supported. The findings further imply that the pre-filing financial 
information is at least partially connected to survival time since a pre-filing liquidity variable 
is statistically significant. This evidence supports hypothesis 2 partially. Similarly, one non-
financial variable, industry (dummy: manufacturing), is statistically significant in model 3, 
indicating that the likelihood of survival is higher when the industry is not manufacturing. 
Thus, the hypothesis 3 is as well partially supported. The hypothesis 4, combining pre-filing 
financial information and non-financial information, is not supported, as there are two 
marginally statistically significant variables in the model. These variables are industry 
(dummy: manufacturing) and a pre-filing liquidity variable. Therefore, the combined model 
does not outperform the financial model. These findings can be used by courts when examining 
which types of firms would be able to successfully reorganize and by stakeholders when 
preparing a reorganization plan. The goodness-of-fit tests show that in terms of chi-square 
statistics, the model related to financial information outperforms the non-financial and 
combined models. 
 
We acknowledge several limitations in our empirical analysis. First, our sample consists of 
small limited companies. Therefore, our findings may not be applicable to larger firms or 
proprietorships and partnerships. Second, the sample of the study was small and we 
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concentrated only on firms filing for reorganization during two years. Therefore this study is 
more exploratory in nature and aims to help building theory. In further research, larger sample 
size could be applied by using cohorts from several years. Third, the samples for the post-filing 
years were unequal due to interrupted reorganizations. Hence, the financial variables 
demonstrated the financial paths of the remaining firms only. Finally, the study focused only 
on Finnish firms, and therefore, it is uncertain to which extent our results apply in other settings. 
 
 
Acknowledgements  
 
This study was supported by grants from The Foundation for Economic Education 
(Liikesivistysrahasto), Finnish Foundation for Economic and Technology Sciences – KAUTE, 
Marcus Wallenberg Foundation, Evald and Hilda Nissi Foundation and Oskar Öflund 
Foundation.  
  
148 Acta Wasaensia
 29 
 
References 
 
Altman, E. I., & Narayanan, P. (1997). An international survey of business failure classification 
models. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 6(2), 1-57. 
Altman, E. and Hotchkiss, E. (2006). Predict and avoid bankruptcy, analyze and invest in 
distressed debt. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons 
Altman, E. I., Sabato, G., & Wilson, N. (2008). The value of qualitative information in SME 
risk management. Journal of Financial Services Research, 40(2), 15-55. 
Altman, E. I., Sabato, G. and Wilson, N. (2010). The value of non-financial information in 
small and medium-sized enterprise risk management. The Journal of Credit Risk, 6(2), 95. 
Argenti, J. (1976). Corporate Collapse: the Causes and Symptoms, Mc Graw-Hill, Londen. 
Back, P. (2005) Explaining financial difficulties based on previous payment behavior, 
management background variables and financial ratios, European Accounting Review, 
14(4), 839–868. 
Balcaen, S. and Ooghe, H. (2006). 35 years of studies on business failure: an overview of the 
classic statistical methodologies and their related problems, The British Accounting Review, 
38(1), 63–93. 
Barniv, R., Agarwal, A. and Leach, R. (2002). Predicting bankruptcy resolution, Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, 29(3/4), 497–520. 
Bulow, J. and Shoven, J. (1978). The bankruptcy decision, Bell Journal of Economics, 9(2), 
437–456. 
Campbell, S.V. (1996). Predicting bankruptcy reorganization for closely held firms, 
Accounting Horizons, 10(3), 12–25.   
Catanach Jr, A. H., & Perry, S. E. (2001). An evaluation of the survival model's contribution 
to thrift institution distress prediction, Journal of Managerial Issues, 401-417.  
Charitou, A. & Lambertides, N. (2003). Earnings management prior to bankruptcy, Working 
Paper, University of Cyprus, 1–46. 
Couwenberg, O. (2001). Survival rates in bankruptcy systems: overlooking the evidence. 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 12(3), 253–273. 
Crutzen, N. & van Caillie, D. (2010). Towards a taxonomy of explanatory failure patterns for 
small firms: a quantitative research, Review of Business and Economics, 55(4), 438-462. 
 Acta Wasaensia 149 
 30 
D’Aveni, R.A. (1989) The aftermath of organizational decline: a longitudinal study of the 
strategic and managerial characteristics of declining firms, Academy of Management 
Journal, 32(3), 577–605. 
Dambolena, I. G., & Khoury, S. J. (1980). Ratio stability and corporate failure. The Journal of 
Finance, 35(4), 1017-1026. 
Dimitras, A., Zanakis, S. & Zopoudinis, C. (1996). A survey of business failures with an 
emphasis on failure prediction methods and industrial applications, European Journal of 
Operational Research, 90(3), 487–513. 
Dirickx, Y. and Van Landeghem, G. (1994). Statistical failure prevision problems, Tijdschrift 
voor Economie en Management, 39(4), 429–462. 
Duffie, D., Saita, L., & Wang, K. (2007). Multi-period corporate default prediction with 
stochastic covariates, Journal of Financial Economics, 83(3), 635-665. 
Du Jardin, P. (2010). Predicting bankruptcy using neural networks and other classification 
methods: The influence of variable selection techniques on model 
accuracy, Neurocomputing, 73(10), 2047-2060. 
Du Jardin, P. (2015). Bankruptcy prediction using terminal failure processes, European 
Journal of Operational Research, 242(1), 286-303. 
Eisenberg, T., & Tagashira, S. (1994). Should we abolish Chapter 11? The evidence from 
Japan, The Journal of Legal Studies, 23(1), 111-157. 
Fabrigar, L.R., Wegener, D.T., MacCallum, R.C. and Strahan, E.J. (1999). Evaluating the use 
of exploratory factor analysis in psychological research, Psychological Methods, 4(3), 272-
299. 
Fisher, T. C. and Martel, J. (1995). Creditors' financial reorgaization decision: New evidence 
from canadian data, the. JL Econ.& Org., 11(1), 112.  
Fisher, T.C. and Martel, J. (2004). Empirical estimates of filtering failure in court-supervised 
reorganization. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 1(1), 143-164. 
Fisher, T.C. (2007). Discussion of Wong et al., Abacus, 43(3), í 
Frost-Drury, A., Greinke, A. & Shailer, G. (1998). Distinguishing distressed companies 
choosing voluntary administration. Paper presented at AAANZ Annual Conference, 
Adelaine. 
Greenacre, M.J. (1984). Theory of Applications of Correspondence Analysis. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Hotchkiss, E.S. (1995). Postbankruptcy performance and management turnover, The Journal 
of Finance, 50(1), 3-21. 
150 Acta Wasaensia
 31 
Jensen-Conklin, S. (1992). Do confirmed Chapter 11 plans consummate? The results of a study 
and analysis of the law, Commercial Law Journal, 97(3), í 
Johnson, C.G. (1970). Ratio analysis and the prediction of firm failure, Journal of Finance, 
25(5), 1166–1168. 
Jones, F.L. (1987). Current techniques in bankruptcy prediction, Journal of Accounting 
Literature, 6(1), 131–164.  
Kaiser, H.F. (1960). The application of electronic computers to factor analysis. Educational 
and Psychological Measurement, 20, 141-151.  
Keasey, K. and Watson, R. (1987). Non-financial symptoms and the prediction of small 
company failure: a test of Argenti’s hypotheses, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
14(3), 335–354. 
Keasey, K. and Watson, R. (1988). The non-submission of accounts and small company 
financial failure prediction, Accounting and Business Research, 19(73), 47-54. 
Keats, B. and Bracker, J. (1988). Toward a theory of small firm performance: A conceptual 
model, American Journal of Small Business, 12(4), 41-58. 
Laakso, T. (2012). Yrityssaneerausohjelman onnistuminen: käyttäytymistieteellinen 
näkökulma. Aalto University publication series. Doctoral dissertations.  
Laitinen, E.K. (1991). Financial ratios and different failure processes, Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, 18(5), 649–673.  
Laitinen, E.K. (1992). Prediction of failure of a newly founded firm, Journal of 
BusinessVenturing, 7(4), 323–340.  
Laitinen, E.K. (1993). Financial predictors for different phases of the failure process, Omega, 
21(2), 215–228. 
Laitinen, E.K. (2005). Survival analysis and financial distress prediction: Finnish evidence, 
Review of Accounting and Finance, 4(4), 76–90.  
Laitinen, E.K. (2011). Effect of reorganization actions on the financial performance of small 
entrepreneurial distressed firms, Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, 7(1), 57 
– 95. 
Laitinen, E. K. (2013). Financial and non–financial variables in predicting failure of small 
business reorganisation, International Journal of Accounting and Finance, 4(1), 1-34.  
Laitinen, E.K and Lukason, O. (2014). Do firm failure processes differ across countries: 
evidence from Finland and Estonia, Journal of Business Economics and Management, 
15(5), 810-832. 
 Acta Wasaensia 151 
 32 
Lebart, L., Morineau, A. and Warwick, K.M. (1984). Multivariate Descriptive Statistical 
Analysis: Correspondence Analysis and Related Techniques for Large Matrices. New York: 
Wiley. 
LeClere, M. J. (2000). The occurrence and timing of events: Survival analysis applied to the 
study of financial distress. Journal of Accounting Literature, 19, 158. 
Lensberg, T., Eilifsen, A. and McKee, T. E. (2006). Bankruptcy theory development and 
classification via genetic programming, European Journal of Operational Research, 169(2), 
677-697.  
LoPucki, L.M. (1983). The debtor in full control – systems failure under chapter 11 of the 
bankruptcy code?, American Bankruptcy Law Journal, 57, 99–126. 
LoPucki, L.M. and Doherty, J.W. (2002). Why are Delaware and New York bankruptcy 
reorganizations failing?, Vanderbilt Law Review, 55(6), 1933–1985. 
LoPucki, L.M. and Kalin, S.D. (2001). The failure of public company bankruptcies in Delaware 
and New York: empirical evidence of a ‘race to the bottom’’, Vanderbilt Law Review, 54(2), 
231–283. 
Luoma, M. and Laitinen, E.K. (1991). Survival analysis as a tool for company failure 
prediction, Omega International Journal of Management Science, 19(6), 673–678. 
Micha, B. (1984). Analysis of business failures in France, Journal of Banking and Finance, 
8(2), 281–291. 
Moulton, W. N., Thomas, H., and Pruett, M. (1996). Business failure pathways: environmental 
stress and organizational response. Journal of Management, 22(4), 571–593. 
Ooghe, Hubert, and Sofie De Prijcker (2008). Failure processes and causes of company 
bankruptcy: a typology, Management Decision, 46(2), 223-242. 
Partington, G., Russel, P., Stevenson, M. and Torbey, V. (2001). Predicting the return outcomes 
to shareholders from companies entering Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Managerial Finance, 
27(4), í 
Peel, M. and Peel, D.  (1987) Some further empirical evidence on predicting private company 
failure, Accounting and Business Research, 18(69), 57-66. 
Philippe and Partners, Deloitte and Touche Corporate Finance (2002). Bankruptcy and a Fresh 
Start: Stigma on Failure and Legal Consequences of Bankruptcy. Brussels.  
Poston, K.M., Harmon, W.K. and Gramlich, J.D. (1994). A test of financial ratios as predictors 
of turnaround versus failure among financially distressed firms. Journal of Applied Business 
Research, 10(1), 41–56.  
152 Acta Wasaensia
 33 
Routledge, J. & Gadenne, D. (2000). Financial distress, reorganization and corporate 
performance, Accounting and Finance, 40(3), 233–259. 
Scott, J. (1981). The probability of bankruptcy, Journal of Banking and Finance, 5(3), 317–
344. 
Sheppard, J. and Chowdhury, S. (2005). Riding the wrong wave: Organizational failure as a 
failed turnaround. Long Range Planning, 38(3), 239-260. 
Shumway, T. (2001). Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: A simple hazard model, The 
Journal of Business, 74(1), 101-124. 
Smith, M., and Liou, D. K. (2007). Industrial sector and financial distress, Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 22(4), 376-391. 
Sobehart, J.R., Keenan, S.C., Stein, R.M. (2000). Benchmarking quantitative default risk 
models: A validation methodology, Moodys Investors Service.  
Statsoft (2001). Statistica for Windows (Volume III): Statistics II (2nd ed.). USA: Statsoft 
IncStorey, D. 
Sundgren, S (1998). Does a Reorganization Law Improve the Efficiency of the Insolvency 
Law? The Finnish Experience, European Journal of Law and Economics, 6(2), 177–198. 
Turetsky, H. F., & McEwen, R. A. (2001). An empirical investigation of firm longevity: a 
model of the ex ante predictors of financial distress. Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting, 16(4), 323-343. 
Ward, J.H. (1963). Hierarchical grouping to optimize an objective function, Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 58(301), 236–244. 
Weitzel, W. and  Jonsson, E. (1989). Decline in organizations: a literature integration and 
extension', Administrative Science Quarterly, 34(1), 91-109. 
White, M. (1980). Public policy toward bankruptcy: me-first and other priority rules. Bell 
Journal of Economics, 11, 550–564.  
White, M. (1984). Bankruptcy, liquidation and reorganization. In D. Logue (Ed.), Handbook 
of modern finance. New York: Warren, Gorham and Lamont.  
White, M. (1989). The corporate bankruptcy decision. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 
129–152 
Wong, B., Partington, G., Stevenson, M. and Torbey, V. (2007). Surviving chapter 11 
bankruptcies: Duration and payoff?, Abacus, 43(3), 363-387.  
Zavgren, C. (1983). The prediction of corporate failure: the state of the art. Journal of 
Accounting Literature, 2 (1), 1-38. 
 Acta Wasaensia 153 
 34 
 Zavgren, C. V. and Friedman, G. E. (1988). Are bankruptcy prediction models worthwhile? 
An application in securities analysis, Management International Review, 28(1), 34-44. 
  
154 Acta Wasaensia
 
35
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
1.
  
  
 
Fa
ile
d 
 
 
 
N
on
-f
ai
le
d 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
M
ea
n 
St
d 
D
ev
 
M
in
im
um
 M
ax
im
um
 
N
 
M
ed
ia
n 
M
ea
n 
St
d 
D
ev
 
M
in
im
um
 M
ax
im
um
 
N
 
M
ed
ia
n 
K
W
 te
st
 
re
su
lts
 
FA
TA
 -1
 
30
,0
78
 
22
,5
85
 
2,
49
0 
77
,3
94
 
11
3 
23
,1
53
 
24
,5
98
 
19
,0
74
 
2,
49
0 
77
,3
94
 
33
 
20
,5
04
 
0,
25
06
 
FA
TA
 0
 
27
,5
37
 
21
,2
49
 
2,
78
2 
80
,7
36
 
75
 
23
,0
19
 
29
,5
63
 
20
,6
56
 
2,
78
2 
80
,7
36
 
37
 
23
,3
14
 
0,
46
73
 
O
PC
F 
0 
88
,3
56
 
67
,9
05
 
3,
74
3 
28
6,
27
4 
74
 
78
,0
32
 
95
,0
13
 
81
,3
20
 
3,
74
3 
28
6,
27
4 
37
 
75
,4
72
 
0,
87
08
 
LN
 A
SS
ET
S 
-1
 
13
,0
73
 
1,
19
3 
11
,1
98
 
15
,6
23
 
11
3 
12
,9
18
 
13
,4
09
 
1,
34
3 
11
,1
98
 
15
,6
23
 
33
 
13
,4
45
 
0,
19
49
 
LN
 A
SS
ET
S 
0 
12
,9
61
 
1,
28
1 
10
,8
95
 
15
,6
16
 
76
 
12
,8
57
 
13
,3
23
 
1,
27
6 
10
,8
95
 
15
,6
16
 
37
 
13
,1
75
 
0,
17
63
 
EB
IT
 -1
 
6,
09
0 
3,
75
9 
1,
66
2 
17
,1
36
 
11
3 
4,
94
4 
6,
97
7 
4,
39
6 
1,
66
2 
17
,1
36
 
33
 
6,
15
8 
0,
32
46
 
EB
IT
 0
 
7,
36
5 
4,
34
9 
1,
15
6 
15
,2
18
 
76
 
6,
57
2 
7,
04
6 
3,
79
5 
1,
15
6 
15
,2
18
 
37
 
6,
42
4 
0,
88
81
 
ET
A
 -1
 
-
10
,9
27
 
28
,0
85
 
-7
9,
51
4 
27
,9
10
 
11
3 
-0
,8
53
 
-
16
,3
52
 
30
,8
20
 
-7
9,
51
4 
27
,9
10
 
33
 
-9
,0
15
 
0,
36
03
 
ET
A
 0
 
-
49
,9
44
 
61
,1
62
 
-2
26
,0
49
 
27
,8
23
 
76
 
-3
0,
58
3 
-
43
,7
04
 
73
,6
50
 
-2
26
,0
49
 
27
,8
23
 
37
 
-2
1,
41
0 
0,
21
42
 
 Acta Wasaensia 155 
 
36
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
2.
 
 
 
C
ou
rt
 
A
ge
 
N
um
be
r 
of
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 
Se
rv
ic
e 
E
T
A
T
A
 
E
B
IT
T
A
 
L
N
 
A
SS
E
TS
 
FA
T
A
 
C
ou
rt
 
1 
0,
30
07
9 
0,
01
34
2 
0,
11
44
 
0,
04
28
3 
0,
01
96
3 
0,
01
96
2 
0,
02
56
9 
-0
,1
90
63
 
 
 
<.
00
01
 
0,
86
33
 
0,
14
1 
0,
58
26
 
0,
81
4 
0,
81
42
 
0,
75
82
 
0,
02
12
 
A
ge
 
0,
30
07
9 
1 
0,
43
68
6 
0,
19
83
8 
-0
,0
77
99
 
0,
00
22
9 
0,
00
32
2 
0,
38
56
1 
-0
,0
77
26
 
 
<.
00
01
 
 
<.
00
01
 
0,
01
02
 
0,
31
64
 
0,
97
81
 
0,
96
92
 
<.
00
01
 
0,
35
4 
N
um
be
r 
of
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
0,
01
34
2 
0,
43
68
6 
1 
0,
25
19
5 
-0
,1
55
66
 
0,
06
60
6 
-0
,0
79
12
 
0,
57
56
7 
0,
00
01
3 
 
0,
86
33
 
<.
00
01
 
 
0,
00
1 
0,
04
46
 
0,
42
83
 
0,
34
25
 
<.
00
01
 
0,
99
88
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 
0,
11
44
 
0,
19
83
8 
0,
25
19
5 
1 
-0
,3
07
1 
-0
,0
90
54
 
0,
11
67
1 
0,
24
62
4 
-0
,0
70
62
 
 
0,
14
1 
0,
01
02
 
0,
00
1 
 
<.
00
01
 
0,
27
71
 
0,
16
07
 
0,
00
27
 
0,
39
7 
Se
rv
ic
e 
0,
04
28
3 
-0
,0
77
99
 
-0
,1
55
66
 
-0
,3
07
1 
1 
0,
06
58
9 
0,
16
07
3 
-0
,1
31
27
 
-0
,1
03
52
 
 
0,
58
26
 
0,
31
64
 
0,
04
46
 
<.
00
01
 
 
0,
42
94
 
0,
05
26
 
0,
11
43
 
0,
21
37
 
E
T
A
T
A
 
0,
01
96
3 
0,
00
22
9 
0,
06
60
6 
-0
,0
90
54
 
0,
06
58
9 
1 
-0
,3
55
74
 
0,
19
27
 
-0
,0
66
35
 
 
0,
81
4 
0,
97
81
 
0,
42
83
 
0,
27
71
 
0,
42
94
 
 
<.
00
01
 
0,
01
98
 
0,
42
62
 
E
B
IT
T
A
 
0,
01
96
2 
0,
00
32
2 
-0
,0
79
12
 
0,
11
67
1 
0,
16
07
3 
-0
,3
55
74
 
1 
-0
,1
74
45
 
-0
,0
05
14
 
 
0,
81
42
 
0,
96
92
 
0,
34
25
 
0,
16
07
 
0,
05
26
 
<.
00
01
 
 
0,
03
52
 
0,
95
09
 
L
N
 A
SS
E
TS
 
0,
02
56
9 
0,
38
56
1 
0,
57
56
7 
0,
24
62
4 
-0
,1
31
27
 
0,
19
27
 
-0
,1
74
45
 
1 
-0
,3
26
11
 
 
0,
75
82
 
<.
00
01
 
<.
00
01
 
0,
00
27
 
0,
11
43
 
0,
01
98
 
0,
03
52
 
 
<.
00
01
 
FA
T
A
 
-0
,1
90
63
 
-0
,0
77
26
 
0,
00
01
3 
-0
,0
70
62
 
-0
,1
03
52
 
-0
,0
66
35
 
-0
,0
05
14
 
-0
,3
26
11
 
1 
 
0,
02
12
 
0,
35
4 
0,
99
88
 
0,
39
7 
0,
21
37
 
0,
42
62
 
0,
95
09
 
<.
00
01
 
 
  
 
156 Acta Wasaensia
 
37
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
3.
 
 
 Acta Wasaensia 157 
 
38
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
4.
  
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
N
 
C
lu
st
er
 1
 
N
 
C
lu
st
er
 2
 
N
 
C
lu
st
er
 3
 
N
 
C
lu
st
er
 4
 
N
 
C
lu
st
er
 5
 
N
 
C
lu
st
er
 6
 
K
-W
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
le
ve
l 
ET
A
TA
 -1
 
22
 
-6
,1
4 
17
 
-1
2,
91
 
34
 
6,
73
 
33
 
0,
30
 
23
 
-7
,1
0 
17
 
-5
5,
62
 
0,
00
01
**
* 
ET
A
TA
 0
 
16
 
-3
3,
06
 
34
 
-3
4,
55
 
22
 
-2
,6
2 
22
 
-4
1,
20
 
10
 
-1
8,
91
 
9 
-1
15
,8
8 
0,
00
12
**
 
ET
A
TA
 1
 
14
 
-1
3,
93
 
26
 
-4
,3
1 
17
 
-7
,2
5 
19
 
6,
19
 
5 
-5
7,
93
 
7 
-2
0,
90
 
0,
03
26
**
 
ET
A
TA
 2
 
11
 
-8
,9
1 
17
 
-6
,1
7 
12
 
7,
49
 
12
 
6,
28
 
5 
-7
5,
42
 
5 
-8
,0
1 
0,
10
7 
ET
A
TA
 3
 
9 
-9
,9
6 
13
 
10
,0
2 
10
 
3,
45
 
13
 
7,
63
 
4 
-8
3,
78
 
6 
-1
6,
56
 
0,
03
86
**
 
ET
A
TA
 4
 
9 
-5
,7
8 
13
 
8,
46
 
8 
12
,5
3 
13
 
18
,5
0 
4 
-5
0,
90
 
6 
-1
4,
21
 
0,
07
24
* 
ET
A
TA
 5
 
9 
5,
99
 
12
 
15
,7
7 
9 
12
,5
3 
10
 
22
,6
8 
4 
-1
5,
37
 
4 
-1
,1
5 
0,
40
13
 
ET
A
TA
 6
 
9 
8,
94
 
14
 
11
,5
3 
10
 
19
,0
4 
11
 
22
,1
8 
4 
8,
04
 
4 
29
,9
0 
0,
60
78
 
ET
A
TA
 7
 
9 
0,
25
 
12
 
3,
14
 
7 
32
,4
0 
10
 
16
,6
1 
3 
43
,9
7 
4 
37
,5
9 
0,
40
65
 
ET
A
TA
 8
 
9 
-1
0,
09
 
9 
-4
,3
8 
6 
25
,5
0 
10
 
17
,4
5 
4 
16
,9
2 
3 
83
,9
7 
0,
17
05
 
ET
A
TA
 9
 
8 
6,
31
 
10
 
12
,3
6 
5 
31
,8
7 
8 
21
,4
9 
3 
35
,1
4 
2 
59
,3
2 
0,
18
67
 
ET
A
TA
 1
0 
6 
10
,9
0 
4 
-4
5,
19
 
5 
38
,7
8 
3 
15
,3
4 
2 
38
,2
7 
1 
52
,7
3 
0,
31
87
 
EB
IT
TA
 -1
 
22
 
3,
53
 
17
 
5,
39
 
34
 
4,
62
 
33
 
6,
15
 
23
 
4,
48
 
17
 
12
,3
4 
0,
00
01
**
* 
EB
IT
TA
 0
  
16
 
6,
23
 
34
 
6,
25
 
22
 
5,
34
 
22
 
8,
37
 
10
 
3,
93
 
9 
11
,8
2 
0,
00
89
**
* 
EB
IT
TA
 1
 
14
 
4,
42
 
26
 
2,
82
 
17
 
3,
91
 
19
 
4,
19
 
5 
0,
83
 
7 
4,
28
 
0,
29
73
 
EB
IT
TA
 2
 
11
 
4,
07
 
17
 
2,
76
 
12
 
2,
28
 
12
 
2,
14
 
5 
1,
01
 
5 
2,
01
 
0,
05
33
* 
EB
IT
TA
 3
 
9 
2,
85
 
13
 
3,
17
 
10
 
3,
26
 
13
 
2,
22
 
4 
1,
19
 
5 
1,
65
 
0,
64
56
 
EB
IT
TA
 4
 
9 
3,
96
 
13
 
3,
39
 
8 
2,
62
 
13
 
2,
63
 
4 
0,
64
 
5 
3,
18
 
0,
43
44
 
158 Acta Wasaensia
 
39
 
EB
IT
TA
 5
 
9 
2,
73
 
12
 
3,
61
 
9 
2,
34
 
10
 
5,
41
 
4 
0,
18
 
4 
1,
34
 
0,
05
93
* 
EB
IT
TA
 6
  
9 
4,
51
 
14
 
3,
02
 
10
 
3,
19
 
11
 
4,
30
 
4 
2,
34
 
4 
2,
28
 
0,
50
21
 
EB
IT
TA
 7
 
9 
3,
65
 
12
 
1,
93
 
7 
5,
28
 
10
 
3,
30
 
3 
8,
51
 
4 
0,
71
 
0,
12
38
 
EB
IT
TA
 8
 
9 
2,
73
 
9 
2,
81
 
6 
1,
90
 
10
 
2,
52
 
3 
1,
70
 
3 
0,
83
 
0,
90
05
 
EB
IT
TA
 9
  
8 
2,
88
 
10
 
1,
62
 
5 
3,
14
 
8 
2,
66
 
3 
9,
24
 
2 
3,
38
 
0,
97
95
 
EB
IT
TA
 1
0 
 
6 
3,
33
 
4 
2,
76
 
5 
2,
99
 
3 
3,
48
 
2 
3,
93
 
1 
1,
83
 
0,
96
62
 
FA
TA
 -1
 
22
 
0,
25
 
17
 
0,
26
 
34
 
0,
09
 
33
 
0,
28
 
23
 
0,
68
 
17
 
0,
14
 
0,
00
01
**
* 
FA
TA
 0
 
16
 
0,
30
 
34
 
0,
23
 
21
 
0,
09
 
22
 
0,
30
 
10
 
0,
77
 
9 
0,
23
 
0,
00
01
**
* 
FA
TA
 1
 
14
 
0,
15
 
26
 
0,
31
 
17
 
0,
16
 
19
 
0,
36
 
5 
0,
56
 
7 
0,
13
 
0,
00
01
**
* 
FA
TA
 2
 
11
 
0,
24
 
17
 
0,
30
 
12
 
0,
18
 
12
 
0,
39
 
5 
0,
67
 
5 
0,
22
 
0,
00
46
**
* 
FA
TA
 3
 
9 
0,
39
 
13
 
0,
25
 
10
 
0,
24
 
13
 
0,
33
 
4 
0,
68
 
6 
0,
66
 
0,
07
90
* 
FA
TA
 4
 
9 
0,
27
 
13
 
0,
35
 
8 
0,
36
 
13
 
0,
30
 
4 
0,
75
 
6 
0,
68
 
0,
13
48
 
FA
TA
 5
 
9 
0,
33
 
12
 
0,
34
 
9 
0,
29
 
10
 
0,
25
 
4 
0,
82
 
4 
0,
28
 
0,
08
79
* 
FA
TA
 6
 
9 
0,
19
 
14
 
0,
28
 
10
 
0,
21
 
11
 
0,
27
 
4 
0,
75
 
4 
0,
32
 
0,
06
39
* 
FA
TA
 7
 
9 
0,
17
 
12
 
0,
26
 
7 
0,
29
 
10
 
0,
26
 
3 
0,
79
 
4 
0,
29
 
0,
20
21
 
FA
TA
 8
 
9 
0,
22
 
9 
0,
35
 
6 
0,
20
 
10
 
0,
24
 
4 
0,
76
 
3 
0,
12
 
0,
06
21
* 
FA
TA
 9
 
8 
0,
23
 
10
 
0,
48
 
5 
0,
27
 
8 
0,
31
 
3 
0,
83
 
2 
0,
14
 
0,
16
01
 
FA
TA
 1
0 
6 
0,
24
 
4 
0,
39
 
5 
0,
27
 
3 
0,
23
 
2 
0,
76
 
1 
0,
47
 
0,
16
59
 
O
PC
F 
0 
16
 
91
,6
0 
32
 
63
,4
9 
22
 
35
,3
3 
22
 
64
,0
5 
10
 
13
8,
09
 
9 
76
,3
3 
0,
00
26
* 
O
PC
FT
A
 1
 
14
 
30
,9
9 
26
 
48
,6
3 
17
 
35
,0
5 
19
 
18
,7
3 
5 
28
3,
15
 
7 
12
,9
5 
0,
06
98
* 
O
PC
FT
A
 2
 
11
 
40
,1
3 
17
 
58
,7
1 
12
 
72
,5
4 
12
 
63
,7
5 
5 
11
7,
08
 
5 
34
,9
8 
0,
18
1 
 Acta Wasaensia 159 
 
40
 
O
PC
FT
A
 3
 
9 
53
,5
6 
13
 
71
,2
4 
10
 
80
,3
2 
13
 
60
,4
4 
4 
18
9,
24
 
6 
61
,8
4 
0,
05
94
* 
O
PC
FT
A
 4
 
9 
47
,0
1 
21
 
34
,6
2 
12
 
56
,5
6 
17
 
33
,1
1 
5 
28
3,
15
 
7 
0,
00
 
0,
00
62
**
* 
O
PC
FT
A
 5
 
12
 
49
,6
9 
14
 
90
,7
8 
12
 
50
,1
5 
11
 
75
,1
4 
4 
19
0,
57
 
6 
99
,8
8 
0,
10
15
 
O
PC
F 
6 
9 
10
2,
47
 
14
 
64
,6
9 
10
 
63
,6
6 
11
 
59
,1
0 
4 
25
0,
88
 
4 
20
,5
5 
0,
06
87
* 
O
PC
FT
A
 7
 
9 
63
,4
1 
12
 
60
,2
4 
7 
46
,7
4 
10
 
81
,8
7 
3 
12
7,
48
 
4 
5,
28
 
0,
28
18
 
O
PC
FT
A
 8
 
9 
98
,1
6 
9 
82
,2
6 
6 
47
,0
9 
10
 
70
,8
2 
4 
34
0,
00
 
3 
11
,8
4 
0,
72
37
 
O
PC
FT
A
 9
 
9 
10
3,
10
 
9 
82
,2
6 
6 
37
,5
2 
9 
65
,9
3 
4 
34
8,
50
 
3 
11
,8
4 
0,
53
41
 
O
PC
FT
A
 1
0 
7 
64
,1
8 
4 
63
,5
4 
5 
22
,5
7 
4 
91
,8
3 
2 
34
8,
50
 
1 
15
8,
18
 
0,
54
84
 
LN
 A
SS
ET
S 
-1
 2
2 
15
,1
3 
17
 
13
,3
9 
34
 
13
,5
7 
33
 
12
,1
0 
23
 
12
,3
8 
17
 
12
,9
5 
0,
00
01
**
* 
LN
A
SS
ET
S 
0 
16
 
15
,1
8 
34
 
12
,9
9 
22
 
13
,5
8 
22
 
11
,8
0 
10
 
11
,4
0 
9 
13
,4
5 
0,
00
01
**
* 
LN
A
SS
ET
S 
1 
14
 
14
,8
2 
26
 
13
,0
4 
17
 
13
,2
8 
19
 
11
,9
3 
5 
12
,7
5 
7 
13
,2
8 
0,
00
01
**
* 
LN
A
SS
ET
S 
2 
11
 
14
,8
1 
17
 
12
,9
8 
12
 
13
,2
6 
12
 
11
,9
9 
5 
12
,6
2 
5 
13
,7
1 
0,
00
01
**
* 
LN
A
SS
ET
S 
3 
9 
14
,8
8 
13
 
13
,0
9 
10
 
12
,9
7 
13
 
12
,3
9 
4 
11
,8
9 
6 
13
,9
7 
0,
00
02
**
* 
LN
A
SS
ET
S 
4 
9 
14
,7
9 
13
 
13
,3
1 
8 
12
,9
9 
13
 
12
,4
8 
4 
11
,8
0 
6 
14
,0
9 
0,
00
03
**
* 
LN
A
SS
ET
S 
5 
9 
15
,0
6 
12
 
13
,3
3 
9 
13
,5
0 
10
 
12
,4
5 
4 
12
,0
4 
4 
14
,0
0 
0,
00
03
**
* 
LN
A
SS
ET
S 
6 
9 
15
,3
2 
14
 
12
,7
9 
10
 
13
,3
1 
11
 
12
,3
5 
4 
12
,0
3 
4 
13
,8
7 
0,
00
05
**
* 
LN
A
SS
ET
S 
7 
9 
14
,9
5 
12
 
12
,7
6 
7 
13
,3
9 
10
 
12
,2
6 
3 
11
,8
6 
4 
13
,5
2 
0,
00
15
**
 
LN
A
SS
ET
S 
8 
9 
14
,9
6 
9 
12
,2
8 
6 
13
,2
2 
10
 
12
,3
8 
4 
11
,6
4 
3 
13
,5
9 
0,
02
49
**
 
LN
A
SS
ET
S 
9 
8 
15
,2
4 
10
 
12
,2
9 
5 
13
,3
6 
8 
12
,4
0 
3 
11
,8
3 
2 
12
,8
6 
0,
00
57
**
* 
LN
A
SS
ET
S 
10
 
6 
15
,3
4 
4 
11
,1
2 
5 
13
,4
7 
3 
12
,2
4 
2 
12
,5
9 
1 
10
,9
2 
0,
00
42
**
* 
 
 
160 Acta Wasaensia
 
41
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
5 
    
C
lu
st
er
 1
 
C
lu
st
er
 2
 
C
lu
st
er
 3
 
C
lu
st
er
 4
 
C
lu
st
er
 5
 
C
lu
st
er
 6
 
  
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
M
ea
n 
M
ea
n 
M
ea
n 
M
ea
n 
M
ea
n 
M
ea
n 
K
-W
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
te
st
 
C
ou
rt 
0,
27
3 
0,
21
1 
0,
38
2 
0,
27
3 
0,
13
0 
0,
23
5 
0,
38
82
 
R
eo
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
 fi
ni
sh
ed
 
0,
31
8 
0,
23
7 
0,
23
5 
0,
21
2 
0,
13
0 
0,
29
4 
0,
75
12
 
R
eo
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
 
0,
63
6 
0,
71
1 
0,
64
7 
0,
60
6 
0,
26
1 
0,
64
7 
0,
01
95
**
 
A
ge
 o
f t
he
 fi
rm
 (m
on
th
s)
 
33
,2
27
 
24
,6
58
 
23
,5
59
 
20
,5
45
 
20
,0
00
 
20
,7
65
 
0,
08
16
* 
R
eo
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
0,
72
7 
0,
86
8 
0,
79
4 
0,
84
8 
0,
69
6 
0,
82
4 
0,
55
50
 
R
eo
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
in
te
rr
up
te
d 
0,
68
2 
0,
76
3 
0,
76
5 
0,
78
8 
0,
87
0 
0,
70
6 
0,
75
12
 
N
um
be
r o
f e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
35
,2
5 
8,
35
 
7,
50
 
3,
00
 
35
,0
0 
7,
65
 
0,
00
1*
**
 
 
